Inventing A New Metric: Strength of Schedule

Most of the mainstream statistics, often quoted as they may be, are generally worthless in terms of evaluating the true quality of football teams. And no statistic is more worthless than the one generally used to tabulate strength of schedule.

Here's a list of strength of schedule in 2006, but don't even waste your time clicking the link, it's not worth the time. When strength of schedule is tabulated, how do they do it? Elementary style, that's how. They just add up the cumulative records of a team's individual opponents, do that for every team, and then rank each team based on opponent's winning percentage. At bottom, it's first grade logic mixed with third grade math.

There are just so many things wrong with that approach.

To begin with, teams with equal records are, in fact, not equal. That's a rather simple insight, but nevertheless it is something that the traditional strength of schedule tabulation does not take into consideration. For example, last year the USC Trojans and the TCU Horned Frogs both went 11-2, but is there really any doubt as to who was the far superior team? Of course not, but even so, both teams count the exact same in strength of schedule.

Beyond that, a few outlier teams can drastically sway a team's strength of schedule ranking when using the traditional tabulation. Take Notre Dame in 2006, for example. Critics argued that the Irish weren't particularly good and mainly won ten games because of a weak schedule. Notre Dame defenders, however, quickly pointed to the fact that the Irish schedule wasn't really that bad, and was in fact the 39th toughest out of the 120 FBS teams when using the traditional tabulation. But that's an incomplete response at best. Even if you use the traditional tabulation, once you break it down even further it's a poor argument. In reality, Notre Dame's ten wins came over teams with a combined record of 56-67 (.459 winning percentage). On the other hand, their three losses came against teams with a combined record of 31-5 (.861 winning percentage). At bottom, Notre Dame beat up on combination of the Sisters of the Poor and some mediocre teams, and then were annihilated when they faced good teams. The underlying reality is that you can have a poor schedule as a whole, but play a couple of really good teams and that will sway your strength of schedule rating into looking pretty solid.

Moreover, what about those other odd-ball things that affect games, like injuries? Obviously, those aren't accounted for, but they should be. Take Tennessee in 2006 for example. In a critical stretch (against LSU and Arkansas), Erik Ainge was injured. Now obviously, Tennessee was a much easier opponent without their star quarterback on the field, but in terms of strength of schedule, they go in the books as a 9-4 team regardless of it you faced Ainge or his back-up Johnathon Crompton. Obviously that's not right.

At bottom, without going into further detail, we really need to invent a new metric for determining strength of schedule simply because the current one is effectively meaningless, and because strength of schedule is highly important.

Nothing is concrete as of this minute, but I'm trying to come up with something for the 2007 season.

At the moment, though, I have a few ideas for how the system would work:

• Division 1-AA teams would not count in any way whatsoever.
  

• Non-BCS teams would count, but to a significantly smaller degree. For example, an 11-2 TCU team would not count as much as an 11-2 USC team.
  

• Significant injuries (such as to a quarterback) will make a particular team count less in terms of strength of schedule

• Expand the data by looking at not just wins and losses, but more advanced statistics such as Pythagorean Wins and the like.
  

We'll see as the 2007 season progresses.

The Heisman Pundit Responds

The Heisman Pundit -- almost without doubt the foremost internet authority on all things Heisman -- has read the earlier post here on Outside The Sidelines regarding the Heisman Trophy, and has taken exception to some of the things noted.

If you recall, the money quote from that column was essentially this: "The truth of the matter is that for a player to have any legitimate shot at the Heisman Trophy these days, his team almost certainly has to be playing for the national championship."

The Heisman Pundit had this to say regarding that particular thesis:

"It's really not that simple. In reality, it may be the other way around: To have a shot at the national championship you probably have to have a Heisman Trophy contender. Having one of what people regard as one of the best players in the country playing for your team at an important position like quarterback or running back is invariably a boost to ranking and record. Would Ohio State have made the national title game without Troy Smith under center? Doubt it. And that's the whole point: Heisman contenders usually make the teams, not the other way around.

So let's look at the main argument.

The Heisman Pundit explicitly stated that in order to have a shot at the national championship, you probably have to have a Heisman Trophy contender.

Does that argument have any validity? As best I can tell, no. Far beyond merely contending for the national championship, six national champions have emerged in the past eleven years with no legitimate Heisman Trophy contender whatsoever.

Among that group includes:

2006 Florida: Despite some ESPN rumblings about Chris Leak potentially being a Heisman contender, the Heisman voters never felt that way. Though the Gators were undisputed national champions, according to the expanded Heisman Trophy voting, he was not among the top 11 vote-getters.

2003 LSU: Though the Tigers won the BCS national championship, they did not have a player finish in the top 10 in Heisman balloting in 2003. In reality, they won it with a journeyman quarterback who came to Baton Rouge via Lansing, Michigan and Minor League Baseball (Mauck), and a tailback who was a one-year freshman wonder (Vincent).

2002 Ohio State: The Buckeyes may have shocked the world by knocking off defending national champion Miami in the Fiesta Bowl, but they did so with an unheralded quarterback (Krenzel), and a true freshman tailback (Clarett). No Buckeye finished in the final top 10 in Heisman balloting in 2002.

1999 Florida State: The Seminoles went undefeated and won the national championship with a convincing win over Virginia Tech in the Sugar Bowl, but didn't have a legitimate Heisman contender. Wide receiver Peter Warrick finished sixth in Heisman voting. He ended with approximately one-tenth of the total points as did Heisman Trophy winner Ron Dayne. Perhaps this is a subjective judgment, but I wouldn't consider finishing sixth in Heisman voting with only roughly one-tenth of the total points as the eventual winner legitimately "contending" for the award.

1998 Tennessee: The Volunteers went undefeated in 1998 and won the national championship, but did not have a player finish in the final top ten in Heisman voting. What's more, Florida State, the Volunteers opponent in the first ever BCS national championship game, did not have a player finish in the final top ten in Heisman voting, either.

1997 Nebraska: Though the Corhuskers went undefeated and won the third and final national championship for Tom Osbourne, they did not have a player finish in the final top ten in Heisman voting in 1997.

So, as noted earlier, that argument just doesn't seem to have very much validity. There have been, in my eyes, entirely too many national champions the past several years that have done so with no legitimate Heisman contender whatsoever for that argument to have any real validity.

Now, let's move to the other corollary of that argument:

"And that's the whole point: Heisman contenders usually make the teams, not the other way around."

On that point, I'd have to disagree. Successful teams, at bottom, are not about having one great player, but instead are about having great players at nearly every position, from top-to-bottom on the depth chart. To say that one player "makes" the team, in my eyes, is absurd. Certainly one player can be highly important to your team's overall successes, no doubt there. However, if all you have is one incredible player, you don't have very much, and aren't going to go very far. Calvin Johnson and 9-5 Georgia Tech provide the textbook example. Troy Smith and the Ohio State Buckeyes, on the other hand, prove the reverse of that point nicely. Though Smith was an integral piece, no doubt about it, Ohio State wasn't in the national championship game solely because of him. Rather, their national championship appearance was about a good offensive line, great receivers (Ginn and Gonzalez), a good running game (Pittman), a great defense (fifth in the country in scoring defense), and one of the best head coaches in the country. At bottom, football is the ultimate team sport, and is not defined by single good players. For any team to have any real national championship contender, they have to be good from top-to-bottom. True one man teams generally end up in mid-tier bowls at best, not hoisting the national championship trophy.

Moreover, if Heisman Trophy winners are really so integral, why have their teams struggled so much in national championship games? Since the inception of the BCS in 1998, Heisman Trophy winners have played in the national championship game six times, and generally it hasn't been pretty for those who have hoisted the Heisman. All told, their teams are only 1-5 in the BCS national championship game. More specifically:

2000: Florida State loses to Oklahoma, 13-2 (Chris Weinke)
2001: Nebraska loses to Miami, 37-14 (Eric Crouch)
2003: Oklahoma loses to LSU, 21-14 (Jason White)
2004: USC beats Oklahoma, 55-19 (Matt Leinart)
2005: USC loses to Texas, 41-38 (Reggie Bush)
2006: Ohio State loses to Florida, 41-14 (Troy Smith)

At bottom, having a Heisman Trophy winner on your team doesn't seem to pay off too much when it is all on the line.

Also, to close, if the Heisman Trophy is viewed as a total team award as opposed to an individual accomplishment, it does help explain why Heisman Trophy winners have generally struggled so greatly in the NFL the past few years. When looked at in that light, it makes a bit of sense. Arguably, the Heisman Trophy winners weren't particularly great players in their own right, but were mainly the by-product of great teams, and once they were faced with a much higher level of competition in the NFL and much more overall parity with their opponents, their true abilities were fully revealed. Certainly there are some exceptions to this rule (Carson Palmer, mainly), but generally that rule could be construed as valid (Jason White, Chris Weinke, Eric Crouch, etc.).

Either way, it's nice to get into a good debate with one of the best blogs you can find anywhere. I look forward to their response.

The Heisman Trophy: A Total Team Award

Upon his retirement, Paul W. Bryant was asked whether or not he was disappointed in the fact that he never had a Heisman Trophy winner at Alabama. His reply was something to the effect of, "At Alabama our players don't win Heismany trophies, our teams win national championships," addressing the notion that the Heisman is purely an individual award and that he cared only about team accomplishments.

That may have been true during the time that Bryant said it, but today, it couldn't be farther from the truth.

In reality, the Heisman Trophy is now a total team award. It is not the total team award (that honored distinction remains for the national championship), but it is nevertheless an award marked by overall team success, and not merely individual performance.

The truth of the matter is that for a player to have any legitimate shot at the Heisman Trophy these days, his team almost certainly has to be playing for a national championship.

Let's look at recent history, looking at the past eleven Heisman Trophy winners.

2006: Troy Smith took home the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Ohio State Buckeyes were 12-0, had a spot secured in the BCS Title game, and were also a massive favorite over Florida.

2005: Reggie Bush won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his USC Trojans were 11-0, coming off of back-to-back national championships, and were going into the Rose Bowl as the #1 team in the country.

2004: Matt Leinart won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his USC Trojans were 11-0, coming off of a national championship season, and were going into the Orange Bowl as the #1 team in the country.

2003: Jason White won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Sooners were 12-1 and had a spot secured to play for the national championship against LSU in the Sugar Bowl. For months, his Oklahoma Sooners were talked about as one of the greatest teams in the history of college football.

2002: Carson Palmer won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Trojans were Pac-10 champions, and were going to play Big Ten champion Iowa in the Orange Bowl.

2001: Eric Crouch won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Cornhuskers were 11-1 and were slated to play Miami for the national championship in the Rose Bowl.

2000: Chris Weinke won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Seminoles were 10-1 and playing Oklahoma in the Orange Bowl for the national championship. Florida State was coming off of a national championship season, and were playing in their third consecutive national championship game.

1999: Ron Dayne won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Big Ten champion Badgers were slated to play in the Rose Bowl, and Dayne had just broken the NCAA all-time rushing record.

1998: Ricky Williams won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Longhorns were slated to play in the Cotton Bowl, and Williams had just broken the NCAA all-time rushing record.

1997: Charles Woodson won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Wolverines were 11-0 and were slated to play, effectively, for the national championship in the Rose Bowl against Washington State.

1996: Danny Wuerffel won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Gators were 11-1, SEC Champs, and were slated to play Florida State for the national championship in the Sugar Bowl.

So, that's it for the past eleven years.

All told, of the eleven last Heisman Trophy winners, eight of them were on a team playing in the national championship game, and the two that didn't had teams playing in the Cotton Bowl and the Rose Bowl, respectively, and had just broken the all-time NCAA rushing record. The only winner that did not fall into either category was Carson Palmer, the 2002 winner, and he was generally considered the best player in the country (he was the number overall selection in the NFL Draft six months later), and his Trojans at the end of the year were likely the hottest team in the country. Not exactly a mediocre squad, to say the least.

Let's look at combined overall records to drive home the point. If you omit the two who won the Heisman because they broke the all-time NCAA rushing record (Williams and Dayne), the other nine Heisman Trophy winner's team's had, at the time they were given the award, a combined 100-6 record, and eight national championship game appearances. Even if you include the 1998 Texas Longhorns (Williams), and the 1999 Wisconsin Badgers (Dayne), the overall record is 119-11. Quite impressive, to say the least.

In the end, it's a pretty simple analysis: If you want to win the Heisman Trophy, your team almost certainly must be in contention for the national championship (and by that I mean literally playing in a national championship game), or you must break one of the most highly regarded historical records.

Again, at bottom, despite assertions to the contrary, the Heisman Trophy is very much a team award. Unless your team is having a national championship contending year, you just aren't likely going to be able to win the Heisman.

2006 provided the perfect example. Everyone, and I do mean everyone, agreed that Georgia Tech's Calvin Johnson was the best player in the nation. Many contended, and still contend, that he was the best Division 1-A receiver in decades, and honestly it was / is a legitimate argument. Nevertheless, Johnson never had a legitimate shot at the Heisman Trophy because he was on a mediocre team, and actually was not even in the final three at the Downtown Athletic Club. In fact, Johnson finished tenth in Heisman voting, behind the likes of Ian Johnson and Ray Rice.

And what about 2007? Most people have John David Booty as the Heisman Trophy front-runner, even though most will contend that Arkansas' Darren McFadden is the best player in the nation. Why? Booty's USC Trojans are #1 in the country, and everyone's pick to be national champions. Arkansas, on the other hand, isn't even picked to win their division, and is ranked 20th.

Again, there are no two ways about it, the Heisman Trophy is a team award.

Preseason Rankings: Do They Matter?

A few days ago, USA Today released its Top 25 Coaches' Poll. You've probably read about it by now, but in case you haven't, click here. The AP Poll, I'm sure, will be coming out shortly, though I don't know precisely when.

And, well, it is what it is. But the relevant question to it all is this: Do preseason rankings really matter? Do they have any real correlation with the actual end result, i.e. the final poll?

Well, that's what I wanted to know.

So, I did some analysis on the subject. All in all, I took the preseason AP Poll from 2002-2006, a five year stretch, and attempted to determine how well the preseason rankings correlated to the final rankings. In doing so, largely for simplification purposes, I decided to only look at the preseason top ten and then look how well those teams did in the final poll.

The following two images represent the entire data set summed up nicely. As you will see, team names are omitted, and only the raw ranking is shown. "Pre" indicates the slot that the particular team was ranked in the preseason AP Poll, and "Final" indicates where the team was ranked in the final AP Poll after the conclusion of the bowl games.

Here goes:





And that is all of the data regarding the subject analyzed here.

So, what did we find?

I ran the correlation numbers, and they were very hit and miss. Some years the preseason poll was pretty accurate, i.e. a pretty strong correlation, and in other years the correlation was almost non-existent. Here is the list of the correlation by year:

2002: .6068
2003: .6973
2004: .7901
2005: -.0105
2006: -.0657

So, as you can see, it's a bit all over the board. Some years you have pretty high correlation, and others there is effectively none whatsoever.

Going deeper than that, once you really look at the data past the raw correlation numbers, you see that even in the best years, the preseason poll isn't too accurate. Though they have a generally high correlation, nevertheless it's still very hit or miss, and the high correlation numbers are mainly due to the fact that a handful of teams were very close in terms of preseason ranking and final ranking.

Let's break things down year-by-year:

2002: As a whole, 2002 was one of the better years, but it still wasn't particularly good. Miami was the preseason number one, coming off of national championship. The Hurricanes didn't really disappoint, finishing second after a controversial overtime loss to Ohio State in the Fiesta Bowl. Aside from that, though, the rest wasn't particularly good. All told, three teams of the preseason top ten did not even finish in the final top 25. Six of the preseason top ten teams did not finish in the top ten; the preseason top ten accurately predicted only four of the final top ten teams. Ohio State, the 2002 national champion that went 13-0, was ranked 13th in the preseason poll.

2003: Much like 2003, 2002 was a good year in terms of pure correlation, but looking deeper it was still very much hit or miss. Three of the preseason top ten teams finished outside of the final top 25, and five of the preseason top ten teams finished outside of the final top 10. LSU, the team that took the Coaches' Poll national championship and finished 2nd in the AP Poll, was ranked 14th in the preseason AP Polll.

2004: The 2004 season had by far the highest correlation of any year, but even it had problems. Though it accurately predicted the eventual national champion (USC), the only time that happened in the five year stretch, and only one of the preseason top 10 teams finished unranked, six of the preseason top 10 teams finished outside of the top 10. The preseason top 10 accurately predicted only four of the final AP top ten teams.

2005: The 2005 preseason poll had effectively no correlation. It accurately predicted the final top two teams, but aside from that it was quite poor. Preseason number three (Tennessee), and preseason number four (Michigan), finished well outside the top 25, and Tennessee went 5-6. Though only two preseason top ten teams finished the season unranked, but five of the preseason top ten teams finished outside the top ten.

2006: The 2006 preseason poll was even worse than 2005. Though none of the preseason top ten teams finished unranked, four teams finished outside of the final top ten. Of the preseason top five, only one team (Ohio State) ranked higher than ninth in the final poll.

At bottom, the preseason rankings can be solid at times, but essentially pointless at others. They generally tell you who the top team is (though, being honest, that's a pretty easy thing to do), but aside from that, I don't think, generally speaking, they really have very much meaning. Every year there are usually two or three preseason top ten teams that finished unranked, and generally speaking around five of the preseason top ten teams finish outside of the final top ten. All told, again, it just doesn't seem like they mean too much. Being brutally honest, it just seems that there is entirely too many uncertainties in college football for preseason rankings to be particularly accurate.

And, well, that's it. A couple of administrative notes:

• I used the AP poll in this analysis, simply because, for whatever reason, it was easier to find the older AP polls than the Coaches' polls. That said, it really shouldn't make a difference one way or the other. All told, the polls are just so similar, there is just no legitimate amount of disparity between the two. They basically come to the same conclusions, and I imagine the analytical conclusions would be the same as well.
  

• For teams that finished outside of the top 25, I counted from 26 on down based on how many votes a particular team received. For teams that did not even receive a vote, I generally assigned them the spot immediately behind the last team that did receive a vote. I understand that there are no official rankings outside of the top 25, but this had to be done to complete the analysis.
  

Recruiting: Four and Five Stars

In an earlier post, I tried to determine whether or not recruiting rankings mattered in terms of future team performance. One of the many conclusions of that post was that approximately 80 per cent of Alabama's roster (not the total roster, but only those on scholarship)the past few years has been comprised of players rated as three-star or lower by the recruiting services. Long story short, the argument was that number was / is entirely too low.

So, I decided to take the same time period (2002-2004) and determine how many four and five star recruits that each SEC team signed over that period.

The following is what I found, listing the number signed by each team per year, and then the total for the three year period:



So, how well did all of that correlate with overall winning percentage in a future time-frame (2004-2006)? Here is that data broken down:



Much like with recruiting rankings, as you can see, where you rank in terms of how many four and five star recruits you sign, compared to the rest of the conference, strongly correlates with overall winning percentage on down the road.

To be specific, the correlation between recruiting rank and winning percentage rank was a robust .7202. That's not quite as strong as the .8 that we saw between overall team recruiting rankings and winning percentage, but it's still very strong.

At bottom, the teams that sign the most four and five star players are generally the ones that do the best on the playing field. Certainly there were a lot of busts included in those numbers, but on the whole the teams that signed the most high-quality players did better than the rest. It didn't correlate quite as high as overall team rankings, I presume, because recruiting isn't just about signing four and five star players (although that's the majority of it), it's also about signing some players that are rated three stars and below and turning them into quality football players as well.

Nevertheless, at bottom, it just further seems to indicate that, regardless of how vehemently some people want to assert otherwise, recruiting rankings do matter.

Recruiting Rankings: Do They Matter?

It's almost a timeless question: Do recruiting rankings really matter? Does highly-rated recruiting classes mean that you will win a lot of football games in the future? In more statistical terms, do recruiting rankings correlate with future team performance?

As said earlier, it's essentially a timeless questions, and just about every college football fan you'll ever run across will have an opinion on the subject one way or the other.

So I want to see how it stacks up empirically, and to that end I've done some research on the subject.

Basically this is what I've done: I've taken the team recruiting rankings from 2002-2004 from both Scout.com and Rivals, Inc, the two major recruiting services. Once compiling the data as to where each SEC team ranked in those three years (on a national basis, out of the one-hundred plus Division 1-A teams), I simply divided by three and came up with a three-year average recruiting finish for each SEC school. I took that three-year average recruiting finish, and ranked all twelve SEC schools on it, from one to twelve. From there, I stepped forward in time a bit, compiling the overall win-loss records (note overall, not conference) for each SEC team in the three-year stretch of 2004-2006. After that, I ranked the SEC teams by overall winning percentages, and then I started to compare all of the information that I compiled.

So here we go. The following is the three-year rankings for Scout.com, including the three-year average recruiting finish, and the conference rank:



And now here is the exact same data, except this time using Rivals, Inc. as the source:



Now that those two are out of the way, next let's move on to the three-year overall records in terms of winning percentage:



So that's basically all of the data in a spreadsheet format, for those who wanted it. But we can trim all of that down, simplify it greatly, and make things just much more easy to comprehend by collapsing a lot of that into one spreadsheet image, so here goes:



At bottom, Scout Rank is where that particular team finished among SEC teams in average recruiting rankings, and Rivals Rank is the exact same thing except it, of course, uses the Rivals, Inc. data. Win Rank is simply how that particular team finished among SEC teams in overall winning percentage the past three years.

So, all of that out of the way, what do we see?

It's quickly obvious that there is a very high correlation between good recruiting classes and future wins. If you run the numbers, there is a .8 correlation between Scout.com average recruiting finish rankings and future winning percentage rankings. And there's actually a little higher correlation for Rivals, Inc. as it crunches out at a robust .818.

What can you say? That's a pretty solid case. After all, a correlation in the neighborhood of .8 is very high, no two ways about it.

Moreover, just eyeball it, things are generally dead on. Take a look at the Scout.com average finish rankings. All told, eight of the twelve SEC teams finished in terms of winning percentage rank either exactly where they finished in Scout.com average recruit finish rankings, or within +/- one spot. The same goes for Rivals, Inc. as well. Again with Rivals, Inc. that same occurrence happened with eight teams. Beyond that, it's just elementary. The teams that did well in recruiting (LSU, Florida, Georgia, Auburn, and Tennessee) are the ones that generally did well on the field, and the ones who struggled in recruiting (Ole Miss, MSU, Kentucky, Vanderbilt, and Alabama) generally struggled on the field.

Again, what can you really say? Despite some people vehemently arguing to the contrary, the harsh statistical truth is that high recruiting rankings do correlate very highly with future wins, no two ways about it. Aside from a couple of exceptions (mostly Auburn), you just aren't going to finish low in terms of recruiting rankings and do particularly well in the SEC in the coming years.

I think you have to give the recruiting services a good deal of credit here. I personally believe they have improved by leaps and bounds over the over-inflated rankings of the late 1990's, and today they generally present very accurate overall projections. Sure, they miss on individual players (of course, nothing is perfect, and granted individual prospect ratings are very speculative), but as a whole, average team rankings over the course of several years seem to make a major impact later on in terms of how many games you win.

So, at the end of the day, to answer the question, "Do recruiting rankings matter?" Yes, they matter very much.

Recruiting Analysis: 2002-2005

I usually try to take any research topic suggestions that I can get, and a good one came from a friend and reader of this blog. It's a pretty simple topic really: take every four and five star recruit that we have signed the past several years and see how they have panned out. He felt that we tended to get more quality players from two and three stars than from four and five stars.

So, let's look at it.

The Scout.com recruiting database goes back to the 2002, so let's start there. We'll go from 2002-2005, looking at each four and five star recruit that we have picked up in that four-year stretch, and then broke each one of them down individually.

All told, from 2002-2005, we signed fifteen four or five star recruits, according to Scout.com. They include:

Kyle Tatum
Chris Browder
David Scott
Derrick Pope
Jeremy Clark
Le'Ron McClain
Chris Felder
Matt Caddell
Dominic Lee
Chris Felder
Lorenzo Washington
B.J. Stabler
Nikita Stover
Brandon Deaderick
Mike Ford
Chris Keys
Brandon Fanney

So that's the total list. It includes fifteen guys over a four year period, fourteen of which four-star recruits, with one being a five-star recruit (Derrick Pope).

Now let's break them down individually:

Kyle Tatum was a four-star defensive line prospect out of Prattville. He was generally considered one of the top linemen in the state, and could have went anywhere in the country. He signed with Alabama, and then redshirted, as expected. He played as a redshirt freshman in 2003, and looked pretty good; people loved his intensity and his motor. Then, Shula moved him to right tackle, where he effectively fell into a black hole in 2004 and 2005. He started, but wasn't very good, and finally in 2006 he was apparently in Shula's doghouse, and that was the end of his career.

Chris Browder was a highly touted defensive end, rated as a four-star the 26th best defensive end in the country. He did not qualify academically, and went to junior college. He resurfaced a couple of years later with Auburn, but as far as I can tell never made any real impact.

David Scott was a four-star JUCO cornerback out of Mississippi. He signed with two years of eligibility, and played a fair amount as a nickel corner in both 2002 and 2003. It's not to say he was a bad player, but everyone thought he would be a true shutdown corner when he signed, and the truth was he never even became a starter.

Derrick Pope was a five-star JUCO linebacker, and he was as good as billed. He played great in 2002, and was about the only bright spot in 2003. The only problem was, as with most JUCO players, he was only here for two years.

Jeremy Clark was a four-star defensive line recruit out of Daphne, second only in the state to Kyle Tatum. And he started most of his career at Alabama, but he was never an impact player of any sort. At best, he was pretty mediocre, and the main reason he started was because of an overall lack of quality depth at the position.

Le'Ron McClain was a four-star running back recruit, and generally regarded as the top fullback in the country. He lived up to that expectation fully. He became qualified, started four years, and when he left was he was considered the best pure fullback in the country.

Matt Caddell was a four-star wide receiver recruit and a member of the vaunted triumvirate of receivers to come out of the state in 2003 (the other two were Chad Jackson and Jayson Swaine). Unfortunately, Caddell has struggled at Alabama, and has never developed into a consistent. He looked good as a freshman in 2004, especially considering the poor quarterback play that year, but he hasn't done anything since. He has made a few memorable catches (2004 LSU comes to mind), but generally struggled with tentative play and poor hands. Going into his senior season in 2006, he seems, at the very least, behind D.J. Hall, Keith Brown, and Nikita Stover on the depth chart.

Dominic Lee was a four-star recruit out of Huffman, and was generally considered the top defensive line prospect in the state. We signed him, and despite high expectations, he never did much of anything. He never became a consistent starter, and his best times were playing in the defensive tackle rotation as a back-up in 2005 and 2006. His biggest contributions to the Crimson Tide by far was the wooing of his cousin Andre Smith -- yes, that Andre Smith -- to sign with Alabama.

Chris Felder was a four-star cornerback recruit out of Thomasville, Alabama, and he was generally considered one the top cornerback prospects in the country (ranked 13th overall by Scout.com). Unfortunately, he did not qualify academically, and has seemingly fallen off the face of the Earth in terms of information regarding his where-abouts.

Lorenzo Washington was a four-star defensive line recruit generally considered one of the top defensive tackle prospects in the country (ranked 18th in the country by Scout.com), and he was a good student as well. Unfortunately, he shocked everyone by not qualifying, and when he returned after a tour of Hargrave, he didn't exactly set the world on fire. In his two years thus far at Alabama, he has yet to see any meaningful playing time, and has struggled to gain weight. At the moment -- barring major changes in Fall practice -- it is unlikely that he sees meaningful playing time this season.

B.J. Stabler was a four-star recruit, and was generally considered one of the best offensive line prospects in the country (ranked 26th by Scout.com). And, honestly, he has done pretty well, it's obvious the kid has a good deal of talent. Unfortunately, leg injuries have slowed him, and are apparently still slowing him. Either way, though, when he has been healthy, he has started the past two years, and will do so again in 2007.

Nikita Stover was a four-star recruit, generally considered the top wide receiver prospect in Alabama, and in the country (ranked 14th overall by Scout.com). He didn't qualify, and went to junior college, finally arriving at the Capstone for the 2006 season. He showed promise late in the year, despite conditioning problems, and will see a lot of playing time in 2007. Odds are that he will start in 2008.

Brandon Deaderick was a four-star defensive line recruit out of Kentucky. He was highly-touted, by like so many other players he hasn't been able to find a definite position (either end or tackle), and has never played any meaningful snaps. Honestly, I did not hear his name mentioned a single time this Spring. And then he raised some hell on the Strip and was arrested. I assumed that, as I type, he's running his butt off, and probably about to vomit somewhere. That's graphic, I know, but probably nonetheless true.

Mike Ford was a four-star tailback recruit out of Florida, and considered one of the best in the country (18th overall by Scout.com). He didn't qualify initially, went to Hargrave, and didn't qualify the second time around. After that, he ended up at South Florida somehow or another, and he was expected to play this Fall. And then it comes out that he has been arrested for a variety of offenses.

Chris Keys was a four-star safety prospect, and was considered one of the best in the country (7th overall by Scout.com). He was committed to LSU, but left when Nick Saban went to Miami, and jumped ship the Tide. He had a lot of talent, but couldn't stay out of trouble. Finally, Mike Shula -- unable to control him -- kicked him off the team. He's playing football now at a lower level, but I forget where.

Brandon Fanney -- coming out of Hargrave -- was a four-star defensive line recruit. He hasn't seen any meaningful snaps so far, but that may change. He's been moved to the Jack position, but he was involved in the incident on the Strip. Much like Deaderick, it's likely that as I type, he's running his butt off and probably about to vomit at the moment. Again, graphic but true.

So that's it. That is all fifteen of the four and five star recruits that we signed from 2002-2005.

To break it down further:

• One player was a five-star (Pope).

• Fourteen players were four-stars.

• Three of the fifteen never qualified academically (Browder, Felder, and Ford).

• One player was kicked off the team (Keys).

• Three players qualified, but nevertheless never lived up to anywhere near their expectations, for whatever reason (Tatum, Lee, and Scott). All three have since graduated / eligibility expired.

• Two players really lived up to their expectations and did as well as everyone expected they would (McClain and Pope).
  

• Three players qualified, are currently on the team, but unfortunately none of the three have lived up to expectations thus far, nor do they seem destined for any legitimate playing time in 2007 barring some Fall practice surprises (Washington, Fanney, and Deaderick).

• Two players are currently on the roster, showing promise, with two years of eligibility left, and both seemingly are in line to be good, quality football players before they leave after the 2008 season (Stabler and Stover).
  

All told, it's not too good.

And the reader is correct, we have gotten more good players out of two and three star prospects than we have four and five star prospects. With that said, however, I wouldn't read much into that. Yes, more good players emerged from the two and three star prospects, but two and three star prospects also comprised about 80% of our overall classes, so it only makes sense that more of those guys turned out to be good players. After all, they outnumbered the four and five stars at a rate of about 4:1, so that's how it should be.

So it really doesn't say anything bad about the recruiting services, for the most part.

What it does show, however, is the complete lack of highly rated recruits that we have signed. On average, we racked up less than four of the four or five star recruits per year, and that's simply nowhere near enough. As mentioned earlier, roughly 80% of our classes over a four-year stretch was comprised by recruits rated three stars and later. Hell, it's still one month until kick-off, and Nick Saban has already racked up six four star recruits thus far, and honestly we'll probably have at least eight by the end of August. Truth be told, Saban and company will reel in almost as many, if not as many, four and five star recruits in this recruiting class alone as we reeled in, as a whole, in the four-year stretch from 2002-2005.

Moreover, it is also an indication of poor coaching. Never underestimate the importance of good coaching in getting a prospect to realize his full potential, and you have to be brutally honest: the guys we signed from 2002-2005 simply, for the most part, did not get it. Great prospects will often times become poor-to-average players with poor-to-average coaching, and I think that is reflected to a degree here.

Again, it's not really an indicator of poor ratings. The raw number of four and five star recruits is mainly an indictment of terrible recruiting in that stretch, more than anything else. And, fortunately, that latter has drastically changed since Nick Saban stepped off of that airplane in early January.

The rest is largely an indictment of poor coaching. And fortunately, that, too, has drastically changed in the past few months.

Home Field Advantage

Now we turn to the next vaunted topic, "Home Field Advantage."

Admit it, you hear about it all the time, you probably talk about it all the time, and you probably think it is a very significant factor in the outcome of games.

But is it really? Does home field advantage really make a difference in the outcome of games? Oh sure, the talking heads go on and on about it, but does it really count?

Well that's a good question, and believe it or not, it's a very complex question. Some would like to paint that question in simple terms of "Team X has the loudest stadium, and it's much tougher to beat Team X in Team's X's home stadium." But, of course, things in life are rarely that simple, and the phenomenon of home field advantage is no different.

In fact, believe it or not, there is a lot of data, and I do mean a lot of data, that indicates that there really is, effectively speaking, no such thing as home field advantage. This forum will be one of the few places you hear that, but it is nevertheless true.

For example, if you break down the results in SEC games (48 SEC intra-conference games per year), there seems to be little legitimate correlation between the overall results and where the game was played. In most years, the home teams wins slightly more games than the road team (usually about one game more, a 25-23 overall record for the home team), but that's not always a given. It's pretty common for the road teams to actually have a better overall record in conference play than the home teams. In the end, it's very close one way or the other, with neither the home teams or the away teams having any real advantage, and honestly what very little difference that actually exists between the two being almost certainly statistical white noise.

Beyond that, we have further evidence.

Let's take a look at the last five years. If you had to say, which two SEC teams performed better at home, relative to their road performance, than the rest of the SEC? Surely, if a team does have a home field advantage, and if that advantage really makes a tangible impact on the outcome of games, then the teams with the biggest home field advantage would generally speaking have the best home performance relative to their road performance, right? Not quite. In fact -- get ready for a shocker -- the two SEC teams that have performed the best at home relative to their performance on the road have been -- again, get ready for a shock -- Ole Miss and Mississippi State. And correct me if I'm wrong, but you never hear anybody talking about how difficult it is to play in Vaught-Hemingway, or Davis Wade Stadium.

So what about some of the big boys of the SEC with those massive 90,000+ seat stadiums? Surely there is a big home field advantage there with those extremely loud crowds. Uh, well, not quite. Take LSU for example, and their vaunted Tiger Stadium. Believe it or not, despite all of the talk about supposedly how difficult it is to play in "Death Valley," in the five-year stretch from 2001-2005, LSU was 15-5 at home in conference play, and 15-5 on the road in conference play. At bottom, it was the same record, regardless of where they played. We'll go even deeper than that, looking at Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee in that same five-year stretch. Despite massive stadiums, it did them little good. In fact, all three teams had a significantly better record on the road than than they did at home. If anything, for that group, playing at home was at times seemingly a death knell more than anything else.

At bottom, as a whole, big-time programs have big-time winning records at their home stadiums, compared to their road records. And the reason is simple, when you take into account all games, you take into account all of the Sisters of the Poor that a team will play, and those patsies greatly inflate the overall home record (even we went 6-2 at home in 2006, for example). And obviously, since you don't play home-and-home series with the Sisters of the Poor, you never play them on the road to where you greatly inflate that record too, which causes the disparity between the overall home and away records. So, as expected, once you filter out all of the Sisters of the Poor, that inflated record goes away. At bottom, you generally win fewer games against better teams, and more games against poorer teams, regardless of where you play the game itself. For example, we all know the argument from the 2006 LSU season. They went 4-0 at home in SEC play, but 2-2 on the road, and the argument was that had those four road games been played in Tiger Stadium, they would have won them all. In reality though, that argument doesn't hold water. The disparities between the two records did not result from the location of the games, but the overall quality of the opponents faced. The four home games included three teams with losing records, and the overall record of those four teams was a measly 21-28 (42.8%). On the other hand, the four road games included the eventual national champion, a top ten team, a top fifteen team, and also a team that went 9-4 and finished in the top 25. All told, the overall record of those four teams was 43-11 (79.6% winning percentage). Had the schedule been reversed, it's very likely they would have went 2-2 at home and 4-0 on the road. Again, it wasn't the location of the games that made the difference, it was the disparity in the quality of opponents that mattered. The point of the matter is that when playing similar teams (such as conference games), teams tend to win more games against lesser opponents, and win fewer games against better opponents, regardless of whether the game is played at home or on the road.

Going even deeper than that, you often here that home field advantage really makes a difference in close games. So is that valid or not? In a word, no. Brian C. Fremeau, who publishes a college football rating system called the Fremeau Efficiency Index, did the research for a November 9th, 2006 column at Football Outsiders. In it, he compiled a list of every Division 1-A college football game that was decided by seven points or less, and he came to the conclusion that 172 games fell into that category in the 2006 regular season. Want to guess the home record and the road record? All told, in the 172 games, home teams went 86-86 (.500), and road teams went 86-86 (.500).

Fremeau later summed it up best: "Home-field advantage may be an emotional factor, but it does not appear to be a significant statistical one."

In fact, several coaches have indicated that they feel it to be advantageous to play on the road. That may sound odd at first because you hear so much about home field advantage, but there's a legitimate rationale behind it. Pat Dye, arguably, is that viewpoint's most prominent proponent, and he long stated his belief that playing on the road presented a more advantageous situation. According to Dye, teams are more focused on the road due to fewer off-field distractions (especially the day before the game and the day of the game), and also going into a hostile environment forces teams to band together as, well, a team, which though not quantifiable, is an important factor in winning football games.

Again, that probably sounds odd because you never hear it, but nonetheless it is a pretty solid rationale.

At the end of the day, the only real support for home field advantage seems to be what people say. In other words, support for the existence and legitimacy of home field advantage usually amounts to nothing more than unqualified verbal and written speculation from fans and / or questionably-qualified "experts" like the Lee Corsos of the world.

But why does everyone so badly want to believe in home field advantage? I say two main reasons.

For one, teams that lose games on the road suddenly have a convenient excuse for the loss. You hear it all of the time, as we mentioned earlier. Though it's a weak-at-best argument (it doesn't matter the least bit the speculative outcome of a game when played somewhere else, all that matters is the outcome of the game where it is played), fans cling to it passionately, even to the point of absurdity. Again with the 2006 LSU team, even most LSU fans continue to cling to the notion that they would have beaten Florida had the game been in Baton Rouge instead of Gainesville. Only one problem with that: the game wasn't even close. Florida took a 23-7 lead early in the third quarter, and from there sit on it. Only did a long LSU field goal four minutes into the fourth quarter bring the game within two touchdowns, and they never got closer. Truth is, even the people who think home field advantage has a massive impact on the outcome of games would have easily said it would never have made that much difference in a game like that. And keep in mind I'm not trying to pick on the LSU people here; if it is being read that way then that is incorrect. This type of rationale is common among all college football fans, unfortunately. At bottom, people will cling to the notion that "Oh yeah, well we would have won had it been at our stadium" (as if that doesn't sound like a middle school argument), even in the fact of sheer absurdity.

Two, you have to consider this: If home field advantage is legitimate and significant, a fan literally is part of a win. The fan literally plays a role in his team winning, and in that sense he's essentially like a player on the team; it produces the feeling that, hell, the common fan may as well have caught the game-winning touchdown pass. And of course, fans desperately want to believe that. They want to believe that their actions have a very tangible, very real, and very significant positive impact on their favorite team, even if there is no real evidence indicating anything of the sort. No one wants to believe that they pay ungodly amounts of money and yell and scream in support of their favorite team for it to have essentially no impact. Fans want to believe the former notion.

But wanting to believe something doesn't make that something true. Nor does everyone talking about it, even if it ESPN and the like doing the talking.

At bottom, despite vehement assertions that home field advantage is real and significant, there is simply little to no actual empirical evidence that there is any such thing as a home field advantage in college football, and what little "advantage" could possibly be rationally construed from the data seems to be so small that it is essentially insignificant in statistical terms. Just because something is constantly repeated does not make it true, and home field advantage in college football seems to be a good real-world example of that.

Again, Fremeau summed it up perfectly. Home field advantage may represent a significant emotional attachment to the fans, but in an empirical real world sense, it seemingly has simply has no real, legitimate, or significant impact on the outcome of college football games.

A Synthesis: Sacks And Pass Defense

Earlier I made a post about 2006 SEC pass defense, and also about 2006 SEC sacks, analyzing each separately.

In reality though, considering it is all one defense, the two things are related, or are they? That's basically what I set out to determine. At bottom, is there any correlation between the number of sacks a team generates and how well their pass defense performs? Or does that number of sacks created have little if any correlation to how well a pass defense performs, as Joe Kines contended?

To figure it out, I ran the numbers on how well Adjusted Sacks correlated to a variety of different measures of performance for a pass defense, including opposing quarterback's average passer rating, yards per completion, yards per attempt, completion percentage, interception rate, and touchdown rate.

Before I list the results of what I found, I'll give a very brief primer on correlation for those who may not be familiar with the concept. At bottom, correlation ranges from 1 to -1, and values that that are near 1 or -1 have correlation, and values near 0 essentially have no correlation. Going up to 1 means there is positive correlation, i.e. the more x happens, the more y happens. Going down to -1 means there is negative correlation, i.e. the more x happens, the less y happens.

So, with that in mind, the following is how well Adjusted Sacks correlated to that variety of measures, in descending order:

Opposing QB average passer rating: -.4997
Touchdown rate: -.4693
Completion percentage: -.4660
Yards per attempt: -.4489
Yards per completion: -.3087
Interception rate: -.2573

As you see, opposing team's passing numbers generally tend to go down greatly as the number of Adjusted Sacks increase.

Opposing quarterback average passer rating, touchdown rate, completion percentage, and yards per attempt all have a pretty high negative correlation with the number of Adjusted Sacks. Again, there's just no real way to dispute the data, for the most part. Unless it's just an odd-ball deal with a one year sample size, which I highly doubt given the breadth of the statistics, it generally just showcases that pressuring the quarterback pays off.

I was thinking, perhaps, that would I might find would be a good bit of teams that racked up a lot of Adjusted Sacks did so by blitzing heavily, and that would even things out in the end with that defense giving up a lot of big plays and completions. But, as the breakdown showed, that simply wasn't the case. Certainly some teams did get a high number of Adjusted Sacks by blitzing heavily, but they didn't seemingly give up very many big plays or lot of completions. I suppose it isn't quite like the old Joe Lee Dunn days at MSU, where two sacks would be followed by a 38-yard completion against a seven man rush. You have to give credit to defensive coordinators and other defensive coaches; generally, it seems, even when they bring lots of pressure, the defensive backfield still, relatively speaking, prevents big plays.

The only snafu to the entire analysis was Interception Rate. There was a -.2573 correlation between Adjusted Sacks and Interception Rate, meaning that as Adjusted Sacks went up, the Interception rate tended to go down. Perhaps this should have been too shocking, especially considering the result of LSU, Arkansas, and Alabama, but it still is just a bit. You would think, intuitively, that more pressure would result in more bad throws and more interceptions, but the reverse is true. I suppose that the man-to-man coverage on the outside, combined with the shorter throws when the blitz is expected, means that defensive backs are not in as good of a position to intercept the football. And moreover, again since they are in man-to-man coverage, cornerbacks may not want to be as aggressive, knowing that they would have no help over the top if they made the slightest mistake. I know, it doesn't seem right intuitively, but more sacks correlates with fewer interceptions, at least in this data set. I would point out, however, that a correlation of only .2573 isn't particularly high, so maybe it is just statistical white noise that would work itself with a larger sample size. I suppose we'll see when we run the same numbers this time next year.

At the end of the day, you just have to be brutally honest about it. At bottom, it seems that if you were going to be successful in pass defense, you had to get after the quarterback. If you didn't, you just weren't going to be very good in defending the pass.

As for Kines, I certainly don't want to criticize his philosophy, because obviously he's forgotten more about football than I will ever know, but the numbers just seem to invalidate his defensive philosophy. Kines essentially betted that we could drop seven and eight defenders into heavy zone coverage, and opposing quarterbacks wouldn't be able to beat it. Unfortunately, at least in 2006 (that philosophy worked with all of the talent we had in 2005), that didn't work. Quarterbacks did effectively pick apart the defense with a relatively high degree of regularity, and with that in mind we struggled greatly in terms of pass defense. And, honestly, a lot of that credit goes to opposing quarterbacks. Perhaps there was a time when you could count on opposing quarterbacks to make a lot of mistakes throwing into heavy zone coverage, but that time seems to have passed.

The good news is that with Saban in charge now, Adjusted Sacks will go way up, and that should drive opposing team's passing numbers considerably lower.

2006 SEC: Adjusted Defensive Sack Rates

We've already covered offensive sack rates to help determine who protected their quarterback the best in 2006, so we'll now turn to defensive sack rates to help determine which teams rushed the quarterback the best in 2006.

As was the case with total offensive sacks allowed, defensive sacks created on its own is a pretty meaningless number, and only takes on real meaning when you put it into the context of pass attempts. Long story short, a team that piles up a lot of sacks can be a relatively poor pass rushing team, and a team that has only a relatively few sacks can in fact be a good pass rushing team, depending on how many passes they have thrown against them.

So, what I have done is taken the total number of sacks created by a particular team in SEC play in 2006, and divided that by the total number of pass attempts against the same team. That division yields a percentage of passing plays that I call Adjusted Sack Rate, which of course is the percentage of passes that resulted in a sack.

The following is how the SEC ranked in terms of sacks in 2006:



Moreover, we'll break things down a bit further. I understand that Adjusted Sack Rate can be a bit hard to grasp, being a raw percentage and all, so I also added Adjusted Sacks. Basically, Adjusted Sacks is the number of sacks that a team would have gotten had they faced the league average of pass attempts (223). Again, it doesn't change the data at all, it just makes it a bit easier to comprehend and fully understand by putting it in concepts more familiar to football fans.

Also, I've looked at teams not just by sacks alone, but also the lost yardage from those sacks. As you'll see, I've ranked the SEC in terms of the average yards lost per sack as well.

Without further adieu...



So there it is. If you've ever wanted better statistics regarding sacks in 2007, now you have them.

Honestly, I really don't have a whole lot to say regarding the data itself, and the main reason I did this was to get data needed for a later post.

Why do you ask?

At bottom, a sack is a pretty meaningless thing, in and of itself. You often times see teams that have a lot of sacks because they consistently blitzed everything but the kitchen sink, and while that did accumulate a lot of sacks, it still did not mark solid defensive play. Opposing teams would know their heavy blitz tendencies, and game-plan accordingly with a lot of max protect packages and short drops, with the end result being lots of completions and many big plays when a defensive back, playing man-to-man coverage, would miss a tackle and there would be no one over the top to clean it up. So really the reason I did all this is to compare it (hopefully in a post coming shortly) to 2006 SEC pass defense results. Again, hopefully that post will be coming shortly.

But I will say a few things...

Namely, Alabama just didn't get it done. The pass rush was a little better than most would have thought (eleventh instead of dead last), but there wasn't much to it. As I've posted before, the underlying idea behind the Kines scheme with regard to pass defense was to drop a lot of defenders into coverage, usually only rushing three or four defenders, and then forcing the opposing quarterback to throw into heavy zone coverage. And, well, that's exactly what we did. It just didn't work. We didn't get very many sacks (as expected, even by Kines), but we also didn't force incompletions with the heavy zone coverage. Again, at bottom, it just didn't work. You really can't put it any way other than that.

Georgia does need to be mentioned. The Dawgs finished third in the conference in total sacks, which sounds about right, considering their two outstanding defensive ends Quentin Moses and Charles Johnson. However, once you analyze the Dawgs through Adjusted Sack Rate, they only finished fifth in the conference, and really just looked like a very mediocre pass rushing team. Honestly, that shocked me. I fully expected Georgia to be one of the, if not the, top pass rushing teams in the conference. With Moses and Johnson gone to the NFL, and Georgia having to replace eight starters on defense in 2007, perhaps there are some signs for concern in Athens. All told, the Dawgs were the textbook example of racking up a lot of sacks against the Sisters of the Poor, racking up ten sacks against the, shall we say, vaunted triumvirate of Western Kentucky, Colorado, and UAB (a 6-5 Division 1-AA opponent, and two D-1A opponents with a combined record of 5-19. If you ever wanted a case study of why I only look at conference games, this would be a good one.

The rest really aren't too shocking. The teams that you thought rushed the quarterback really well (LSU, Florida, etc.) in fact did so, and the teams that you thought rushed the quarterback poorly in fact did so, too.

The only other mild surprise, to me, was Tennessee. The Vols are always very talented in the front seven, and I expected them to be a pretty solid pass rushing team, and they were far from it. For whatever reason, the Vols struggled to get after the quarterback, finishing tenth in the SEC in Adjusted Sack Rate, and had only about two Adjusted Sacks more than Alabama and Ole Miss. Yikes for the Vols. Not what I expected.

Finally, let's look at average yards lost per sack. Arkansas, LSU, and Florida (i.e. three of the top four teams in Adjusted Sack Rate), finished 9th, 10th, and 12th, respectively, in terms of average yards lost per sack. At bottom, teams knew they had a great pass rush, and planned shorter drops accordingly. And, of course, shorter drops equals less yardage lost when in fact a sack does occur. On the other end of the spectrum, the two teams that finished first and second (Alabama and Tennessee) in average yards lost per sack were about the two worst pass rushing teams in the conference. Opponents saw the lack of a pass rush, and planned deeper drops and longer routes, accordingly. That, in turn, resulted in a higher amount of yards lost per sack, when in fact a sack did occur.

Later we'll put all of this together with 2006 pass defense and see what we find. It should be interesting stuff.

The Scoreability Index

A couple of days ago, I posted about the Bendability Index, and made the case for its high relevance in college football.

Today, we'll move from a statistic that focuses mainly on the defensive side of the ball to a statistic that focuses mainly on the offensive side of the ball: the Scoreability Index. Whereas the Bendability Index determines how many yards it took an opponent to accumulate to score a point on a team, the Scoreability Index determines how many yards it takes an offense to score a point on their opponent. Just like was the case with the Bendability Index, the Scoreability Index is not solely a measure of offensive prowess, but instead a measure of overall team efficiency that takes into account a variety of factors, such as red zone offense, special teams performance, defensive performance, and turnovers.

The following is how the SEC finished up in terms of the Scoreability Index in 2006:



Now let's look at things closer, beginning with my beloved Crimson Tide.

Unfortunately, well, it's just not pretty for those clad in crimson. As you can see, we finished eleventh in the conference in the Scoreability Index, and combined with us finishing eleventh in the Bendability Index, well, no one should be surprised that we went 6-7 and Mike Shula was fired. In terms of the Scoreability Index, the offense moved the ball relatively well. We racked up 2,691 yard of total offense -- granted, keep in mind I understand that looking at things by total yardage alone doesn't tell you much, which is why we're going farther in this analysis -- and moreover we were very consistent in racking up yardage. We weren't boom and bust (400 one week, 150 the next), we consistently put up over 300 yards almost each and every week (the only two exceptions were Tennessee and MSU). But unfortunately, those yards didn't really translate into very many points.

At bottom, though we moved the ball relatively well, it didn't translate into points. Poor special teams (all across the board, in terms of punt returns, kick returns, punting, kicking, and punt and kick coverage), and below average defensive play meant that we generally didn't have great field position, so we had to move the ball long distances to score. Beyond that, once we did move the ball downfield, we bogged down in the red zone, so we never saw the full potential point value of all of the yards that we had accumulated. For example, moving the ball 74 yards isn't very meaningful if you can only get three points on the board when it is all said and done.

At the end of the day, it was just bad from top-to-bottom. There are no real bright spots to the matter.

Now just a few thoughts on the rest of the SEC...

Vanderbilt was the only team that finished behind Alabama, and in reality we should have been behind even them. Vanderbilt's yards-per-point ratio was skewed massively by the fact that in one game (Kentucky) they put up 621 yards of offense. For the other seven games, we were a good bit worse than even the Commodores. Bad stuff.

Arkansas just set the world on fire in this category, needing only 11.5 yards per point. You have to give the Hogs credit, they were good from top to bottom. They played great defense, capitalized on turnovers, had good special teams, and ran all over just about everyone when they actually got the ball on offense. What can you say? They were the epitome of how it is supposed to be done.

Auburn did not have a very good offense in 2006, but they did quite well in the Scoreability Index, finishing third in the conference. Again, they weren't very good on offense, mainly due to injuries to Brandon Cox and Kenny Irons. However, they still did the things, as an entire team, needed to be successful. They got great special teams play, and great play from their defense. Though their offense wasn't particularly good, it was efficient and capitalized quite well off of what their special teams and defense created for them.

And finally, to close, one of the keys to always look at with any statistic is how well that particular statistic correlates to winning or losing football games. Some stats -- despite people talking about them all the time and you hearing it talked about on ESPN 24/7 -- have essentially no correlation to winning or losing football games, but that is not true of this statistic. Much like the Bendability Index, the Scoreability Index has a very high correlation to actual wins. Just look at the teams that finished in the top five in the Scoreability Index versus those who finished in the bottom five. The teams that finished in the top five of the Scoreability Index were a combined 54-13 (80.59 percent winning percentage). The teams that finished in the bottom five of the Scoreability Index were a combined 28-33 (45.9 percent winning percentage).

Small wonder Cold, Hard Football Facts -- the inventor of this statistic -- refers to it as one of the "Stats That Matter."

Update: SEC Favorites

In a previous post, I looked at how the consensus SEC favorites have fared over the course of the past decade.

I recently ran across an article, however, that detailed the official SEC champion selection at SEC Media Days, and how they have historically performed.

According to this article in the The Advocate, only twice has the media successfully predicted the eventual SEC champion in the fifteen year history of the SEC since the implementation of the divisional format in 1992. The media correctly predicted the eventual SEC champion in 1994 and 1995, both times when they selected the Florida Gators. In the other thirteen years, the media has been dead wrong.

So, in reality, the "official" SEC favorite hasn't actually won the SEC in the eleven seasons, going 0-11 in the process.

Interestingly enough, teams not picked to win the SEC include five national champions (1992 Alabama, 1996 Florida, 1998 Tennessee, 2003 LSU, and 2006 Florida), and one team that went 13-0 despite being jilted at the ballot box (2004 Auburn).

I can't help but wonder if being the favorite makes teams prepare for you harder, and play harder against you, thus almost wholly ending your chances of the winning the SEC? And perhaps that same phenomenon allows other teams to sneak up a bit and get the job done? Right or wrong, it seems something is amiss. I understand the media isn't the most football savvy group in the world, but you could probably do better than 2-13 just by throwing darts at a dartboard.

But alas, back to the original point at the hand, if LSU can pull it off this year, you'll have to give the Tigers and Les Miles all the credit in the world. They will truly have pulled off a very rare feat.

More On Pass Defense

In the past few weeks, I've made several posts on 2006 SEC pass defense. The problem with it all, however, is that its hard to put together. You analyze a ton of pieces, but at the end of the day it can be difficult to put them all together and determine what they mean as a whole.

But what we can do is take the combined statistics (attempts, completions, yards, touchdowns, and interceptions) of every SEC pass defense and convert them into one simple, easy-to-understand formula: the quarterback passer rating.

Granted, the quarterback passer rating has some flaws, but generally it presents a good overall summary of performance.

Thus, here you go, the 2006 SEC pass defenses ranked in terms of opposing quarterback's cumulative passer rating:



And that sums things up quite nicely.

As you can see, the Crimson Tide ranked ninth in the SEC in terms of opposing quarterback's cumulative passer rating. At bottom, we looked good on total pass defense (4th in the conference) because we allowed so few passing yards. But the dirty little secret behind that was we saw the fewest passes thrown against us of any team in the conference. In reality, we were a quite poor team in terms of pass defense, better than only lowly Mississippi State, Kentucky, and Vanderbilt.

Bayou Bengals Fighting History

2007 SEC Media Days recently concluded with the media voting the LSU Tigers the overwhelming favorite to win the SEC this season. But the Tigers are very much fighting history. Being tabbed as the favorite to win the SEC has very much been a kiss of death the past decade.

Just look at the past nine seasons.

In 2006, everyone and their brother thought the Auburn Tigers had it locked up. And then the season started, and they finished second in their own division. 2005 had no true favorite (though Tennessee would have likely came closest), for the most part, but the team that did win it, the Georgia Bulldogs, were picked by effectively no one after they lost media darlings David Greene and David Pollack to graduation the year before. Tennessee, who was likely the main favorite, went 5-6, and a purge of their coaching ranks ensued.

In 2004, many expected Georgia to rebound for the SEC title, and some others expected Florida to break through in Zook's third year. As it happened, Auburn came out of nowhere and went 13-0 en route to an SEC championship. In 2003, Auburn was everyone's favorite, but they crashed and burned to a five-loss season in which head coach Tommy Tuberville came this close to getting fired. No one expected LSU to do it, coming off of an 8-5 season in 2002, but they did just that, winning the SEC and a share of the national championship.

In 2002, Tennessee, with Casey Clausen returning, was dubbed by most as the eventual SEC Champions. The Vols imploded amongst team dissension, and the Georgia Bulldogs came out of nowhere to go 13-1, win the SEC, and go on to a victory in the Sugar Bowl over Florida State. In 2001, the Florida Gators were pegged to win the SEC, and possibly the national championship. But the Gators fell to Auburn and Tennessee, and didn't even win the SEC East. LSU, the actual 2001 SEC Champion, shocked everyone by pulling it out. No one even thought they would win it even when they advanced to the SEC Title Game against Tennessee.

In 2000, our beloved Crimson Tide was the unanimous favorite, and uh, yeah, we all know how that one turned out. Florida ended up as the SEC champions, facing little resistance on their way to Atlanta or in Atlanta against Auburn. In 1999, everyone had either Tennessee, Georgia, or Florida as the SEC Champions. As it turned out, Alabama came out of nowhere and beat Florida twice, winning the SEC in a route of the Gators in Atlanta.

In 1998, the Florida Gators were dubbed by most to win the SEC after the departure of Peyton Manning, but surprising Tennessee -- led by Tee Martin -- came out of nowhere and went undefeated, winning the SEC en route to a national championship.

Finally, you have to go all the way back to 1997 until the favorite went on to win the SEC. That year, after Peyton Manning opted to forgo the NFL Draft and return for his senior season. The media picked up on it, and dubbed Tennessee as the SEC Champion. Though the Vols were blown out by Florida early in the year in the Swamp, they made the SEC title game when Florida surprisingly lost to two inferior teams (LSU and Georgia), and narrowly edged out Auburn 30-29 in the SEC Championship Game.

In the nine seasons since the Vols' SEC Championship in 1997, the preseason SEC favorite has combined to go 0-9 in their pursuit of the SEC title. More damning, however, is this fact: Of those nine favorites to win SEC, only one time did anyone remotely close to being considered a favorite has actually advanced to the SEC title game (the 1999 Florida Gators), and even the one team that did came in a year when there was no clear-cut favorite.

To sum up -- and this is something you are probably only going to read here regarding media favorites -- the harsh truth of the matter is that none of the past nine favorites to win the SEC have actually won it, and only one time did a favorite even make it to the SEC Championship game.

The perilous road to a championship doesn't simply end there, however.

It is an almost equally perilous route for those attempting to win the SEC with a first-year starter at quarterback.

Just look at the past eight seasons. In the past eight years, every team that has won the SEC championship has done so with a returning starter at quarterback.

In 2006, Florida won the SEC and later the national championship under the leadership of Chris Leak, a four year starter playing as a senior. In 2005, Georgia won the SEC with D.J. Shockley, who had started several games in his career in Athens, and had generally split playing time with David Greene.

In 2004, Auburn won the SEC with Jason Campbell under center. Campbell was a fifth-year senior who had started nearly his entire career. 2003 saw the LSU Tigers win the SEC with Matt Mauck, who had started the previous year, and who was older than most college quarterbacks (Mauck was 24, due to a minor league baseball career).

In 2002, David Greene led Georgia to its first SEC championship in twenty years in his second full season as a starter. In 2001, Rohan Davey led LSU to the SEC championship as a senior who had started off-and-on his entire career at LSU (he generally split starts from 1999-2000 with Josh Booty). Finally, Alabama won the SEC in 1999 with Andrew Zow in his second full season as a starter.

You have to go all the way back to the 1998 season to find a team that won the SEC with a first-year starter. The Tennessee Volunteers did it that year with Tee Martin, and no one has done it since.

So what does all of it mean?

At bottom, it means that the SEC is an incredibly tough conference with an amazingly high level of parity. No matter how good one team is thought to be, the truth is that the conference is just so strong from top-to-bottom that the odds are very much against even the favorite winning the SEC. And, moreover, if you generally want to have any real chance of winning the SEC, you had better have a quarterback with at least a year of starting experience. Apparently this league is generally just entirely too tough to throw a first-year starter to the wolves and expect a champion to emerge.

As LSU embarks on its 2007 campaign, they will do so as the undisputed SEC favorite, and also with a first-year starter at quarterback: Matt Flynn. If the Tigers can win the SEC this season, they will not only have out-fought eleven opponents in a brutally tough conference, but they will have out-fought history as well.

2006 SEC: The Bendability Index

In the previous post, I introduced the Bendability Index, and made the argument for its relevance in college football. Though I focused on Alabama, I nevertheless had to do the research for the other eleven SEC teams just to see how the Crimson Tide stacked up by comparison. And since the research has already been done, I might as well go ahead and publish it.

The following is how the entire SEC ranked in Bendability Index:



All told, I wouldn't really say there are any major surprises. The teams generally stacked up about like you thought they would have, with a few exceptions here and there.

One point, though, that should be made regards Georgia. Though the Dawgs had one of the best defenses in the conference -- if not the nation -- in 2006, they were very low in terms of Bendability Index, ranking tenth in the conference by that measure. The problem was a struggling Georgia offense that often times committed devastating turnovers. Again, as said earlier, the Bendability Index is not solely a measure of defensive prowess, but of overall team efficiency. The 2006 Georgia Bulldogs proved that point quite nicely.

The Bendability Index

The Bendability Index is something you probably haven't heard of before. But it's something you are about to hear about, and it's something that you should know. It's a very relevant statistic, and it should be tracked, though -- for the usual reasons regarding a lack of in-depth analysis in most circles -- it is not.

So just what is the Bendability Index?

Cold, Hard Football Facts -- insofar as I can tell -- is the inventor of this statistic, and they have this to say about it:

This is the first stat that chronicles the phenomenon of the "bend but don't break" defense and provides a measure of defensive efficiency. The Bendability Index is obtained by dividing a team's total yards allowed by total points allowed, yielding Yards Per Point allowed. A team that ranks high on the Bendability Index has the defense that opponents must work hardest to score upon

In other words, you literally have to do more to score points against teams that rank high in the Bendability Index. You have to gain more yards, move the ball farther, pick up more first downs, etc.

But is the Bendability Index merely a measure of defensive prowess? No. Again quoting Cold, Hard Football Facts:

The Bendability Index is not purely a defensive yardstick. It is, instead, a great barometer of team success, of overall team strength and efficiency. It is a function of many team-wide factors, including general defensive strength, special teams proficiency, turnover differential, and Red Zone defense.

Though the Bendability Index measures defensive prowess, as noted earlier, it also indicates overall team strength. Poor play from the offensive and special teams (namely offensive turnovers, and poor punting and kicking) also have a massive impact on the number of points allowed. So it's not just a measure of defensive performance, but of the efficiency of your team as a whole. Never forget, it's not just defenses that give up points. Teams, as a whole, give up points.

Moreover, it's a highly relevant statistic. Double Extra Point -- a blog similar to this one dedicated to Nebraska football -- crunched the numbers and found that the Bendability Index correlated with winning significantly higher than total defense, pass efficiency defense, run defense, third down efficiency defense, and fourth down efficiency defense. The only thing that correlated higher with winning than the Bendability Index was scoring defense, and it did so only very slightly. In the big picture, the Bendability Index may even be a more important statistic than even scoring defense, as was noted by Cold, Hard Football Facts.

So how did my beloved Crimson Tide stack up in terms of Bendability Index in 2006?

Not well at all, unfortunately.

All told, when you run the numbers based on conference play, we finished 11th in the conference in the Bendability Index, ahead of only Mississippi State. At the end of the day, opposing teams generated only 13.39 yards per point scored. By comparison, Florida led the conference, as opposing teams generated over 19 yards per point scored. For another comparison, our 2005 team forced opposing teams to generate 23.75 yards per point scored (I don't have the full SEC data for the 2005, but I'm sure that led the league by a mile).

Certainly that is a sign of a poor play in 2006 by our defense. The loss of the stars of the 2005 defense, being brutally honest, hurt much more than anyone expected. I'm not even sure rival Alabama haters expected the drop-off that we ultimately saw.

But, again, it's not just the defense. It's a measure of overall team efficiency, or in case in 2006, a lack thereof. The Alabama offense turned the ball over entirely too much, and in some cases those turnovers led directly to points. Take Quentin Culbertson's interception of John Parker Wilson returned for a touchdown in the Mississippi State game for example, the Bulldogs put seven points on the board with the offense sipping Gatorade on the bench. But it was also indicative of other problems, particularly on special teams. No one needs to be told special teams were atrocious in 2006. We finished near the bottom in punting, kick-offs were generally short, and we generally allowed big returns. All told, it all combined for opposing teams to have short fields, if not points directly, and that made it much easier to score points by having to move the ball a much shorter distance to get the ball either into the end zone and / or between the uprights.

And, really, that's about all you can say. Unfortunately, it's just another statistic showing just how bad we were in 2006. Hopefully that will change dramatically in 2007 with the new coaching regime.

Either way, the Bendability Index is certainly something you should be keeping your eye on.

Snap Distribution

A reader asked in a previous post for my opinions on how snaps should be distributed between starters and back-ups, so here goes:

At bottom, how should snaps be distributed between starters and back-ups?

Well, the simple answer is that the proper snap distribution depends on a variety of factors, and the distribution itself changes based on the unique circumstances of situation in question.

To begin with, there are no hard and fast answers to the question. There's just no way you can really run the data and somehow conclude that starters should play x percentage of snaps and that back-ups should play z percentage of snaps. Something like that would require the situation to be very black and white, but in reality it's all one massive gray area.

Generally speaking, though, you would like to give back-ups a good bit of meaningful playing time. Doing so would not only build for the future, but it would also create a more experienced squad with more quality depth, and as we all know, quality depth is largely what wins football games. However, though you would like to do that, the harsh reality is doing so is simply not a feasible option in most cases. Conference games (and all "big" games, for that matter) are generally always close, even for bad teams (look at our 2006 season), and you simply cannot afford to not have your best players on the field the overwhelming majority of the time. The games are just too close and the end result could completely change with just one play, so you must play your best players (i.e. starters) as much as you possibly can.

Beyond that, the snap distribution between the starters and the back-ups should also depend on the disparity of the talent levels between the two groups. If you have great starters and poor back-ups, it only makes sense to give the overwhelming majority of meaningful snaps to the starters; honestly, you may as well play them 'til they drop, because even in that scenario they are still likely your best players. On the other hand, if the talent level between the starters and back-ups is closer (say, Shaud Williams and Santonio Beard, as we saw in 2002) then you should alter your strategy to split the snaps more equally. Doing so limits the odds of one player getting injured, and the lesser physical pounding keeps them fresher, healthier, etc., and overall more productive in the long-run.

A sizable lead, too, can alter the ideal strategy. If you find yourself in an unusual number of blowout games (regardless of which end you are on), the ideal strategy would be to play the back-ups more. If you are blowing a team out (say, for example, like LSU blew out Kentucky 49-0 a year ago), you should bench the starters and play the back-ups. Doing so limits the risk your starters will suffer injuries, and moreover it will also help, albeit slightly, increase experience and quality depth. On the other hand, if you are getting annihilated, you should give the back-ups more time. Just as playing starters when you are ahead by a wide margin is a poor idea, so is playing them when you are behind by a wide margin. By that point, considering it is likely later in the game, a win is impossible, and all you will do by playing starters is stretch the game out and increase the risk of injury for your starters. You may as well give the back-ups some quality snaps to improve your overall team, and shield your starters from potential injuries.

The position of a particular player can also change the snap distribution. At one extreme, the starting quarterback is generally going to play every meaningful snap, as long he remains remotely healthy. At other extremes (generally interior defensive linemen), players rotate almost continuously, with back-ups often getting as many snaps as starters.

At bottom, despite the extreme importance of finding the right snap distribution between starters and back-ups, it's a complicated question with no clear-cut answers. There are a literal ton of factors that could influence the ideal snap distribution strategy, and figuring out the ideal snap distribution strategy in any game is a very complex matter. It's yet another gray area in which good coaching can come into play and make a massive difference in the overall performance of a team.

And finally, to close, never think that proper snap distribution is not important. No, we can't quantify it, and we can't put those numbers in an Excel spreadsheet and come up with an ideal strategy. But nevertheless, it's very important. Never think that just because you can't quantify something into a tangible product that it is not important. Proper snap distribution is just one of many things of that nature that are very important.

2006 SEC Pass Defense

After posting the analysis of the 2006 Alabama pass defense, I said a post on the 2006 overall SEC pass defense would be forthcoming. Thus...

LSU and Arkansas were two of the top pass defenses in the SEC in 2006. Interestingly enough, though, on the surface you might not expect that they were all that good. Combined, they gave up twice as many touchdowns as they created interceptions, and the Bayou Bengals and the Hogs finished tenth and eleventh in interception rate, respectively. But make no mistake about it, these two pass defenses were damn good. LSU and Arkansas finished first and second in completion percentage, and third and fourth in yards per completion, respectively.

LSU and Arkansas bring an opportunity to make a great point about effective pass defense. In reality, in terms of coverage of pass defense, all that really gets any real attention is touchdown passes and interceptions. That's what Stu Scott blows his load over on SportsCenter, and that is what is replayed a million times on YouTube. But that is far from what effective pass defense is about. As LSU and Arkansas made a great example of in 2006, effective pass defense is mostly about forcing a large number of incomplete passes, and limiting the yardage allowed when a pass is completed. Oh sure, limiting touchdowns and maximizing interceptions are things that you should certainly strive for, but in reality touchdowns and interceptions are a relative rarity, with a touchdown or an interception occurring on only about 8.5% of total pass attempts (8.47% of the time in 2006). Even the SEC leader in interception rate snagged interceptions on only a mere 5.53% of all passes thrown (South Carolina). At bottom, the truth of the matter is that the best pass defense is a pass falling harmlessly to the ground, or if a pass is caught by the offense, tackling the receiver immediately and limiting him to a relatively short gain. If you can consistently do that, almost regardless of what happens with touchdowns and interceptions, you are going to have a good pass defense. Again, LSU and Arkansas proved that point quite nicely with their 2006 performances. On the other hand, if you can't consistently force incomplete passes -- however you go about doing that -- and if you can't limit yardage in the event that there is a completion, you are in major trouble. Even if you snag more interceptions than any other team in the conference, interceptions are such a rarity in terms of overall passes that if you can't force incompletions and limit yardage on the other 95% of throws, you are not going to have a very good pass defense.

South Carolina exemplifies the last point. The Gamecocks in 2006 were great at intercepting the football, as they led the SEC in interception rate. They snagged eleven interceptions on 199 passing attempts, giving them a league-leading 5.53% interception rate. However, they finished seventh in the conference in completion percentage (58.29% of passes against them were completed), and finished tenth in the conference in yards allowed per completion, giving up roughly 13.5 yards per catch. And, of course, the South Carolina pass defense was pretty mediocre, all things considered. Again, it doesn't matter if you are great at intercepting the football, interceptions are such a rare occurrence that you will not be able to build a good pass defense off of just intercepting the football. You must be able to force incompletions and limit the amount of yardage gained when the ball is caught. South Carolina was not able to do that particularly well in 2006, despite their knack for interceptions, and as a result they did not field a particularly good pass defense.

Georgia, too, brings about an opportunity to showcase another point. The Dawgs had a very good pass defense in 2006, no two ways about it. Though they finished sixth in the conference in completion percentage, they were second in yards per completion, second in interception rate, and fourth in touchdown rate. At bottom, this was a good pass defense. But what is the point I'm getting at? The point is that the Dawgs had a very good pass defense, and that was due in large part to a great pass rush from the defensive ends. All told, Quentin Moses and Charles Johnson combined for 15.5 sacks in 2006, and are now playing in the NFL. The point is that good pass defense can come from either a good pass rush from the defensive line, and / or good pass coverage from the secondary. You often times see teams with relatively poor secondaries do quite well against the pass because the rush the passer so well with their front four, and likewise, you often times see relatively poor pass rushing teams do quite well because the secondary covers so well. Georgia proves that point quite nicely. Their secondary -- though stocked with solid players -- perhaps didn't have as good of secondary players as the numbers would suggest, but nevertheless they had a great pass defense because they got such a good, consistent pass rush from their defensive ends.

And that's going to be about it for the lessons, but moving on...

I said earlier that LSU and Arkansas were two of the best pass defenses in the conference, but I didn't say they were the best. Reason being: the Florida Gators. Though the Gators did allow opponents to complete a lot of passes (9th in the conference), they were exceptional in every other category. Granted, they did give up quite a few completions, they generally didn't give up very much yardage. They finished first in the conference in yards per completion, and did so by a very wide margin over second place Georgia. Moreover, despite the fact that teams threw more passes against the Gators than any other SEC team (290 attempts), they allowed the fewest touchdown passes in the SEC, thus leading the SEC in touchdown rate by an incredibly massive margin. Beyond that, the Gators had more than twice as many interceptions as touchdowns, thus leading the conference in interception-to-touchdown ratio, again by a massive margin. What can you say? These guys really had it together in 2006.

The Auburn pass defense was generally regarded as good, but it wasn't anything overly special, and it was a bit intriguing. They didn't give up very many completions (fourth in the conference in completion percentage), but when they did give up completions, they generally went for big yardage (eighth in the conference in yards per reception). Moreover, they didn't intercept the ball particularly well (ninth in the conference in interception rate). However, they did finish third in the conference in touchdown rate, which makes me wonder a bit. It wasn't a particularly great pass defense, so why did they finish so high in that category? A few reasons are possible. One, they may have not given up very many long passes; two, they may have tightened up considerably in the redzone, where teams could have opted more towards the run; or three, they may have just played that much better in the red zone with a smaller space to defend. Either way, it'd be nice to break things down even further to see exactly what was going on there.

Tennessee, as a whole, was pretty middle of the road. They did quite well in a couple of categories, finishing third in completion percentage and fourth in interception rate. But they also didn't do too well in a couple of categories, finishing seventh in yards per completion and ninth in interception rate.

The Ole Miss pass defense was probably a bit better than most gave it credit for being, at least in the eight conference games. They finished fifth in completion percentage, and fifth in yards per completion. They were the definition of average in touchdown rate, finishing sixth in the conference. The problem with the Rebels was interceptions. For whatever reason, Johnny Reb couldn't get an interception if their life depended on it. They racked up a mere three interceptions, and finished dead last in terms of interception rate, with its interception rate a puny 1.72%. Again, though, this was a better pass defense than most gave it credit for. The Rebs only went 2-6 in conference play, but they scared the living hell out of Auburn, Alabama, LSU, and Georgia, and came very close to knocking each member of that group off. Obviously, it wasn't the atrociously anemic offense that kept them in those games, and run defense alone can't do it. The Rebs pass defense, while not particularly good, was pretty decent.

And then we get to the really ugly pass defenses...

Kentucky finished tenth in the league in completion percentage, and as often as they gave up completed passes, those completions nevertheless went for huge yardage. These weren't dink and dunk throws that failed to rack up very much yardage. All told, UK finished dead last in the SEC in yards per completion, giving up 15.66 yards per catch. They were the only SEC team to give up more than 14 yards per reception. Though they intercepted the ball quite well (5th in the SEC in interception rate), they struggled in terms of touchdown rate, finishing 8th. At bottom, this pass defense was just terrible. All year long, teams consistently threw the ball at will with little trouble. How in the world Mike Archer, the defensive coordinator, was hired by NC State, I'll never know.

Mississippi State, too, was equally terrible. They finished eleventh in completion percentage, and eleventh in yards per reception. They did intercept the ball relatively well, sixth in the conference in interception rate, but did give up a lot of touchdown passes, as they finished eleventh in the conference in touchdown rate. At bottom, it was a terrible pass defense. Teams completed a high percentage of passes, and those completions went for a lot of yards. All year long, teams easily moved the ball through the air on the Bulldogs. About the only good game their pass defense had was, unfortunately, against Alabama. What can you say? They went 3-9 for a reason.

And last, and certainly worst, we have the Vanderbilt Commodores. The enlightened 'Dores might win in the game of life, but they didn't win on the field in 2006, and their horrendous pass defense was a large reason why. The 'Dores finished dead last in completion percentage, as teams completed almost 65 per cent of their passes against them. Vanderbilt was the only team to have a completion percentage above 60 per cent. They finished ninth in yards per completion, seventh in interception rate, and dead last yet again in touchdown rate. What can you say? They were just, well, Vanderbilt.