The Crimson Tide defense, after losing several starters from a year ago, is a bit unsettled going into 2007 as to whom the starters will be. Moreover, that is all compounded by the fact that there is a new regime in town, with a completely different defensive philosophy.
So exactly which players seem to comprise the starting eleven for the upcoming season?
It's hard to tell, to say the least. However, Spring practice and the A-Day game does give us a very good indicator of who is seemingly starting this Fall. Judging by that, the starting eleven seems to be:
DE: Wallace Gilberry
DT: Bryan Motley
DE: Bobby Greenwood
OLB: Zeke Knight
ILB: Darren Mustin
ILB: Prince Hall
Jack: Keith Saunders
CB: Simeon Castille
S: Marcus Carter
S: Rashad Johnson
CB: Kareem Jackson
That was the first-string defense at the A-Day game, and being quite honest, there's no reason to expect that won't be the first-string defense this Fall, barring a couple of possible exceptions.
Going deeper, expounding upon the rough outline of the likely starting eleven:
Wallace Gilberry is a fifth-year senior, and this will be his third year as a starter. He has started twenty-four consecutive games for the Crimson Tide, and he is one of the better players we have on the defensive of the ball. He was a great pass rusher in 2004, but foundered the past couple of years with Kines going to a more conservative pass rushing scheme. Hopefully we'll see the pass rusher we saw as a freshman. He's solid against the run, and he'll be a key cog. As long as Gilberry can stay remotely healthy, he'll be a starter, no question about it.
Bryan Motley is likely to anchor the center of the line. He has some talent but he's also young (redshirt freshman), still needs to put on some weight, and has no Division 1-A experience at nose tackle. It is not that anyone should expect that Motley will set the world on fire, but at the moment no one is going to beat him out. Probably the only incoming freshman who could have done so is Kerry Murphy, and he is not going to qualify academically, it seems. As for the other nose tackles, Motley quickly shot past all of them when he was moved to nose tackle this Spring.
Bobby Greenwood had a good Spring, and started at defensive end opposite Gilberry in the Tide's three scrimmages. All told, he's one of the most talented guys we have on the defensive side of the ball. He was a huge signee coming out of Prattville, as the 6-A lineman of the year with over 100 tackles and 19 sacks in his senior season, and he had a great year as a true freshman in 2005. Just being honest, Greenwood is a rising third-year player with good size, good talent, and lots of potential. Despite a frustrating 2006 season in which he butted heads with his position coach, his tangibles alone means he will start if he stays healthy.
Zeke Knight is, apparently, going to start at outside linebacker. Though he did get some reps at the Jack position this Spring behind Keith Saunders, he played a good bit during the A-Day game as the first-string outside linebacker and had a great showing (three tackles and a quarterback pressure). Much like with Greenwood, Knight is an extremely talented player. He has great size and is incredibly athletic; he was yet another huge recruit coming out of high school, and he is now finally at the position that fits his physical skill set best: linebacker. Much like Greenwood, Knight simply has so much size, speed, athleticism, and overall talent that it will be very hard for anyone to beat him out, assuming he can stay healthy. Moreover, his athleticism will allow Saban to use him as a weapon in a variety of zone blitz packages, which is a major part of Saban's defense.
Darren Mustin, at the moment, is the first-team inside linebacker alongside Prince Hall. Mustin is a 23-year old player, a senior who transferred from Middle Tennessee State. He's pretty big, and that fits pretty well for an inside linebacker in the 3-4. The question with Mustin will be how long he can hold off super recruit Rolando McClain, but until McClain overtakes him, Mustin is the presumed starter.
Prince Hall will be, arguably, the key to the defense, and there's no question of him starting. As long as he's healthy, he will start.
Keith Saunders is without a doubt the front runner for the Jack position, the hybrid end / linebacker in the 3-4. Much like Hall and Gilberry, given his outstanding Spring performance, if he's healthy, he will start.
Simeon Castille will be the team's number one cornerback. He's physically gifted, has a ton of experience, and his natural aggressive style makes him a perfect fit for Saban's aggressive cover schemes. Just like Gilberry, Hall, and Saunders, as long as Castille is healthy, he will be starting.
Kareem Jackson, oddly enough, seems to be the favorite to start opposite of Simeon Castille. Saban and company raved all through Spring practice about Jackson's standout play, and any time someone as critical as Saban is handing out praise, people should take notice. Jackson spent last year in military school, and he seemingly has a very big upside. While more experienced players such as Eric Gray, Marquis Johnson or another player was expected to step up and nab the starting corner job opposite Simeon, Jackson seems to be the front runner. He played with the first-string during the A-Day game, and he is seemingly set to solidify his hold on the starting job. Apparently Saban is very big on him, which only increases his chances of starting.
Rashad Johnson, the former walk-on, surprised everyone last year when he beat out Marcus Carter for most of the year. Honestly, Carter was only able to regain his starting job when Johnson went down with a severe ankle sprain. This Spring, Johnson did well again, seemingly getting a good hold on a starting job this Fall. He's a very athletic guy, and he has a good bit of experience (he played 406 snaps last year, despite missing two games due to the ankle injury, and 196 snaps as a freshman), so he is probably going to hold on to that job.
Marcus Carter, at the moment, is likely to be the starter opposite Johnson. That said, though, he didn't have a very good year in 2006 (go back and watch Keiland Williams' touchdown run in the first quarter of the LSU game for verification), and at the moment it seems that he is only in line for the starting job because of a lack of proven depth behind him. Moreover, Carter tends to play timid and reserved, neither of which are qualities that Saban looks for in a defensive back. And, despite playing with the first-string in the A-Day game, Carter did give up a long touchdown pass to Nikita Stover when he bit entirely too much on the playaction fake. Much like with Darren Mustin, the thing to keep your eye on will be how long Carter can hold off Justin Woodall, and -- if he qualifies -- Michael Ricks. Both of those guys are seemingly more talented, and have more upside, but until they can take over, Carter is the presumed starter.
As for now, that seems to be the likely starters on the defensive side of the ball in 2007.
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
Tight End Production, Or Lack Thereof
Many fans are excited about the usage of the tight end in the new Saban / Applewhite / Pendry offensive scheme. Many are even expecting that the tight end will be quite productive in this year's scheme.
A dose of reality could be helpful.
In 2006, we didn't throw the ball very often to the tight end, and rightfully so. In the eight conference games, we threw the ball to the tight end fourteen times, and it only resulted in a completed pass about one-third of the time (five receptions).
Generally speaking, the few catches that the tight ends racked up in 2007 generally came when they were ignored by the defense. For example, Nick Walker's touchdown catch in overtime against Arkansas was a fluke thing that wouldn't normally occur. In that situation, all eleven Arkansas defenders engaged the run, and no one ever thought twice about covering Walker, who waltzed into the back of the end zone wide open. Of course, that was a great play call in that situation, but it's not useful for future performance because if the tight end became more involved in the offense, the opposing defense would have covered him.
At bottom, the tight ends simply were terrible in 2006, and there is no way to sugarcoat the situation otherwise. Despite the fact that we sent tight ends into passing routes with a relatively high degree of regularity (contrary to popular belief, we did try to utilize the tight end in the passing game, and he was not just a blocker; if you don't believe me, ask Chris Capps), it just didn't work. The tight ends didn't get off the line well, ran poor routes, thus struggling to get open, and then struggled to actually catch the ball once it was thrown in their direction.
The performance of the tight ends in the passing game in 2006 can be summed up quite nicely in one play: We are playing Florida, in the Swamp, in a very close game. It is in the fourth quarter, Florida leads 14-10, and we are driving deep into Florida territory. It is 3rd and 5 from the Florida 4-yard line, and we desperately need a touchdown, or at the very least a first down. Nick Walker comes into the game at tight end, and Shula and co., knowing that the Florida safeties will be playing the outside to shut down the dangerous receivers D.J. Hall and Keith Brown, will likely leave the deep middle of the field open, call for Walker to run a post route. Unfortunately, though we have exactly the match-up we are looking for, Walker lazily gets onto the second level, and then runs a very poor route (rounds it off instead of running a good, clean route with a sharp cut towards the middle of the field). The end result is that the pass is almost intercepted by the Florida defender, and the pass falls harmlessly to the ground, incomplete. We settle for a field goal, and never get close to the end zone again.
Ideally, with the match-up that we wanted, Walker would have charged strong out of his stance and quickly moved onto the second level. After running very hard in a straight line, once he reached the depth of about seven or eight yards, he would immediately and unexpectedly make a very sharp and crisp 45 degree cut towards the middle of the field, and in doing so he would separate himself from the defender covering him. As a result, he would be open, and with a good throw from Wilson, we score the touchdown, and take a 17-14 lead over Florida with twelve minutes to go, and it's an entirely different ball game. Of course, though, it did not go as ideally planned, just about like everything else with the 2006 season.
The tight end play will, hopefully, be a good bit improved, but no one should be kidding themselves. The performance of our tight ends last year was terrible, and from a player development perspective, they probably have as far to go as any other unit on the entire team. Rome wasn't built in a day is the common expression these days, and that applies to tight ends as well. No one should be expecting miracles, just hoping for solid, steady improvement.
A dose of reality could be helpful.
In 2006, we didn't throw the ball very often to the tight end, and rightfully so. In the eight conference games, we threw the ball to the tight end fourteen times, and it only resulted in a completed pass about one-third of the time (five receptions).
Generally speaking, the few catches that the tight ends racked up in 2007 generally came when they were ignored by the defense. For example, Nick Walker's touchdown catch in overtime against Arkansas was a fluke thing that wouldn't normally occur. In that situation, all eleven Arkansas defenders engaged the run, and no one ever thought twice about covering Walker, who waltzed into the back of the end zone wide open. Of course, that was a great play call in that situation, but it's not useful for future performance because if the tight end became more involved in the offense, the opposing defense would have covered him.
At bottom, the tight ends simply were terrible in 2006, and there is no way to sugarcoat the situation otherwise. Despite the fact that we sent tight ends into passing routes with a relatively high degree of regularity (contrary to popular belief, we did try to utilize the tight end in the passing game, and he was not just a blocker; if you don't believe me, ask Chris Capps), it just didn't work. The tight ends didn't get off the line well, ran poor routes, thus struggling to get open, and then struggled to actually catch the ball once it was thrown in their direction.
The performance of the tight ends in the passing game in 2006 can be summed up quite nicely in one play: We are playing Florida, in the Swamp, in a very close game. It is in the fourth quarter, Florida leads 14-10, and we are driving deep into Florida territory. It is 3rd and 5 from the Florida 4-yard line, and we desperately need a touchdown, or at the very least a first down. Nick Walker comes into the game at tight end, and Shula and co., knowing that the Florida safeties will be playing the outside to shut down the dangerous receivers D.J. Hall and Keith Brown, will likely leave the deep middle of the field open, call for Walker to run a post route. Unfortunately, though we have exactly the match-up we are looking for, Walker lazily gets onto the second level, and then runs a very poor route (rounds it off instead of running a good, clean route with a sharp cut towards the middle of the field). The end result is that the pass is almost intercepted by the Florida defender, and the pass falls harmlessly to the ground, incomplete. We settle for a field goal, and never get close to the end zone again.
Ideally, with the match-up that we wanted, Walker would have charged strong out of his stance and quickly moved onto the second level. After running very hard in a straight line, once he reached the depth of about seven or eight yards, he would immediately and unexpectedly make a very sharp and crisp 45 degree cut towards the middle of the field, and in doing so he would separate himself from the defender covering him. As a result, he would be open, and with a good throw from Wilson, we score the touchdown, and take a 17-14 lead over Florida with twelve minutes to go, and it's an entirely different ball game. Of course, though, it did not go as ideally planned, just about like everything else with the 2006 season.
The tight end play will, hopefully, be a good bit improved, but no one should be kidding themselves. The performance of our tight ends last year was terrible, and from a player development perspective, they probably have as far to go as any other unit on the entire team. Rome wasn't built in a day is the common expression these days, and that applies to tight ends as well. No one should be expecting miracles, just hoping for solid, steady improvement.
Monday, July 16, 2007
2006 Pythagorean Wins
I've posted previously about Pythagorean Wins in this forum, so perhaps it should be a bit familiar. As a refresher, Pythagorean Wins is a statistical measure of how many wins a team "should" have in a given year based on how many points the team scored and how many points they allowed. The concept was first used in professional baseball, but has since been successfully applied to other sports, and I've applied it to college football as well.
At bottom, the underlying point of Pythagorean Wins in regard to predicting future performance is that teams that overachieve -- i.e. win more games than their Pythagorean projections says they should have -- tend to decline the following year, and teams that underachieve -- i.e. win fewer games than their Pythagorean projections said they should have -- tend to improve the following year. After analyzing SEC football from 1999-2006, it becomes very obvious that Pythagorean Wins is a highly useful indicator of future performance.
Among the major declines that Pythagorean wins predicted included 2000 Alabama, 2004 Ole Miss, 2004 Florida, and 2005 Tennessee. Among the major improvements predicted by Pythagorean wins included 2001 Alabama, 2005 Alabama, 2005 Florida, 2006 Arkansas, and 2006 Tennessee.
Generally speaking, the magic number seems to be one. You come up with a Pythagorean projection based on the eight regular season conference games, and the teams that win a game or more above their Pythagorean projection tend to decline the following year, and teams that win a game or fewer above their Pythagorean projection tend to improve the following year.
Here are the Pythagorean projections for the 2006 season:
Obviously, we had three overachievers -- Florida, Kentucky, and Auburn -- and two underachievers -- South Carolina and Vanderbilt -- in 2006.
The Gators, despite having a projection of only 5.5 conference wins, went 7-1 in conference play, won the SEC, and ultimately became national champions. Auburn was the second most overachieving team, and it shouldn't come as much of a surprise. The Tigers beat LSU on a controversial call, stood up South Carolina on the goal line, beat Florida in a narrow game, needed an interception returned for a touchdown to beat Ole Miss, and had another narrow win over Alabama, despite being annihilated by Georgia and Arkansas. Kentucky, too, becomes suspect with a few close wins mixed in with a few lopsided blowouts.
The underachievers, as largely expected, include South Carolina and Vanderbilt. Both teams played solid football all year, but generally ran out of luck in close contests.
You never know for certain, and there will be some exceptions, but if you are looking for teams to mildly improve in 2006, Vanderbilt and South Carolina would be safe beats, and no one should be surprised if Florida, Auburn, and Kentucky suffer a bit of a decline.
A few more general notes on Pythagorean wins:
At bottom, the underlying point of Pythagorean Wins in regard to predicting future performance is that teams that overachieve -- i.e. win more games than their Pythagorean projections says they should have -- tend to decline the following year, and teams that underachieve -- i.e. win fewer games than their Pythagorean projections said they should have -- tend to improve the following year. After analyzing SEC football from 1999-2006, it becomes very obvious that Pythagorean Wins is a highly useful indicator of future performance.
Among the major declines that Pythagorean wins predicted included 2000 Alabama, 2004 Ole Miss, 2004 Florida, and 2005 Tennessee. Among the major improvements predicted by Pythagorean wins included 2001 Alabama, 2005 Alabama, 2005 Florida, 2006 Arkansas, and 2006 Tennessee.
Generally speaking, the magic number seems to be one. You come up with a Pythagorean projection based on the eight regular season conference games, and the teams that win a game or more above their Pythagorean projection tend to decline the following year, and teams that win a game or fewer above their Pythagorean projection tend to improve the following year.
Here are the Pythagorean projections for the 2006 season:
Obviously, we had three overachievers -- Florida, Kentucky, and Auburn -- and two underachievers -- South Carolina and Vanderbilt -- in 2006.
The Gators, despite having a projection of only 5.5 conference wins, went 7-1 in conference play, won the SEC, and ultimately became national champions. Auburn was the second most overachieving team, and it shouldn't come as much of a surprise. The Tigers beat LSU on a controversial call, stood up South Carolina on the goal line, beat Florida in a narrow game, needed an interception returned for a touchdown to beat Ole Miss, and had another narrow win over Alabama, despite being annihilated by Georgia and Arkansas. Kentucky, too, becomes suspect with a few close wins mixed in with a few lopsided blowouts.
The underachievers, as largely expected, include South Carolina and Vanderbilt. Both teams played solid football all year, but generally ran out of luck in close contests.
You never know for certain, and there will be some exceptions, but if you are looking for teams to mildly improve in 2006, Vanderbilt and South Carolina would be safe beats, and no one should be surprised if Florida, Auburn, and Kentucky suffer a bit of a decline.
A few more general notes on Pythagorean wins:
- Generally speaking, the underlying rule regarding Pythagorean wins holds true in SEC football. There does seem to be a couple of exceptions, however. The first exception is second year coaches. Even when a team overachieves with a first year coach, they often times nevertheless improve in their second season. It's not a guaranteed thing, but apparently the gains made by continuity and that particular coach's players in place help offset what the Pythagorean projection says you should do. The second exception is with the sisters of the poor of the SEC, mainly Kentucky, Vanderbilt, and Mississippi State. For whatever reason, those teams tend to be able to underachieve one year, and consistently do as bad or worse the following year. I'm not sure why that happens, but it is something that keeps popping up.
- If you factor out the last-second fluke touchdown that Auburn scored on Florida (in which had no influence on the outcome of the game), the Pythagorean projections flip a bit, as suddenly Auburn was the most overachieving team and Florida was the second most overachieving team. Some people take out meaningless, fluke points like that because they skew the data, and that wouldn't be a bad idea in this case. But, technically if I did it for that game, I'd have to do it for every other, too, so I decided against that for the sake of simplicity.
"Bear Bryant Is Dead"
As an Alabama fan, you usually hear the old refrain, "Bear Bryant is dead." The gist is that well, Bear Bryant is dead, and with him gone Alabama football is nothing special. Moreover, it also implies that we fell apart after Bryant, with us doing very little since he left, and none of the foregoing has any validity.
Let us go deeper and re-visit the past 25 years.
The departure of Bryant could not have had worse timing, and could not have been more surprising. In 1978 and 1979, we were national champions. 1980 brought another incredible year that had us contending for a national championship, and though 1981 was a bit of a down year -- as expected -- we still won 9 games, and Bryant won 315. Then came 1982. Many thought Bryant would win his seventh national championship, and early on that seemed valid. We started out 4-0, and then highly-ranked Penn State and Joe Paterno came to Legion Field. As great as that team was, they were no match for the man under the houndstooth hat. The Tide dominated Penn State day, and won by three touchdowns. After the Nittany Lion massacre, we were 5-0, #1 in both polls, and on track for yet another national championship.
And then it all fell apart. Bryant's health suddenly failed, and he struggled just to get through his day-to-day coaching activities. It showed on the field. The season crashed and burned with losses to Tennessee, LSU, Auburn, and Southern Miss. Penn State, the team that was annihilated by Alabama, went on to beat Hershel Walker and Georgia in the Sugar Bowl, and finished as national champions. Less than a month after the season ended, Bryant was dead.
Again, it couldn't have been worse timing, and it could not have been more surprising. Most were expecting another national championship, and the end result was not even imaginable.
Despite the difficult situation, however, we did quite well in the years following Bryant's death.
Ray Perkins was hired to replace Bryant (though he was not Bryant's choice), and in 1983 we went 8-4 and won the Sun Bowl. 1984 was a major disappointment, largely due to injuries (Kerry Goode), as we went 5-6, our first losing season in almost thirty years. Still, even in that year, we racked up wins over Penn State and Auburn. 1985 was a good year, with the Tide going 9-2-1 and winning arguably the best Iron Bowl ever. The season ended with a blowout win over USC in the Sun Bowl. 1986 was another good year, with the Tide winning 10 games and blowing out Washington in the Sun Bowl.
1987 saw the arrival of the Bill Curry, and it was a bit of a disappointing year. We went only 7-5 -- despite wins over Penn State, Tennessee, and LSU -- and lost a close game to Michigan in the Hall of Fame Bowl. 1988 was an improvement, going 9-3, with wins over Tennessee, Penn State, Texas A&M, and Army in the Sun Bowl. 1989 was the breakout year, as we went 10-0 before losing to Auburn in the Iron Bowl. Still, we finished 10-1, won the SEC, and lost by eight points in a close game to national champion Miami in the Sugar Bowl.
1990 marked the arrival of Gene Stallings, and despite terrible injury luck (Siran Stacey tore his ACL on the first play from scrimmage in the season opener), we still went 7-5 with wins over Tennessee, LSU, and Auburn, and an appearance (albeit a very disappointing one) in the Fiesta Bowl. 1991 saw the Tide go 11-1, win the Blockbuster Bowl, and finish in the final top five. In 1992, of course, we went undefeated and won a national championship. 1993 saw nine more wins, and a bowl win in the Gator Bowl over North Carolina. 1994 ended with a 12-1 record, the sole loss coming by one point to Florida in the SEC Championship Game, and a win over Ohio State in the Citrus Bowl. 1995 saw nine wins, and 1996 ended with another ten-win season, and a bowl win over Michigan in the Outback Bowl.
At bottom, the fourteen year stretch from 1983-1996 was pretty successful for Alabama, even considering our lofty accomplishments. In those 14 years, we had 13 winning seasons with 12 bowl appearances (would have been 13, but in 1995 we were banned from bowl play) and those 12 bowl appearances netted 9 bowl wins. Moreover, we racked up two SEC championships and one national championship, and won over 75% of our games in that 14-year stretch. We had six seasons of 10+ wins, and nine seasons of 9+ wins, and we averaged over nine wins per year. Moreover, in that stretch, we had a 7-7 record against Auburn (in arguably the greatest stretch in the history of Auburn football), a 4-2 record against Georgia, a 9-4-1 record against LSU, and an 8-5-1 record against Tennessee.
Even with Bryant gone, we did very well in the fourteen years following his departure.
It wasn't until 1997, with the hiring of Mike Dubose, that we began to struggle. Unfortunately, the Dubose hiring and the NCAA sanctions doomed us to a poor decade -- well, poor for us, anyway -- from 1997-2006, but all of that had absolutely nothing to do with Bryant. Saying that the Bryant departure was any way related to the struggles from 1997-2006 is about like saying that the Herbert Hoover presidency was related to World War II. There's just no legitimate causal link between the two occurrences.
The truth of the matter is that since the early 1920's, we have been the example of consistent high-quality performance on the football field. Hell, we had three national championships before Bryant even arrived at Alabama as a player, and we continued to do very well in the 20 years after Bryant left. Only the three years of Ears Whitworth saw the Crimson Tide struggle greatly. But after that, Bryant returned, which led 25 years of sheer and utter dominance, and even after he left we had another 14-year stretch of very good football. It's just we've had a rough-for-us ten year stretch from 1997-2006, and nothing more.
At bottom, the whole "Bear Bryant is dead" argument is patently absurd, and really only reflects upon the idiocy of whomever is making the argument.
Let us go deeper and re-visit the past 25 years.
The departure of Bryant could not have had worse timing, and could not have been more surprising. In 1978 and 1979, we were national champions. 1980 brought another incredible year that had us contending for a national championship, and though 1981 was a bit of a down year -- as expected -- we still won 9 games, and Bryant won 315. Then came 1982. Many thought Bryant would win his seventh national championship, and early on that seemed valid. We started out 4-0, and then highly-ranked Penn State and Joe Paterno came to Legion Field. As great as that team was, they were no match for the man under the houndstooth hat. The Tide dominated Penn State day, and won by three touchdowns. After the Nittany Lion massacre, we were 5-0, #1 in both polls, and on track for yet another national championship.
And then it all fell apart. Bryant's health suddenly failed, and he struggled just to get through his day-to-day coaching activities. It showed on the field. The season crashed and burned with losses to Tennessee, LSU, Auburn, and Southern Miss. Penn State, the team that was annihilated by Alabama, went on to beat Hershel Walker and Georgia in the Sugar Bowl, and finished as national champions. Less than a month after the season ended, Bryant was dead.
Again, it couldn't have been worse timing, and it could not have been more surprising. Most were expecting another national championship, and the end result was not even imaginable.
Despite the difficult situation, however, we did quite well in the years following Bryant's death.
Ray Perkins was hired to replace Bryant (though he was not Bryant's choice), and in 1983 we went 8-4 and won the Sun Bowl. 1984 was a major disappointment, largely due to injuries (Kerry Goode), as we went 5-6, our first losing season in almost thirty years. Still, even in that year, we racked up wins over Penn State and Auburn. 1985 was a good year, with the Tide going 9-2-1 and winning arguably the best Iron Bowl ever. The season ended with a blowout win over USC in the Sun Bowl. 1986 was another good year, with the Tide winning 10 games and blowing out Washington in the Sun Bowl.
1987 saw the arrival of the Bill Curry, and it was a bit of a disappointing year. We went only 7-5 -- despite wins over Penn State, Tennessee, and LSU -- and lost a close game to Michigan in the Hall of Fame Bowl. 1988 was an improvement, going 9-3, with wins over Tennessee, Penn State, Texas A&M, and Army in the Sun Bowl. 1989 was the breakout year, as we went 10-0 before losing to Auburn in the Iron Bowl. Still, we finished 10-1, won the SEC, and lost by eight points in a close game to national champion Miami in the Sugar Bowl.
1990 marked the arrival of Gene Stallings, and despite terrible injury luck (Siran Stacey tore his ACL on the first play from scrimmage in the season opener), we still went 7-5 with wins over Tennessee, LSU, and Auburn, and an appearance (albeit a very disappointing one) in the Fiesta Bowl. 1991 saw the Tide go 11-1, win the Blockbuster Bowl, and finish in the final top five. In 1992, of course, we went undefeated and won a national championship. 1993 saw nine more wins, and a bowl win in the Gator Bowl over North Carolina. 1994 ended with a 12-1 record, the sole loss coming by one point to Florida in the SEC Championship Game, and a win over Ohio State in the Citrus Bowl. 1995 saw nine wins, and 1996 ended with another ten-win season, and a bowl win over Michigan in the Outback Bowl.
At bottom, the fourteen year stretch from 1983-1996 was pretty successful for Alabama, even considering our lofty accomplishments. In those 14 years, we had 13 winning seasons with 12 bowl appearances (would have been 13, but in 1995 we were banned from bowl play) and those 12 bowl appearances netted 9 bowl wins. Moreover, we racked up two SEC championships and one national championship, and won over 75% of our games in that 14-year stretch. We had six seasons of 10+ wins, and nine seasons of 9+ wins, and we averaged over nine wins per year. Moreover, in that stretch, we had a 7-7 record against Auburn (in arguably the greatest stretch in the history of Auburn football), a 4-2 record against Georgia, a 9-4-1 record against LSU, and an 8-5-1 record against Tennessee.
Even with Bryant gone, we did very well in the fourteen years following his departure.
It wasn't until 1997, with the hiring of Mike Dubose, that we began to struggle. Unfortunately, the Dubose hiring and the NCAA sanctions doomed us to a poor decade -- well, poor for us, anyway -- from 1997-2006, but all of that had absolutely nothing to do with Bryant. Saying that the Bryant departure was any way related to the struggles from 1997-2006 is about like saying that the Herbert Hoover presidency was related to World War II. There's just no legitimate causal link between the two occurrences.
The truth of the matter is that since the early 1920's, we have been the example of consistent high-quality performance on the football field. Hell, we had three national championships before Bryant even arrived at Alabama as a player, and we continued to do very well in the 20 years after Bryant left. Only the three years of Ears Whitworth saw the Crimson Tide struggle greatly. But after that, Bryant returned, which led 25 years of sheer and utter dominance, and even after he left we had another 14-year stretch of very good football. It's just we've had a rough-for-us ten year stretch from 1997-2006, and nothing more.
At bottom, the whole "Bear Bryant is dead" argument is patently absurd, and really only reflects upon the idiocy of whomever is making the argument.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
D.J. Hall: Record Breaker
Anyone who knows anything about football can tell you that D.J. Hall is a great receiver. In 2006, he broke just about every Alabama single season receiving record, and if he stays even remotely healthy in 2007, he'll own essentially every receiving record in Alabama football history.
All of the mainstream statistics for the receiver position, however, are all cumulative, and thus can be inflated by increased opportunities. In short, a receiver can put up big numbers and still not have a particularly good year, with the reason for the big numbers being so many passes were thrown his way. Considering John Parker Wilson set the Alabama record for single season passing attempts in 2007 with 393 attempts, I wondered if that could have possibly been the real underlying reason to Hall's successes in 2007.
So, I applied the usual analysis, I broke down every pass thrown to Hall this season in the eight conference games.
Long story short, the pass attempts didn't inflate Hall's numbers, he was just that good.
All told, in the eight conference games, 78 passes were thrown to D.J. Hall. Of those 78 passes, Hall caught 47 of them, which gives him a catch rate (percentage of passes thrown to a particular receiver that were actually caught by that receiver) of 60.26%, which is a very high number, especially considering the quality of competition faced in SEC play. Hall went up against opposing team's best cornerback, and often times faced double coverage, but yet he still had a Catch Rate of over 60%, a truly impressive number. To give the number some context, generally speaking, the best NFL receivers have a Catch Rate in the sixty-percent range.
And these weren't short throws, either. It wasn't as if Hall was continuously running five yard curl routes, racking up easy receptions. Hall averaged just under 17 yards per catch on those 47 receptions, so his receptions were generally downfield, more difficult, catches.
Hall's catch rate is even more impressive when you put it context with what surrounded him. The quarterback throwing him the ball, John Parker Wilson, was a first year starter, and Wilson was constantly under pressure due to a poor pass blocking offensive line. Moreover, teams keyed on the pass all year long due the complete ineffectiveness of our rushing attack. Beyond that, Hall largely lacked a legitimate receiving threat to compliment his abilities. Keith Brown was hurt in the Ole Miss game, and never really recovered, and no legitimate receiving threat appeared the rest of the year (aside from Stover in the Iron Bowl).
At bottom, opposing teams knew that Hall was all we had, and they put all of their emphasis on stopping him. We threw to Hall 12 times against Tennessee, 17 times against Mississippi State, and 14 times against LSU. Again, opposing defenses knew he was our only real threat down the stretch, but even so they simply could not stop him.
Beyond that, though, the breakdown showed that we didn't exactly throw to Hall in ideal situations. We threw to him a lot on 1st down (36 times), but when we threw to Hall it was almost always in situations where lots of yardage was needed. Granted, that shouldn't be too surprising -- after all, long yardage situations is why you are throwing in the first place -- but it would have been nice if he could have been utilized better. The underlying idea to play-calling is that you should pass when other teams expect a run, and run when the opposing defense expects a pass, and Shula and co. failed miserably at that in 2006 in relation to Hall. Generally speaking, when you have a play-maker wide receiver, you would like to throw him the ball in situations where the opposing defense expects the run, which should free up man-to-man coverage on the outside for your play-maker receiver. We didn't do that at all in 2006. Of the 78 passes to Hall in 2006, only seven of them came with five yards or less needed for a first down. Unfortunately -- another sign of poor play-calling -- we largely threw the ball to Hall when it was obvious we needed to pass.
Beyond all of the foregoing, we must keep in mind one other thing. Hall played almost all of the 2006 season with a serious left shoulder injury, and injury that was severe enough to require off-season shoulder surgery.
Despite all that he had going against him, Hall caught just about everything that was thrown in his general direction. Actually, the play-by-play data at RollTide.com does not list Hall with dropping a single pass that was thrown his way in conference play in 2006, and, moreover, a large chunk of his incompleted passes were desperation throws late in games that were effectively over.
There are no two ways about it. When you break down Hall's performance using advanced statistics, he really was just that good in 2006, and assuming he can stay healthy in 2007, he's going to likely have an even better year, and break essentially every Alabama receiving record.
Hall's big performance is enough to make the case that he is quite possibly the greatest pure wide receiver we've ever had at Alabama.
All of the mainstream statistics for the receiver position, however, are all cumulative, and thus can be inflated by increased opportunities. In short, a receiver can put up big numbers and still not have a particularly good year, with the reason for the big numbers being so many passes were thrown his way. Considering John Parker Wilson set the Alabama record for single season passing attempts in 2007 with 393 attempts, I wondered if that could have possibly been the real underlying reason to Hall's successes in 2007.
So, I applied the usual analysis, I broke down every pass thrown to Hall this season in the eight conference games.
Long story short, the pass attempts didn't inflate Hall's numbers, he was just that good.
All told, in the eight conference games, 78 passes were thrown to D.J. Hall. Of those 78 passes, Hall caught 47 of them, which gives him a catch rate (percentage of passes thrown to a particular receiver that were actually caught by that receiver) of 60.26%, which is a very high number, especially considering the quality of competition faced in SEC play. Hall went up against opposing team's best cornerback, and often times faced double coverage, but yet he still had a Catch Rate of over 60%, a truly impressive number. To give the number some context, generally speaking, the best NFL receivers have a Catch Rate in the sixty-percent range.
And these weren't short throws, either. It wasn't as if Hall was continuously running five yard curl routes, racking up easy receptions. Hall averaged just under 17 yards per catch on those 47 receptions, so his receptions were generally downfield, more difficult, catches.
Hall's catch rate is even more impressive when you put it context with what surrounded him. The quarterback throwing him the ball, John Parker Wilson, was a first year starter, and Wilson was constantly under pressure due to a poor pass blocking offensive line. Moreover, teams keyed on the pass all year long due the complete ineffectiveness of our rushing attack. Beyond that, Hall largely lacked a legitimate receiving threat to compliment his abilities. Keith Brown was hurt in the Ole Miss game, and never really recovered, and no legitimate receiving threat appeared the rest of the year (aside from Stover in the Iron Bowl).
At bottom, opposing teams knew that Hall was all we had, and they put all of their emphasis on stopping him. We threw to Hall 12 times against Tennessee, 17 times against Mississippi State, and 14 times against LSU. Again, opposing defenses knew he was our only real threat down the stretch, but even so they simply could not stop him.
Beyond that, though, the breakdown showed that we didn't exactly throw to Hall in ideal situations. We threw to him a lot on 1st down (36 times), but when we threw to Hall it was almost always in situations where lots of yardage was needed. Granted, that shouldn't be too surprising -- after all, long yardage situations is why you are throwing in the first place -- but it would have been nice if he could have been utilized better. The underlying idea to play-calling is that you should pass when other teams expect a run, and run when the opposing defense expects a pass, and Shula and co. failed miserably at that in 2006 in relation to Hall. Generally speaking, when you have a play-maker wide receiver, you would like to throw him the ball in situations where the opposing defense expects the run, which should free up man-to-man coverage on the outside for your play-maker receiver. We didn't do that at all in 2006. Of the 78 passes to Hall in 2006, only seven of them came with five yards or less needed for a first down. Unfortunately -- another sign of poor play-calling -- we largely threw the ball to Hall when it was obvious we needed to pass.
Beyond all of the foregoing, we must keep in mind one other thing. Hall played almost all of the 2006 season with a serious left shoulder injury, and injury that was severe enough to require off-season shoulder surgery.
Despite all that he had going against him, Hall caught just about everything that was thrown in his general direction. Actually, the play-by-play data at RollTide.com does not list Hall with dropping a single pass that was thrown his way in conference play in 2006, and, moreover, a large chunk of his incompleted passes were desperation throws late in games that were effectively over.
There are no two ways about it. When you break down Hall's performance using advanced statistics, he really was just that good in 2006, and assuming he can stay healthy in 2007, he's going to likely have an even better year, and break essentially every Alabama receiving record.
Hall's big performance is enough to make the case that he is quite possibly the greatest pure wide receiver we've ever had at Alabama.
Saturday, July 14, 2007
A Closer Look: 2006 Red Zone Production
In the last post, I took a closer look at our red zone production in 2006, and today we're going to take an even closer look than that.
Thankfully, the stat compilation company used by by RollTide.com this season provided in-depth play-by-play data of each and every snap, so we can analyze the Crimson Tide on a play-by-play basis. Furthermore, I've analyzed only eight games -- the eight conference games -- for the exact same reasons as mentioned earlier in the post on Pythagorean Wins.
So, after breaking down every red zone play in the conference games, what exactly did I find?
In the eight conference games, we ran a grand total of 94 plays in the red zone. And, well, those 94 plays were generally pretty damn ugly. All told, in 94 red zone plays, we accumulated only 166 yards of offense, about 1.7 yards per play. Moreover, we scored only seven touchdowns in these 94 plays, meaning we scored, on average, one touchdown per every 13.4 red zone plays.
John Parker Wilson, despite an otherwise solid year, struggled a good bit in the red zone. Yes, he did throw five red zone touchdown passes, but all told he was only 14-29 in the red zone, completing less than 50% of his passes. Moreover, Wilson also had 10 rushes (either scrambles or sacks) on aborted passing plays. All told, Shula and co. called 39 passing plays in the red zone in 2006, and it resulted in only 14 completions. Putting a percentage to it, only a mere 35.8% of called passing plays actually resulted in a completed pass, and the average completion -- in the relative rarity that it did occur -- went for only about four yards. Unfortunately, the much more often result was a sack, a Wilson scramble, a turnover, or an attempted pass that fell harmlessly to the ground.
Beyond that, I went a bit deeper in breaking down our red zone production into more specific categories. I broke down the 94 plays into four regions: from the 20-16, from the 15-11, from the 10-6, and from the 5 to the goal line. Looking at the numbers in that sense brought about some interesting insights.
From the 5-yard line to the goal line, we were atrocious, as expected, gaining only 15 yards off of 18 plays. All told, when inside the five, we netted on average about two feet per play. And the production from the 20-16 was even worse, as we gained only 32 yards off of 31 plays. Even though it's a higher yard-per-play average than from within the five, it's nevertheless worse because positive gains are capped inside the five yard line by a complete lack of room to move the ball much farther, something that is much less of a problem from the 20-16.
Of course, struggles in both areas had a very negative impact on overall point production. The struggles inside the five yard line turned should-be touchdowns into field goals, and the struggles to move ball from the 20-16 inside the 15 not only hurt point production by stopping drives that could have potentially produced touchdowns, but also by making the field goals that had to be kicked more difficult because of increased distance, which is course drives down the likelihood that those kicks will be successful. And the latter impact is far from insignificant. Given the relative inconsistency of college kickers, a field goal five to ten yards further away probably has anywhere from a 10%-25% smaller chance of being good than from one five or ten yards closer to the goal line.
Oddly enough, though, between the 15-6, we did relatively well, and much better than we did from the 20-16 or the 5 to the goal line. In that area, for whatever reason, we averaged around three yards per play, which, while not great, is triple what we averaged from the 20-16 and the 5 to the goal line. I honestly have no clue as to why that was. Perhaps it was just a statistical oddity that would have worked itself out had we seen a larger sample size, but perhaps there was a legitimate reason for the differences in levels of production. If it is the latter, though, I can't think of why that would be the case.
But what about offensive balance?
All we heard all year long, and even up until today, was that one of our main problems in the red zone was that we were not balanced, that we ran the ball entirely too much and got conservative when it counted; opposing defensive coordinators knew what we were doing, and this allowed opponents to effectively stop it. So how does that argument play out?
Once you run the numbers, that argument doesn't seem to have that much validity, despite spirited assertions to the contrary. All told, from the 20-6, we had 71 plays. Of those 71 plays, 39 were runs (54.9%), and 32 were passes (45.1%). And, of course, that 55-45 split is generally the definition of offensive balance in college football. Even when you break it down by individual games, we were still pretty balanced. We weren't too balanced in the Vanderbilt game (ran mostly), the Arkansas game (ran mostly, especially late in the fourth quarter), and the Florida game (passed mostly), but for the other five SEC games, we were really well balanced in terms of play-calling from the 20 to the 6.
At bottom, despite what some people will strongly assert to the contrary, conservatism wasn't the reason we struggled in the red zone. We were atrocious, for the most part, regardless what we did, whether it be run or pass.
From the five yard line to the goal line, it was a bit of a different story. We had 18 plays from inside our opponent's five yard line, 13 runs and 5 passes. Obviously, the play-calling was heavily swayed in favor of running the football, but before you criticize Shula, you have to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of plays inside the five yard line should be running plays. Throwing the football that deep in your opponent's territory is very difficult, and the interceptions that can occur generally yield much higher return yardage for the opposing team than a normal interception. All told, running the football generally yields small, consistent gains, and that is what you need with such a short distance to go.
Thankfully, the stat compilation company used by by RollTide.com this season provided in-depth play-by-play data of each and every snap, so we can analyze the Crimson Tide on a play-by-play basis. Furthermore, I've analyzed only eight games -- the eight conference games -- for the exact same reasons as mentioned earlier in the post on Pythagorean Wins.
So, after breaking down every red zone play in the conference games, what exactly did I find?
In the eight conference games, we ran a grand total of 94 plays in the red zone. And, well, those 94 plays were generally pretty damn ugly. All told, in 94 red zone plays, we accumulated only 166 yards of offense, about 1.7 yards per play. Moreover, we scored only seven touchdowns in these 94 plays, meaning we scored, on average, one touchdown per every 13.4 red zone plays.
John Parker Wilson, despite an otherwise solid year, struggled a good bit in the red zone. Yes, he did throw five red zone touchdown passes, but all told he was only 14-29 in the red zone, completing less than 50% of his passes. Moreover, Wilson also had 10 rushes (either scrambles or sacks) on aborted passing plays. All told, Shula and co. called 39 passing plays in the red zone in 2006, and it resulted in only 14 completions. Putting a percentage to it, only a mere 35.8% of called passing plays actually resulted in a completed pass, and the average completion -- in the relative rarity that it did occur -- went for only about four yards. Unfortunately, the much more often result was a sack, a Wilson scramble, a turnover, or an attempted pass that fell harmlessly to the ground.
Beyond that, I went a bit deeper in breaking down our red zone production into more specific categories. I broke down the 94 plays into four regions: from the 20-16, from the 15-11, from the 10-6, and from the 5 to the goal line. Looking at the numbers in that sense brought about some interesting insights.
From the 5-yard line to the goal line, we were atrocious, as expected, gaining only 15 yards off of 18 plays. All told, when inside the five, we netted on average about two feet per play. And the production from the 20-16 was even worse, as we gained only 32 yards off of 31 plays. Even though it's a higher yard-per-play average than from within the five, it's nevertheless worse because positive gains are capped inside the five yard line by a complete lack of room to move the ball much farther, something that is much less of a problem from the 20-16.
Of course, struggles in both areas had a very negative impact on overall point production. The struggles inside the five yard line turned should-be touchdowns into field goals, and the struggles to move ball from the 20-16 inside the 15 not only hurt point production by stopping drives that could have potentially produced touchdowns, but also by making the field goals that had to be kicked more difficult because of increased distance, which is course drives down the likelihood that those kicks will be successful. And the latter impact is far from insignificant. Given the relative inconsistency of college kickers, a field goal five to ten yards further away probably has anywhere from a 10%-25% smaller chance of being good than from one five or ten yards closer to the goal line.
Oddly enough, though, between the 15-6, we did relatively well, and much better than we did from the 20-16 or the 5 to the goal line. In that area, for whatever reason, we averaged around three yards per play, which, while not great, is triple what we averaged from the 20-16 and the 5 to the goal line. I honestly have no clue as to why that was. Perhaps it was just a statistical oddity that would have worked itself out had we seen a larger sample size, but perhaps there was a legitimate reason for the differences in levels of production. If it is the latter, though, I can't think of why that would be the case.
But what about offensive balance?
All we heard all year long, and even up until today, was that one of our main problems in the red zone was that we were not balanced, that we ran the ball entirely too much and got conservative when it counted; opposing defensive coordinators knew what we were doing, and this allowed opponents to effectively stop it. So how does that argument play out?
Once you run the numbers, that argument doesn't seem to have that much validity, despite spirited assertions to the contrary. All told, from the 20-6, we had 71 plays. Of those 71 plays, 39 were runs (54.9%), and 32 were passes (45.1%). And, of course, that 55-45 split is generally the definition of offensive balance in college football. Even when you break it down by individual games, we were still pretty balanced. We weren't too balanced in the Vanderbilt game (ran mostly), the Arkansas game (ran mostly, especially late in the fourth quarter), and the Florida game (passed mostly), but for the other five SEC games, we were really well balanced in terms of play-calling from the 20 to the 6.
At bottom, despite what some people will strongly assert to the contrary, conservatism wasn't the reason we struggled in the red zone. We were atrocious, for the most part, regardless what we did, whether it be run or pass.
From the five yard line to the goal line, it was a bit of a different story. We had 18 plays from inside our opponent's five yard line, 13 runs and 5 passes. Obviously, the play-calling was heavily swayed in favor of running the football, but before you criticize Shula, you have to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of plays inside the five yard line should be running plays. Throwing the football that deep in your opponent's territory is very difficult, and the interceptions that can occur generally yield much higher return yardage for the opposing team than a normal interception. All told, running the football generally yields small, consistent gains, and that is what you need with such a short distance to go.
The problem wasn't, seemingly, the fact that we ran the ball so much from inside the five yard line, it was who we ran it with that was the problem. In conference play, Tim Castille -- out of the dread jumbo package -- got eight carries inside the five yard line (Castille carried the ball on almost 45% of plays inside the five), and those eight carries netted a grand total of five yards. All told, Castille averaged about 20 inches per carry inside the five yard line. In general, with Castille -- a fullback -- plays were very slow to develop, and it gave opposing defenses a lot of time to shoot the gaps and stop the play for little or no gain. At the end of the day, hindsight 20/20, a quicker back like Johns or Darby would have likely been the better solution.
The bottom line, the jumbo package should have be re-titled the junk package.
So what all should we take from the analysis? I'd say two things.
One, the play-calling -- or, more precisely, I should say the supposed overly conservative play-calling -- was not, apparently, the problem with our lack of red zone production in 2006. One way or the other, regardless of what we tried in the red zone, it just really didn't work. Running plays were generally stuffed at the line for little or no gain, and passing plays more often than not resulted in incompletions, interceptions, fumbles, or sacks. Our lack of red zone productivity would most certainly not have been improved simply by throwing more passes and opening the offense up more.
Two, however bad you thought our red zone production was in 2006, the statistics show that it was probably much worse than you imagined.
At bottom, after really going in-depth on overall red zone production in 2006, you just appreciate how horrendous it really was. Odds are, we could perform poorly in the red zone again in 2007, and still have red zone production significantly better than in 2006.
The bottom line, the jumbo package should have be re-titled the junk package.
So what all should we take from the analysis? I'd say two things.
One, the play-calling -- or, more precisely, I should say the supposed overly conservative play-calling -- was not, apparently, the problem with our lack of red zone production in 2006. One way or the other, regardless of what we tried in the red zone, it just really didn't work. Running plays were generally stuffed at the line for little or no gain, and passing plays more often than not resulted in incompletions, interceptions, fumbles, or sacks. Our lack of red zone productivity would most certainly not have been improved simply by throwing more passes and opening the offense up more.
Two, however bad you thought our red zone production was in 2006, the statistics show that it was probably much worse than you imagined.
At bottom, after really going in-depth on overall red zone production in 2006, you just appreciate how horrendous it really was. Odds are, we could perform poorly in the red zone again in 2007, and still have red zone production significantly better than in 2006.
Saturday, June 30, 2007
Heaven Help Us: Red Zone Breakdown
The Crimson Tide was atrocious in the red zone in 2006, and no one needs any in-depth analysis to figure that one out. But exactly how bad were we, and how much did it hurt us?
Answering the first question, it was as bad as you think, and then probably worse.
After running the numbers, we made 53 visits to the red zone in 2006. Of those 53 visits, we scored on just over 75% of them (40), which is a good -- but certainly not great -- number. The major problem, of course, was being able to put the ball into the end zone. All told, we only scored 20 touchdowns in 53 trips to the red zone, thus putting it in the end zone on only 37.74% of red zone trips.
It gets worse.
When we look at the eight conference games the Tide played (which, of course, we went 2-6), we made 28 trips to the red zone. Of the 28 times that we got into the red zone in SEC play in 2006, we managed a mere 6 touchdowns. 6 touchdowns in 8 conference games. Long story short, we scored a touchdown on only about 20% of our red zone trips in conference play.
Now let's compare that to LSU, who led the conference in both total offense and scoring offense. Believe it or not, LSU had essentially the same number of red zone trips in conference play that we did (LSU had 30 red zone trips, we had 28). But, of course, they did much more with theirs. All told, LSU scored 22 touchdowns in their 30 trips, and, well, that was a big part of the reason why they led the conference in point production.
So exactly how much did the lack of productivity in the red zone hurt us in terms of wins and losses? Quite a bit, it would seem. With even half-way decent red zone production (say, just to quantify that, 14 touchdowns on 28 trips), our final win-loss record would have been drastically different, and the margin of victory in the games we did win would have gone up as well.
Against Hawai'i, despite us leading all night, it turned out to be a close game, with victory ensured only when a time-expiring Colt Brennan heave to the end zone was intercepted by Lionel Mitchell. We went to the red zone five times that night, and emerged with only one touchdown. With decent red zone production, that game never comes down to a last-second heave.
Against Vanderbilt, the following week, we narrowly edged out a 13-10 victory, at home, over the eventual 4-8 Commodores after Leigh Tiffin booted a 47-yard field goal late in the fourth quarter. During that game, we went to the red zone four times, scored no touchdowns, and came away with only six points. Again, with decent red zone production, that game is never that close; we would have by somewhere in the neighborhood of 14-20 points.
Against Arkansas, two weeks later, five trips to the red zone netted only one touchdown and ten points. Even with slightly better than atrocious red zone production, much less decent production, Alabama wins that game in Fayetteville. Instead, horrendous red zone production turns a sure-win into a one-point loss.
The following week against Florida, two red zone trips netted six points and no touchdowns. Decent red zone production might not have turned this game into a win, but it would have made it very close. Most people forget that this was a 14-13 game with under seven minutes to go in the fourth -- and Alabama having the ball. With decent red zone production, we likely have a 17-14 lead at that juncture, and instead of throwing the football -- which led to a Reggie Nelson interception returned for a touchdown that ultimately doomed us -- we are running out the clock. Again, Florida may still have won, but it would have been a much closer game.
Against Ole Miss -- big shock forthcoming -- we actually had solid red zone production. I've written before that it was probably our best offensive performance, and rightfully so. Four trips to the red zone resulted in 20 points (two touchdowns and two successful field goals). And -- big shock again -- we won this one, though one of the poorest defensive efforts of the year turned it into a very close game.
The following week in Knoxville, poor red zone production was largely responsible for a loss to the hated Volunteers. We had three trips to the red zone, and could muster only one touchdown. With just one more touchdown on the other two red zone trips (again, my definition of half-way decent red zone production), we win that game. Instead of leading 13-9 late, we would have been leading 17-9, and Tennessee would have not only needed to score a touchdown, but successfully complete the two-point conversion just to force overtime.
Against Mississippi State, it was more of the same. Four trips to the red zone netted zero touchdowns and only nine points. In a game ultimately decided by eight points, decent red zone production could have gotten us a win.
One week later against LSU, we played the Bayou Bengals surprisingly tough, but again... red zone woes. We made three trips to the red zone, which netted only ten points. Although this is most likely still a win for LSU with decent red zone production, it would have went right down to the wire in a close contest, particularly if Jamie Christensen could have connected on a first quarter field goal.
Against Auburn, in the Iron Bowl, red zone woes played another big role in our loss. Three red zone trips resulted in only one touchdown, and nine total points. Again, with decent red zone production, we may win that one.
At bottom, red zone woes really killed our 2006 team. It wasn't just that our problems in the red zone hurt us some, they have a drastic effect on our overall win-loss record. We finished the regular season at 6-6, but being quite objective about it, and decent red zone production would have probably given us an 8-4 or 9-3 regular season record, with those losses being very close losses at that. That would have put us, likely, in the Peach Bowl, and Mike Shula would still be the head coach of the Crimson Tide.
The good news though, I suppose, is that with nine starters returning on the offense for 2007, this group should be able to finally break through and translate all of that potential into points.
Answering the first question, it was as bad as you think, and then probably worse.
After running the numbers, we made 53 visits to the red zone in 2006. Of those 53 visits, we scored on just over 75% of them (40), which is a good -- but certainly not great -- number. The major problem, of course, was being able to put the ball into the end zone. All told, we only scored 20 touchdowns in 53 trips to the red zone, thus putting it in the end zone on only 37.74% of red zone trips.
It gets worse.
When we look at the eight conference games the Tide played (which, of course, we went 2-6), we made 28 trips to the red zone. Of the 28 times that we got into the red zone in SEC play in 2006, we managed a mere 6 touchdowns. 6 touchdowns in 8 conference games. Long story short, we scored a touchdown on only about 20% of our red zone trips in conference play.
Now let's compare that to LSU, who led the conference in both total offense and scoring offense. Believe it or not, LSU had essentially the same number of red zone trips in conference play that we did (LSU had 30 red zone trips, we had 28). But, of course, they did much more with theirs. All told, LSU scored 22 touchdowns in their 30 trips, and, well, that was a big part of the reason why they led the conference in point production.
So exactly how much did the lack of productivity in the red zone hurt us in terms of wins and losses? Quite a bit, it would seem. With even half-way decent red zone production (say, just to quantify that, 14 touchdowns on 28 trips), our final win-loss record would have been drastically different, and the margin of victory in the games we did win would have gone up as well.
Against Hawai'i, despite us leading all night, it turned out to be a close game, with victory ensured only when a time-expiring Colt Brennan heave to the end zone was intercepted by Lionel Mitchell. We went to the red zone five times that night, and emerged with only one touchdown. With decent red zone production, that game never comes down to a last-second heave.
Against Vanderbilt, the following week, we narrowly edged out a 13-10 victory, at home, over the eventual 4-8 Commodores after Leigh Tiffin booted a 47-yard field goal late in the fourth quarter. During that game, we went to the red zone four times, scored no touchdowns, and came away with only six points. Again, with decent red zone production, that game is never that close; we would have by somewhere in the neighborhood of 14-20 points.
Against Arkansas, two weeks later, five trips to the red zone netted only one touchdown and ten points. Even with slightly better than atrocious red zone production, much less decent production, Alabama wins that game in Fayetteville. Instead, horrendous red zone production turns a sure-win into a one-point loss.
The following week against Florida, two red zone trips netted six points and no touchdowns. Decent red zone production might not have turned this game into a win, but it would have made it very close. Most people forget that this was a 14-13 game with under seven minutes to go in the fourth -- and Alabama having the ball. With decent red zone production, we likely have a 17-14 lead at that juncture, and instead of throwing the football -- which led to a Reggie Nelson interception returned for a touchdown that ultimately doomed us -- we are running out the clock. Again, Florida may still have won, but it would have been a much closer game.
Against Ole Miss -- big shock forthcoming -- we actually had solid red zone production. I've written before that it was probably our best offensive performance, and rightfully so. Four trips to the red zone resulted in 20 points (two touchdowns and two successful field goals). And -- big shock again -- we won this one, though one of the poorest defensive efforts of the year turned it into a very close game.
The following week in Knoxville, poor red zone production was largely responsible for a loss to the hated Volunteers. We had three trips to the red zone, and could muster only one touchdown. With just one more touchdown on the other two red zone trips (again, my definition of half-way decent red zone production), we win that game. Instead of leading 13-9 late, we would have been leading 17-9, and Tennessee would have not only needed to score a touchdown, but successfully complete the two-point conversion just to force overtime.
Against Mississippi State, it was more of the same. Four trips to the red zone netted zero touchdowns and only nine points. In a game ultimately decided by eight points, decent red zone production could have gotten us a win.
One week later against LSU, we played the Bayou Bengals surprisingly tough, but again... red zone woes. We made three trips to the red zone, which netted only ten points. Although this is most likely still a win for LSU with decent red zone production, it would have went right down to the wire in a close contest, particularly if Jamie Christensen could have connected on a first quarter field goal.
Against Auburn, in the Iron Bowl, red zone woes played another big role in our loss. Three red zone trips resulted in only one touchdown, and nine total points. Again, with decent red zone production, we may win that one.
At bottom, red zone woes really killed our 2006 team. It wasn't just that our problems in the red zone hurt us some, they have a drastic effect on our overall win-loss record. We finished the regular season at 6-6, but being quite objective about it, and decent red zone production would have probably given us an 8-4 or 9-3 regular season record, with those losses being very close losses at that. That would have put us, likely, in the Peach Bowl, and Mike Shula would still be the head coach of the Crimson Tide.
The good news though, I suppose, is that with nine starters returning on the offense for 2007, this group should be able to finally break through and translate all of that potential into points.
Friday, June 22, 2007
Scary Similarity: Shula and Stovall
When Mike Shula was fired days after the 2006 Iron Bowl, the national response was effectively, "Alabama has too high of expectations, and they shouldn't have fired Shula." Many of those making this argument, though certainly not all or even a majority, were the LSU fans. In reality, though, Mike Shula's tenure at Alabama was almost exactly like Jerry Stovall's tenure at LSU. In fact, they are almost so similar that it's a bit scary.
Jerry Stovall was hired in January of 1980 after the tragic death of Bo Rein. After having success at North Carolina State, LSU selected Rein to be the successor to long-time LSU coach Charlie McClendon. However, as the fates would have it, Rein died on January 10th of 1980 when his plane, returning to Baton Rouge from a recruiting trip to Shreveport, apparently lost internal pressure, causing both Rein and the pilot to go unconscious, and the plain ultimately crashed off the Eastern seaboard in the Atlantic Ocean. Needing an emergency hire in a desperate situation, LSU tapped one of its own former players. It wasn't that LSU really wanted Stovall, otherwise they would have hired him in the first place, but he was the best they could do given a difficult situation.
Mike Shula was hired in May of 2003 after Mike Price was fired as a result of his lack of discretion on a night that included a pit stop at the Arety Angel's strip club. At that point, in the midst of probation, Alabama had to make an emergency hire in a desperate situation, and had to tap into its own alumni base. As a result, Mike Shula was selected to be the man at the Capstone. It wasn't that Alabama really wanted Shula, otherwise they would have hired him instead of Price, but he was the best they could do given a difficult situation.
Jerry Stovall was a legendary player at LSU. He was the successor to Billy Cannon, and in 1962 he made the All-America team, and finished second in the Heisman Trophy voting. Only the dazzlings of Oregon State's Terry Baker kept Stovall from hoisting the Heisman at the Downtown Athletic Club.
Mike Shula was a legendary player at Alabama. Although he was never in the league of predecessors such as Starr, Namath, and Stabler, Shula was known for his gutsy play and his legendary comebacks. His last-minute miracle comeback to set up Van Tiffin's 52-yard game winning field goal in the 1985 Iron Bowl will forever be etched in the annals of Alabama football history.
Jerry Stovall, upon taking the LSU job, had no head coaching experience. After Stovall's NFL playing career ended, he became an assistant, and was ultimately an offensive assistant on Charlie McClendon's staff.
Mike Shula, upon taking the Alabama job, had no head coaching experience. After Shula gave up playing football, he moved to coaching and spent the entire time before coming to Alabama as an offensive assistant.
Jerry Stovall had very mixed results in his first two seasons in Baton Rouge. In 1980, he did relatively well, given the circumstances, and went 7-4. In the second season, however, things fell apart, and Stovall went 3-7-1. All told, in his first two years, he only had a winning percentage of roughly 47%
Mike Shula had very mixed results in his first two seasons in Tuscaloosa. In 2003, things went poorly with several close losses, and he went 4-9. The following year, he did relatively well, given the circumstances (tons of injuries), and went 6-6. All told, in his first two years, he had a winning percentage of only roughly 40%.
Jerry Stovall finally found big success in his third season in Baton Rouge. Carrying an undefeated 7-0-1 record late into the season, LSU and Stovall was finally knocked off in a three point loss at the hands of Mississippi State. Shortly thereafter, LSU suffered a disappointing loss to in-state rival Tulane in the last game of the regular season. Nonetheless, though, LSU played in the Orange Bowl, and though they lost a close game to Nebraska, Stovall was nationally lauded for having a great season and putting LSU football back on the map after several years of relative mediocrity.
Mike Shula finally found big success in his third season in Tuscaloosa. Carrying an undefeated 9-0 record late into the season, Shula and Alabama was finally knocked off in a three point loss at the hands of LSU. Shortly thereafter, Alabama suffered a disappointing loss to in-state rival Auburn in the last game of the regular season. Nonetheless, though, Alabama earned a berth in the Cotton Bowl, and beat Texas Tech in a close game. Shula was nationally lauded for having a great season and putting Alabama football back on the map after several years of relative struggles.
Following a successful 1982 campaign, the expectations were quite high for Stovall and his Fighting Tigers in 1983. After a decent start, things soon imploded, and a losing season was guaranteed after a close loss to the Billy Brewer-led Ole Miss Rebels, and another close loss to Alabama in Tiger Stadium. At the end of the year, Stovall was fired. All told, Stovall had a 22-21-2 record at LSU, with a 51.1% winning percentage.
Following a successful 2005 campaign, the expectations were quite high for Shula and his Crimson Tide in 2006. After a decent start, things soon imploded, as the Tide was beaten by quality opponents, and narrowly squeaked by horrible opponents. At the end of the year, Shula was fired. All told, Shula had a 26-23 record at Alabama, with a 53.0% winning percentage.
Long story short, it's really just scary how similar Stovall's tenure at LSU was to Shula's tenure at Alabama. Considering LSU fired Stovall in almost exactly the same situation, they should be the last ones to accuse Alabama of high expectations for firing Shula.
Jerry Stovall was hired in January of 1980 after the tragic death of Bo Rein. After having success at North Carolina State, LSU selected Rein to be the successor to long-time LSU coach Charlie McClendon. However, as the fates would have it, Rein died on January 10th of 1980 when his plane, returning to Baton Rouge from a recruiting trip to Shreveport, apparently lost internal pressure, causing both Rein and the pilot to go unconscious, and the plain ultimately crashed off the Eastern seaboard in the Atlantic Ocean. Needing an emergency hire in a desperate situation, LSU tapped one of its own former players. It wasn't that LSU really wanted Stovall, otherwise they would have hired him in the first place, but he was the best they could do given a difficult situation.
Mike Shula was hired in May of 2003 after Mike Price was fired as a result of his lack of discretion on a night that included a pit stop at the Arety Angel's strip club. At that point, in the midst of probation, Alabama had to make an emergency hire in a desperate situation, and had to tap into its own alumni base. As a result, Mike Shula was selected to be the man at the Capstone. It wasn't that Alabama really wanted Shula, otherwise they would have hired him instead of Price, but he was the best they could do given a difficult situation.
Jerry Stovall was a legendary player at LSU. He was the successor to Billy Cannon, and in 1962 he made the All-America team, and finished second in the Heisman Trophy voting. Only the dazzlings of Oregon State's Terry Baker kept Stovall from hoisting the Heisman at the Downtown Athletic Club.
Mike Shula was a legendary player at Alabama. Although he was never in the league of predecessors such as Starr, Namath, and Stabler, Shula was known for his gutsy play and his legendary comebacks. His last-minute miracle comeback to set up Van Tiffin's 52-yard game winning field goal in the 1985 Iron Bowl will forever be etched in the annals of Alabama football history.
Jerry Stovall, upon taking the LSU job, had no head coaching experience. After Stovall's NFL playing career ended, he became an assistant, and was ultimately an offensive assistant on Charlie McClendon's staff.
Mike Shula, upon taking the Alabama job, had no head coaching experience. After Shula gave up playing football, he moved to coaching and spent the entire time before coming to Alabama as an offensive assistant.
Jerry Stovall had very mixed results in his first two seasons in Baton Rouge. In 1980, he did relatively well, given the circumstances, and went 7-4. In the second season, however, things fell apart, and Stovall went 3-7-1. All told, in his first two years, he only had a winning percentage of roughly 47%
Mike Shula had very mixed results in his first two seasons in Tuscaloosa. In 2003, things went poorly with several close losses, and he went 4-9. The following year, he did relatively well, given the circumstances (tons of injuries), and went 6-6. All told, in his first two years, he had a winning percentage of only roughly 40%.
Jerry Stovall finally found big success in his third season in Baton Rouge. Carrying an undefeated 7-0-1 record late into the season, LSU and Stovall was finally knocked off in a three point loss at the hands of Mississippi State. Shortly thereafter, LSU suffered a disappointing loss to in-state rival Tulane in the last game of the regular season. Nonetheless, though, LSU played in the Orange Bowl, and though they lost a close game to Nebraska, Stovall was nationally lauded for having a great season and putting LSU football back on the map after several years of relative mediocrity.
Mike Shula finally found big success in his third season in Tuscaloosa. Carrying an undefeated 9-0 record late into the season, Shula and Alabama was finally knocked off in a three point loss at the hands of LSU. Shortly thereafter, Alabama suffered a disappointing loss to in-state rival Auburn in the last game of the regular season. Nonetheless, though, Alabama earned a berth in the Cotton Bowl, and beat Texas Tech in a close game. Shula was nationally lauded for having a great season and putting Alabama football back on the map after several years of relative struggles.
Following a successful 1982 campaign, the expectations were quite high for Stovall and his Fighting Tigers in 1983. After a decent start, things soon imploded, and a losing season was guaranteed after a close loss to the Billy Brewer-led Ole Miss Rebels, and another close loss to Alabama in Tiger Stadium. At the end of the year, Stovall was fired. All told, Stovall had a 22-21-2 record at LSU, with a 51.1% winning percentage.
Following a successful 2005 campaign, the expectations were quite high for Shula and his Crimson Tide in 2006. After a decent start, things soon imploded, as the Tide was beaten by quality opponents, and narrowly squeaked by horrible opponents. At the end of the year, Shula was fired. All told, Shula had a 26-23 record at Alabama, with a 53.0% winning percentage.
Long story short, it's really just scary how similar Stovall's tenure at LSU was to Shula's tenure at Alabama. Considering LSU fired Stovall in almost exactly the same situation, they should be the last ones to accuse Alabama of high expectations for firing Shula.
Thursday, June 21, 2007
2006 SEC Football: Offensive Sack Rates
We often hear in traditional media outlets about how certain offensive lines are good because they allowed such a few number of sacks, and others are poor because they allowed so many sacks, but in reality that approach is inherently flawed. Since sacks allowed is a cumulative statistic, people tend to just look at the final number and fail to put that number in any real context. What is almost overlooked is the effect the number of passes thrown have on how many sacks an offensive line will allow.
For an absurd example, say one team gives up 10 sacks in 150 passing attempts while another team gives up 20 sacks in 400 passing attempts. An initial analysis would say the former offensive line is much better, but once you consider passing attempts, the latter was a better pass blocking line.
So how did SEC teams stack up in 2006 in terms of offensive sack rates? Here are the numbers broken-down:
Another important factor to consider is not only the number of sacks allowed, by also how many yards were lost on average per sack. So how did SEC teams stack up in 2006 in terms of average yards lost per sack? Here are the numbers broken-down for that:
We see some pretty interesting things when we go beyond surface-deep. Just a few random notes:
For an absurd example, say one team gives up 10 sacks in 150 passing attempts while another team gives up 20 sacks in 400 passing attempts. An initial analysis would say the former offensive line is much better, but once you consider passing attempts, the latter was a better pass blocking line.
So how did SEC teams stack up in 2006 in terms of offensive sack rates? Here are the numbers broken-down:
Another important factor to consider is not only the number of sacks allowed, by also how many yards were lost on average per sack. So how did SEC teams stack up in 2006 in terms of average yards lost per sack? Here are the numbers broken-down for that:
We see some pretty interesting things when we go beyond surface-deep. Just a few random notes:
- The Alabama line was generally thought of as absolutely terrible in 2006. And, while it wasn't very good, it was probably a bit better than most expected. If you had told an Alabama fan immediately after the season was over that we had the eighth best line in the conference in terms of pass protection, nearly everyone would have probably said they were being very overrated. In reality, that's exactly what they were.
- The real trouble with the Alabama line was the average yards lost per sack, 7.29, which was 11th in the conference. The good news, however, is that number is probably more indicative of the play-calling on Shula's behalf. All year long, I bemoaned about the lack of three and five step drops; almost everything was a seven-stop drops, which made our already relatively poor offensive line have to pass block even longer. As a result of the long drops, when sacks did occur, they were generally for more yardage. More three and five step drops in 2007 will hopefully ameliorate that problem.
- Auburn was dead last in the conference in sack rate, and actually by a very wide margin. I believe most of that could be chalked up to Brandon Cox's lack of mobility following ankle injuries early in the season. However, Auburn was second in the conference in average yards lost per sack, and this is largely the result of so many quick and short passes called by the Auburn offense. Without doubt, a large amount of credit must go to the Auburn coaching staff here. Faced with an immobile quarterback, they shifted their offensive gameplans to include more short drops and quicker throws. Good job by Borges and company.
- The Arkansas offensive line was generally regarded as a great run blocking line, but a poor pass blocking line. In reality, though, they pass blocked very well in 2006. They had the second lowest sack rate in the conference, and they allowed the second fewest average yards lost per sack. Certainly, a great deal of credit goes to the strong running game, which yielded a lot of playaction passing, but the fact remains that they consistently got the job done, even though they were protecting for a true freshman quarterback almost all season.
- Tennessee was simply great up front, leading the conference in offensive sack rate, even though they had to face a non-divisional opponent in LSU that was first in the conference in defensive sack rate, all with a backup quarterback. David Cutcliffe got almost all of the credit for re-invigorating the hapless Erik Ainge, but the offensive line should get a good deal of credit. Teams knew Tennessee was going to throw it a lot (second most pass attempts of any team in the conference), yet they stood up and passed the test anyway.
- Georgia, much like Arkansas, did a very good job of protecting a true freshman quarterback. They finished third in offensive sack rate, despite not having the greatest of rushing attacks. Much of the success in pass protection came from the tackles, Daniel Inman and Ken Shackleford, both of which will not return in 2007. Inman was one of the best linemen in the conference, and he started 48 games in his career for Georgia. If the Georgia line falls off in pass protection in 2007, the loss of Inman and Shackleford will be the likely reason why.
- LSU presents an interesting case study. They finished fourth in the conference in offensive sack rate, and that may seem a bit low considering JaMarcus Russell was the quarterback. Russell is often considered almost un-sackable, and that was one reason he went so high in the NFL Draft. So you would expect that to be a bit better. However, on the other hand, while they were fourth, they were very close to first overall, so it's probably best if we don't pay much attention to that. Then, beyond that, they were dead last in the conference in average loss per sack allowed. But maybe that makes sense, too. The 2006 LSU offense was based almost solely on a deep passing threat, and all of the deep passes (which require deep drops and long times to develop) should result in some big sacks for losses. Still, though, for LSU, they remain an interesting case study, particularly in 2007. Most of the offensive line returns, but they will be switching from an offense predicated upon the deep pass to an offense that has a much higher emphasis on short, quick throws, and the mobility of the quarterback should go up a bit. LSU probably has the greatest transition to make in terms of differences in what their line must accomplish in 2007.
Pythagorean Projection: Alabama Football
The Pythagorean Projection is an approximation of how many games a particular team should have won in a particular season that is determined solely by focusing on points scored and points allowed. First created by revolutionary baseball thinker Bill James, the Pythagorean Projection has been equated to many other sports, such as football and basketball.
The basic formula for the Pythagorean Projection is as follows:
For football, the basic formula remains relatively the same. However, Daryl Morey of STATS, Inc. found that for football, the best exponent is not 2, but 2.37, so the formula is slightly tweaked for football.
But what all does it mean? If a team wins fewer games than its projection said it should have, that team underachieved, and if a team wins more games than they should have, that team underachieved. But exactly what does that mean? Well, the Projection can mean different things to different people, but it is generally accepted that, more than anything else, Pythagorean Projections are mainly an indicator of lucks. Teams that overachieve are said to be "lucky" and teams that underachieve are said to be "unlucky." And truthfully, that's probably the foremost thing we should take from this. However, baseball researchers have found two other variables that have an impact besides luck: coaching decisions and bullpen depth. Obviously, there's no bullpen in football, but that could be construed as a measure of overall team depth, and obviously coaching decisions come into play.
So how has the Crimson Tide stacked up in terms of the Pythagorean Projection the past few years? Let's have a look-see.
To begin with, I should note that I only analyzed eight games in most seasons, and only seven in 1990 and 1991. Why only analyze seven or eight games when you play eleven or twelve regular season games? The reason I did so was because I found that when you look at all games played, the Pythagorean Projection seems to be a bit inflated, as teams never seem to win as many games as they should have. Something didn't seem right to me when I ran the numbers that way, and then it suddenly dawned on me that the reason it was happening because all of the weak opponents an SEC program will play in a season. For example, you play Division 1-AA Western Carolina, and you win 52-0, and suddenly your Pythagorean Projection shoots up dramatically. But why should you get credit for beating an East Popcorn State? In MLB, where the Pythagorean Projection has its roots, you don't have East Popcorn States because all MLB teams only play other MLB teams, where the talent levels are much closer, and as a result the Projections are much more accurate. Obviously, if you started counting results from when the Chicago White Sox play the Birmingham Barons, the projections would lose a good bit of their accuracy, and that is essentially what happens when a team like Alabama plays Western Carolina.
So, to get around all of that, I used solely regular season conference games. As a result, the Projections became much more accurate. And hence why there are only seven and eight conference games. Since 1992, the SEC has played eight regular season conference games, and seven were the norm before the expansion of the SEC in 1990 and 1991.
So what do we see about the Crimson Tide?
I noticed that some of the teams that I felt really underachieved were actually some of the ones that underachieved in the Pythagorean Projection. Just to name a few...
As noted earlier, bullpen depth seemingly changes the difference between actual and expected wins, so you would think overall team depth in football would do the same. So what about when we were on probation? In 1997-1999, the years most thought would be the worst from the probation era, we overachieved twice in three years. On the other hand, from 2004-2006, the years most thought would be the worst from the second probation era, we underachieved three straight years.
Also as mentioned earlier, the quality of coaching decisions can change the difference between actual and expected wins. Unfortunately for former coach Mike Shula, in his four seasons, we underachieved all four years. Maybe the baseball people have it right when it comes to coaching. After all, luck is probably a big part of the Pythagorean Projection, but I'm sure it's not the only variable.
The 2002 squad really was a great one. Although we lost to Georgia in a narrow game at Bryant-Denny (without our starting quarterback), we actually had more Pythagorean Wins than the Dawgs did in the 2002 season. It just reinforces the fact that we all missed out on a great SEC Championship game. And although it shows the 2002 team as underachieving (we had a projection of roughly seven wins, but won only six), I wouldn't look at them as underachievers. We had a projection of seven wins, and going into the Auburn game we had six wins, coming off of a 31-0 blowout of LSU in Tiger Stadium. Long story short, we were on pace to nail the projection... and then Dennis Franchione decided he was going to be an Aggie, and missed team meetings all week. The lack of preparation resulted in an Iron Bowl loss, and that caused us to underachieve. But did we really? Not in my book.
The basic formula for the Pythagorean Projection is as follows:
For football, the basic formula remains relatively the same. However, Daryl Morey of STATS, Inc. found that for football, the best exponent is not 2, but 2.37, so the formula is slightly tweaked for football.
But what all does it mean? If a team wins fewer games than its projection said it should have, that team underachieved, and if a team wins more games than they should have, that team underachieved. But exactly what does that mean? Well, the Projection can mean different things to different people, but it is generally accepted that, more than anything else, Pythagorean Projections are mainly an indicator of lucks. Teams that overachieve are said to be "lucky" and teams that underachieve are said to be "unlucky." And truthfully, that's probably the foremost thing we should take from this. However, baseball researchers have found two other variables that have an impact besides luck: coaching decisions and bullpen depth. Obviously, there's no bullpen in football, but that could be construed as a measure of overall team depth, and obviously coaching decisions come into play.
So how has the Crimson Tide stacked up in terms of the Pythagorean Projection the past few years? Let's have a look-see.
To begin with, I should note that I only analyzed eight games in most seasons, and only seven in 1990 and 1991. Why only analyze seven or eight games when you play eleven or twelve regular season games? The reason I did so was because I found that when you look at all games played, the Pythagorean Projection seems to be a bit inflated, as teams never seem to win as many games as they should have. Something didn't seem right to me when I ran the numbers that way, and then it suddenly dawned on me that the reason it was happening because all of the weak opponents an SEC program will play in a season. For example, you play Division 1-AA Western Carolina, and you win 52-0, and suddenly your Pythagorean Projection shoots up dramatically. But why should you get credit for beating an East Popcorn State? In MLB, where the Pythagorean Projection has its roots, you don't have East Popcorn States because all MLB teams only play other MLB teams, where the talent levels are much closer, and as a result the Projections are much more accurate. Obviously, if you started counting results from when the Chicago White Sox play the Birmingham Barons, the projections would lose a good bit of their accuracy, and that is essentially what happens when a team like Alabama plays Western Carolina.
So, to get around all of that, I used solely regular season conference games. As a result, the Projections became much more accurate. And hence why there are only seven and eight conference games. Since 1992, the SEC has played eight regular season conference games, and seven were the norm before the expansion of the SEC in 1990 and 1991.
So what do we see about the Crimson Tide?
I noticed that some of the teams that I felt really underachieved were actually some of the ones that underachieved in the Pythagorean Projection. Just to name a few...
- 1990: You never hear it mentioned, but in actuality the 1990 defense allowed exactly as many points as the 1992 defense. The offense, though, really struggled with a tough schedule and injuries. Siran Stacey, the star of the offense, went out for the year with a torn ACL on the first play from scrimmage in the season opener against Southern Miss, and that really turned the Tide offense stagnant. As a result, the Tide lost narrow games against Georgia and Florida (Spurrier's first year) when the offense couldn't get it going.
- 2000: The 2000 team underachieved quite a bit, obviously. Some people think of that season as a pure disaster, and it was, but people often forget just how close we were to winning several games. We lost in Fayetteville to Arkansas when two very controversial penalties kept their game-winning drive alive, lost to Central Florida by two points, and lost to LSU in Baton Rouge by two points.
- 2004: The 2004 season was, in a lot of ways, a clone of the 1990 season. The torn ACL by Brodie Croyle basically ended the season, and we lost a ton of close games due to an impotent offense. In both years, atrocious offensive output spoiled great defensive efforts.
- 1991: Stallings' second squad went 11-1, but even I questioned how good we were during that time. In the second game of the season, we were annihilated 35-0 in Gainesville by Florida, in what is still the most dominating performance I've ever seen against an Alabama squad. From there, we had a ton of squeaker wins, such as a five point win over 9-3 Tennessee, a six point win over 7-5 Mississippi State (Danny Woodson's last game, I believe), a three point win over 5-6 Memphis, a seven point win over 5-6 Auburn, and a six point win over 8-3-1 Colorado. We were a good team that year, but you don't win that many close games without a good bit of luck on your side.
- 1994: Going into the 1994 SEC Championship Game, we were 11-0 and 3rd in the country. But we probably weren't that good, to be brutally honest. We looked sloppy in a 17-7 win over Vanderbilt, and Arkansas gave us trouble in Fayetteville, as we won only 13-6 over a 4-7 Danny Ford team. It took a career night from Jay Barker, at home, and luck from the Field Goals Gods on a Michael Proctor kick late in the first half for us to pull out a narrow 29-28 victory over a 6-4-1 Georgia team. We won two road games by a combined four points against solid Mississippi State and Tennessee teams. Finally, we held on to beat Auburn in the closing seconds after their furious comeback ended when Frank Sanders was stopped inches short on a 4th and 6. Again, you just don't do something like that without a good bit of luck on your side.
- 1999: The 2000 collapse shocked everyone, but should have really shocked no one. We had a projection of a mere five wins in 1999, yet went 7-1 in conference play and won the SEC. The 1999 season, all together, was full of close wins. After squeaking by Arkansas, the Gators had us beat in Florida until we got very lucky with a muffed Florida punt return with under two minutes to go and the Extra Point Gods decided to shine on us twice in overtime. A week later, it was another narrow win over a solid Ole Miss team, led by Deuce McAllister and Romero Miller. After a loss to Tennessee, we faced LSU, a team in the midst of a seven-game losing streak that had blown blown out by the likes of Kentucky, yet we needed a time-expiring Goal Line stand to beat the hapless Dinardo-led Bayou Bengals, in Bryant-Denny. Two weeks later, we trailed Auburn for three quarters, and pulled out a victory only after a
dumb play call by Tommy Tubervillegreat play by Kindal Moorehead to sack Ben Leard for a safety after Auburn held on fourth and goal, and Shaun Alexander re-emerged for the first time in weeks to run wild on the Auburn defense in the last stanza. Long story short, it shouldn't have surprised many that we fell apart in 2000, it was a wonder all along that we won that many games in 1999.
As noted earlier, bullpen depth seemingly changes the difference between actual and expected wins, so you would think overall team depth in football would do the same. So what about when we were on probation? In 1997-1999, the years most thought would be the worst from the probation era, we overachieved twice in three years. On the other hand, from 2004-2006, the years most thought would be the worst from the second probation era, we underachieved three straight years.
Also as mentioned earlier, the quality of coaching decisions can change the difference between actual and expected wins. Unfortunately for former coach Mike Shula, in his four seasons, we underachieved all four years. Maybe the baseball people have it right when it comes to coaching. After all, luck is probably a big part of the Pythagorean Projection, but I'm sure it's not the only variable.
The 2002 squad really was a great one. Although we lost to Georgia in a narrow game at Bryant-Denny (without our starting quarterback), we actually had more Pythagorean Wins than the Dawgs did in the 2002 season. It just reinforces the fact that we all missed out on a great SEC Championship game. And although it shows the 2002 team as underachieving (we had a projection of roughly seven wins, but won only six), I wouldn't look at them as underachievers. We had a projection of seven wins, and going into the Auburn game we had six wins, coming off of a 31-0 blowout of LSU in Tiger Stadium. Long story short, we were on pace to nail the projection... and then Dennis Franchione decided he was going to be an Aggie, and missed team meetings all week. The lack of preparation resulted in an Iron Bowl loss, and that caused us to underachieve. But did we really? Not in my book.
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
2006 Season: How Johns Was Under-Utilized
As mentioned in the previous post, it was much the debate last Fall over whether or not Jimmy Johns was being utilized correctly. After charting every carry Johns had last season over the course of our ten big games, we can take a much closer look at that.
Against Hawai'i, Johns had seven carries in the first half. All seven carries were successes when judged by the Running Back Success Rate, and the seven carries resulted in a grand total of 56 yards, thus averaging eight yards per carry. Moreover, five of the runs either went for a first down, or put the Tide within one yard of a first-down. Yet, for some reason, after picking up nine yards on a second and ten in the second quarter, Johns didn't see another carry until the fourth quarter, and ultimately that carry would be his last of the evening.
The following week against Vanderbilt, it was more of the same. Johns had five carries in the first quarter, three of which were successes, and they ground out 25 yards of rushing. After the initial success in the first quarter, though, Johns didn't see another carry until mid-way through the third quarter, which resulted in a fumble (backup-itis?). All told, after his hot first quarter start, Johns saw two carries the rest of the day.
Against Arkansas, it was another solid start, with four carries for 18 yards in the first half. Then, inexplicably, he dropped off the map. After that, Johns only saw one carry (a draw play on a 3rd and 26) before finally being inserted at the end of the fourth for some token carries to run out the clock, and presumably set up a successful Leigh Tiffin field goal.
Against Ole Miss, more of the same. Johns started out with 29 yards off of just four carries, three of which were successes, in the first quarter. From that hot start, he only saw one carry the rest of the day.
Against Tennessee, Johns was hot early yet again. He had three carries in the first half for 38 yards, including a 26 yard scamper. All three carries were successes, and either picked up first downs for the Tide or put them within two yards of a first down. Yet, after the hot first half start, Johns didn't see another carry for the rest of the day.
Same thing again when we played LSU. Johns started out with four carries for 25 yards in the first half, two of which were successes. Yet, after another good start in the first half, Johns never saw a carry in the second half.
Finally, it all culminated in the Independence Bowl, where Johns again looked good early. In the first half, Johns had 38 yards off of just five carries, four of which were successes. Yet, after the initial first half success, Johns only saw one carry in the entire second half, and if my memory is correct, that was an attempt at a bit of a gimmick play.
The story just keeps repeating itself. Johns would have a lot of success on carries in the first half, and then Shula would rarely, if ever, call his number in the second half.
In the seven games I just mentioned, Johns had 33 first half carries for 229 yards. On average alone, that's 6.93 yards per carry, but moreover, an amazing 24 of his 33 carries were successes, giving him a success rate of 72.72%. Long story short, Johns' productivity on the limited first half carries he had was simply incredible.
And then Shula, for whatever reason, decided Johns shouldn't get the time of day in the second half. All told, despite the great production in the first half from Johns, Shula rewarded him by giving him less than 10 second half carries over a seven game stretch. Even with a stagnant offense and an even more stagnant running game, Shula chose to keep what was statistically by-far his best back on the sideline.
Small wonder Shula is no longer at the Capstone, and an even smaller wonder that he is not calling plays with his new position with the Jacksonville Jaguars.
Against Hawai'i, Johns had seven carries in the first half. All seven carries were successes when judged by the Running Back Success Rate, and the seven carries resulted in a grand total of 56 yards, thus averaging eight yards per carry. Moreover, five of the runs either went for a first down, or put the Tide within one yard of a first-down. Yet, for some reason, after picking up nine yards on a second and ten in the second quarter, Johns didn't see another carry until the fourth quarter, and ultimately that carry would be his last of the evening.
The following week against Vanderbilt, it was more of the same. Johns had five carries in the first quarter, three of which were successes, and they ground out 25 yards of rushing. After the initial success in the first quarter, though, Johns didn't see another carry until mid-way through the third quarter, which resulted in a fumble (backup-itis?). All told, after his hot first quarter start, Johns saw two carries the rest of the day.
Against Arkansas, it was another solid start, with four carries for 18 yards in the first half. Then, inexplicably, he dropped off the map. After that, Johns only saw one carry (a draw play on a 3rd and 26) before finally being inserted at the end of the fourth for some token carries to run out the clock, and presumably set up a successful Leigh Tiffin field goal.
Against Ole Miss, more of the same. Johns started out with 29 yards off of just four carries, three of which were successes, in the first quarter. From that hot start, he only saw one carry the rest of the day.
Against Tennessee, Johns was hot early yet again. He had three carries in the first half for 38 yards, including a 26 yard scamper. All three carries were successes, and either picked up first downs for the Tide or put them within two yards of a first down. Yet, after the hot first half start, Johns didn't see another carry for the rest of the day.
Same thing again when we played LSU. Johns started out with four carries for 25 yards in the first half, two of which were successes. Yet, after another good start in the first half, Johns never saw a carry in the second half.
Finally, it all culminated in the Independence Bowl, where Johns again looked good early. In the first half, Johns had 38 yards off of just five carries, four of which were successes. Yet, after the initial first half success, Johns only saw one carry in the entire second half, and if my memory is correct, that was an attempt at a bit of a gimmick play.
The story just keeps repeating itself. Johns would have a lot of success on carries in the first half, and then Shula would rarely, if ever, call his number in the second half.
In the seven games I just mentioned, Johns had 33 first half carries for 229 yards. On average alone, that's 6.93 yards per carry, but moreover, an amazing 24 of his 33 carries were successes, giving him a success rate of 72.72%. Long story short, Johns' productivity on the limited first half carries he had was simply incredible.
And then Shula, for whatever reason, decided Johns shouldn't get the time of day in the second half. All told, despite the great production in the first half from Johns, Shula rewarded him by giving him less than 10 second half carries over a seven game stretch. Even with a stagnant offense and an even more stagnant running game, Shula chose to keep what was statistically by-far his best back on the sideline.
Small wonder Shula is no longer at the Capstone, and an even smaller wonder that he is not calling plays with his new position with the Jacksonville Jaguars.
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