Outside The Sidelines

"To every thing there is a season..."

2007-08-20T00:06:00.000-05:00

In Ecclesiastes, Chapter Three, it is written "To every thing there is a season..." and indeed there is as such.

And that's true here at Outside The Sidelines, too. There was a time to begin and a time to grow, and now there is a time to move on.

At bottom, I'm just a football junkie, nothing more. If there are two teams fighting over a pigskin, I want to see it. Football is, in my opinion, the greatest sport in the world, and the competitive qualities of the game can, and often do, bring out the best in men. And beyond that, I love in-depth analysis, and have for nearly all of my adult life. For years, though, I always thought of football as a simplistic game, and it really didn't satiate the my desire for complicated things. Oh sure, I loved the game nonetheless, but it was in a passionate, non-analytical sense.

And then I started reading sites like Football Outsiders, and trying to understand the game on a technical level. Once I did those things, I realized that the game of football was just as complicated and complex as any thing you would ever find in the academic world, and that really sparked a fire for me. It really just combined two things that I love: football and in-depth analysis, and it just took things to a new level for me in that sense.

So, all of the number crunching and the analysis you've seen around here the past few months were basically all things I did on my own. I never really did it so I could do a blog or anything of that nature, I just did it because, well, I wanted to know those things. It was just that once you have the research already done, you may as well publish it for those who want to know. And thus the creation of Outside the Sidelines.

Unfortunately, not too many people are interested in those things. The sad truth is that the overwhelming majority of people would much rather believe the quick-hitters from the talking heads and their cliches, rather than reading some real in-depth analysis that shows you how things really are. Sad enough, that's generally the truth. For every one person that reads the wonderful work at Football Outsiders, there are tens of thousands who listen to the misleading, pointless, and baseless drivel from ESPN.

Honestly, though, there's quite a few people who are apparently interested in the real in-depth analysis. I never expected Outside The Sidelines to be much of a success in terms of readers, but honestly it's done much better than expected. At this point, we're getting around 300 readers per day, and we're probably going to get 6,000 or 7,000 for the month. Honestly, I never imagined it would do this well; I'd been happy with 30 readers per day.

But, as Ecclesiastes tells us, "To every thing there is a season." And now is the time to move on.

I have been asked by the guys at Roll Bama Roll to join their site as a writer, and I've decided to accept their offer. Roll Bama Roll is a fine site -- in my eyes, the best 'Bama blog on the Internet -- and they want me to do what I've been doing here, just at their site. They've got a much bigger reader base than I do, and I think it's the best move. At the end of the day, it will just make what research that I do available to many, many more people.

Nothing is going to change, mind you. We're going to do the exact same research that we have done here, it will just be at a new site. The only thing that you will change is that you will have to go to rollbamaroll.com, instead of outsidethesidelines.blogspot.com, to read it. And actually, things will get much better. We're going to chart games this year, and we're going to be able to do some advanced analysis that will make what we've done thus far look elementary. To borrow a line from Bachman-Turner Overdrive, "You ain't seen nothing yet!"

As said earlier, the move is for the best. And for all of the research we've done so far, Outside The Sidelines will remain up, so you'll still be able to access all that has been done thus far.

Nevertheless, for better or for worse, to all of the readers of Outside The Sidelines, I extend to you a heartfelt thanks for taking the time -- and I realize it generally takes a lot of time to read the things around here -- to read through all of the analysis that I have done over the past few months.

I hope that you all will join us at Roll Bama Roll. Rest assured, if you liked what you read here, you won't be disappointed.

Bye Weeks & Strength of Schedule

2007-08-17T03:45:00.000-05:00

In the comments of the earlier post on strength of schedule, someone wanted me to elaborate on how by weeks prior to a game affects the the overall strength of the schedule.

Long story short, an off week prior to a game definitely makes an impact on that particular game, no doubt about it. The recuperation time is different, the practice schedule is often different, etc. It's hard to make the argument that it doesn't make an impact.

But exactly what kind of an impact does it make?

Sometimes a team seemingly plays better following an off-week, and sometimes they seemingly regress, so there is no set fixed response to take into account.

Moreover, you would probably run into a situation where off weeks have different impacts depending on when they occur. Obviously, an off week in the second week of the season is very different than an off week in the ninth week.

Beyond that, when you play one of the Sisters of the Poor, it's effectively an off-week for all intents and purposes. How does that go into account?

Again, I'm not saying that bye weeks don't have an impact in this sense, but to be quite frank I really just do not see any way to legitimately quantify it in terms of an overall strength of schedule rating.

I suppose this could be a textbook example of the first half of the old saying that, "Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts."

Inventing A New Metric: Strength of Schedule

2007-08-15T22:09:00.000-05:00

Most of the mainstream statistics, often quoted as they may be, are generally worthless in terms of evaluating the true quality of football teams. And no statistic is more worthless than the one generally used to tabulate strength of schedule.

Here's a list of strength of schedule in 2006, but don't even waste your time clicking the link, it's not worth the time. When strength of schedule is tabulated, how do they do it? Elementary style, that's how. They just add up the cumulative records of a team's individual opponents, do that for every team, and then rank each team based on opponent's winning percentage. At bottom, it's first grade logic mixed with third grade math.

There are just so many things wrong with that approach.

To begin with, teams with equal records are, in fact, not equal. That's a rather simple insight, but nevertheless it is something that the traditional strength of schedule tabulation does not take into consideration. For example, last year the USC Trojans and the TCU Horned Frogs both went 11-2, but is there really any doubt as to who was the far superior team? Of course not, but even so, both teams count the exact same in strength of schedule.

Beyond that, a few outlier teams can drastically sway a team's strength of schedule ranking when using the traditional tabulation. Take Notre Dame in 2006, for example. Critics argued that the Irish weren't particularly good and mainly won ten games because of a weak schedule. Notre Dame defenders, however, quickly pointed to the fact that the Irish schedule wasn't really that bad, and was in fact the 39th toughest out of the 120 FBS teams when using the traditional tabulation. But that's an incomplete response at best. Even if you use the traditional tabulation, once you break it down even further it's a poor argument. In reality, Notre Dame's ten wins came over teams with a combined record of 56-67 (.459 winning percentage). On the other hand, their three losses came against teams with a combined record of 31-5 (.861 winning percentage). At bottom, Notre Dame beat up on combination of the Sisters of the Poor and some mediocre teams, and then were annihilated when they faced good teams. The underlying reality is that you can have a poor schedule as a whole, but play a couple of really good teams and that will sway your strength of schedule rating into looking pretty solid.

Moreover, what about those other odd-ball things that affect games, like injuries? Obviously, those aren't accounted for, but they should be. Take Tennessee in 2006 for example. In a critical stretch (against LSU and Arkansas), Erik Ainge was injured. Now obviously, Tennessee was a much easier opponent without their star quarterback on the field, but in terms of strength of schedule, they go in the books as a 9-4 team regardless of it you faced Ainge or his back-up Johnathon Crompton. Obviously that's not right.

At bottom, without going into further detail, we really need to invent a new metric for determining strength of schedule simply because the current one is effectively meaningless, and because strength of schedule is highly important.

Nothing is concrete as of this minute, but I'm trying to come up with something for the 2007 season.

At the moment, though, I have a few ideas for how the system would work:

Division 1-AA teams would not count in any way whatsoever.

Non-BCS teams would count, but to a significantly smaller degree. For example, an 11-2 TCU team would not count as much as an 11-2 USC team.

Significant injuries (such as to a quarterback) will make a particular team count less in terms of strength of schedule

Expand the data by looking at not just wins and losses, but more advanced statistics such as Pythagorean Wins and the like.

We'll see as the 2007 season progresses.

2007 Defense: Expect The Unexpected

2007-08-14T21:26:00.000-05:00

Ten years ago, Mary Schmich penned a fine column for the Chicago Tribune, and in it dispensed the following advice:

"Don’t worry about the future; or worry, but know that worrying is as effective as trying to solve an algebra equation by chewing bubblegum. The real troubles in your life are apt to be things that never crossed your worried mind; the kind that blindside you at 4pm on some idle Tuesday."

All told, that's good advice for life in general. But it's also pretty good advice for the game of football as well.

Often times, you should expect the unexpected. The things you think will be major problems often times never come to fruition, and things you never think about suddenly pop up and cause havoc.

Take our team in 2006, for example.

Going into the season, everyone knew that the running game would be fine and that the offensive line would play much better, but the real concern was at quarterback with John Parker Wilson. As it turned out, though, Ken Darby showed up overweight and out of shape, which resulted in a poor running game, the line continued to struggle, and John Parker Wilson had a solid year. On defense, despite key losses, people thought that Ramzee Robinson would anchor a good secondary, Terrance Jones would step in and adequately replace the out-going Demeco Ryans, Juwan Simpson would blossom in full, and the real concern was at middle linebacker. As it turned out, of course, Robinson struggled greatly against every quality receiver he faced and the secondary was relatively poor. Terrance Jones was a shell of Demeco Ryans, and that was when he was healthy, Juwan Simpson had a poor year as both a player and a leader, and the main pre-season, concern, middle linebacker, turned into the best player on the entire defense with the rise of Prince Hall.

And now we are here with the 2007 season just 17 days away, and nearly everyone cites the defense as a major concern. Generally speaking, the argument is that the front seven is in major trouble, but the secondary will be very strong.

As they say, though, expect the unexpected. Don't be surprised if the exact opposite of what is expected unfolds in 2007.

The front seven, surprisingly enough, has the potential to be a good, solid unit. I know you hear all of the doom and gloom, but it's nonetheless true. Just follow me.

At defensive end, we are pretty strong. Wallace Gilberry is a four-year starter, and one of the better pure defensive ends in the conference. He is experienced, and plays with as much as heart as you will see from anyone. Moreover, with the right scheme, he can rush the passer, and is a very good defender against the run, something that can't be said of a lot of the more glamorous defensive ends in this conference. Bobby Greenwood will start opposite Gilberry, and he too is a good player. He is very talented, no doubt there, has good size and he has looked well in Fall practice. This is the same guy who made several freshman All-America teams, don't forget that.

At linebacker, it's actually a surprisingly strong group.

Prince Hall returns, and he was a beast a year ago. Honestly, he was the best player on our defense as a redshirt freshman, and he played most of the year overweight and out of shape. As Coach Kines said, he was about a biscuit away from putting his hand on the ground (i.e. moving to defensive end). For 2007, however, Hall has dropped about twenty pounds and is in noticeably the best condition he's been in since he arrived at the Capstone. Better conditioning and a year of experience should only make Hall an even better player.

Rolando McClain is a true freshman, but it is not absurd to expect good things out of him. Physically, he is about as gifted of an athlete as you will find. He is massive (6'4 and 255 pounds), but is also very athletic. Moreover, he's a smart kid, and an extremely hard worker. Beyond that, he is impressing everyone in Fall camp thus far. In fact, yesterday Nick Saban even specifically praised McClain at length, and any time the Nicktator doles out praise to anyone, you should take notice. You almost feel wary of saying it this early in his career, but objectively speaking, McClain has legitimate NFL caliber talent. He's young, but he will start and should be productive.

Zeke Knight will start at outside linebacker, and he too has loads of talent. The truth is, Zeke Knight is one of the most talented players on the entire roster. He's very big, strong, and quick. He was a top-notch recruit out of high school, and could have played for anyone. And now he's finally where he should have been all along: linebacker. Moreover, for the first time in his career, he's healthy now that the heart murmur has been corrected. He, too, has looked good in Fall practice, and a productive year, at the very least, can be expected from him. And honestly, given his freakish athletic abilities, Knight could very well turn into a playmaker.

Keith Saunders will man the Jack position, and he's a fifth-year senior with a good deal of experience. We'll eventually have better players at the Jack position, but we shouldn't be overly concerned with Saunders. He's a solid player, and he fared quite well at the Jack position during the A-Day game, and will likely have a solid senior season.

The only real concern in the front seven is the nose tackle. Bryan Motley will almost certainly start there, and he has some potential on down the road. Unfortunately, at the moment, he is also young, undersized, and inexperienced. It's just not going to be pretty on the interior defensive line, no two ways about it. With that in mind, however, the harsh truth of the matter is that we have been piss-poor on the interior defensive line ever since Jarrett Johnson, Kenny King, and Kindal Moorehead graduated after the 2002 campaign. At bottom, we have relatively poor players replacing relatively poor players.

So, when you look at the front seven, it's actually fairly promising. No, they aren't the second coming of the Steel Curtain, but they do have some potential, and should have a relatively solid campaign in 2007. Certainly the interior tackle play is a concern, but as 2004 and 2005 showed, as long as the rest of the front seven plays well, you can make up for poor interior line play. Moreover, considering we will have two very big inside linebackers (one at 235 and the other at 255), that will go a long way to helping shore up the run defense.

Again, the front seven certainly won't be great, but as long as injuries don't hit us particularly hard, it could be relatively productive. All things considered, it should be relatively good against the run, and Saban will use his usual complicated blitz schemes to get pressure on the quarterback.

The pass defense, however, could be a major problem.

For whatever reason, people have this idea that our pass defense in 2006 was good, but that simply is not true, and the advanced statistics made that harsh truth blatantly obvious. Nevertheless, a lot of people believe that notion, and a corollary of that false belief is that our pass defense, particularly with the addition of Saban and his expert tutelage, should be good in 2007.

Unfortunately, it's unlikely to be that easy considering we must replace two starters from a secondary that wasn't particularly good to begin with.

Simeon Castille returns at cornerback, and he should have a good season. Aside from Castille, however, things are uncertain at best. Opposite Castille, no one in particular has stepped up to take the second cornerback spot. All in all, it seems to be a three-way battle between Kareem Jackson, Lionell Mitchell, and Marquis Johnson. Each player brings his a different skill set to the table, but at the moment none of them have stood out and taken the job. Moreover, the scary part is that Jackson and Johnson have never played any meaningful snaps, and Mitchell has only seen time as a nickel corner. It's all just one big question mark as to who starts opposite Simeon Castille.

The safety position, though, is a much bigger concern.

Rashad Johnson and Marcus Carter seem to be the likely starters, and honestly that's not a particularly good thing.

Johnson plays hard, but it's difficult to see him becoming more than just a replacement-level player. He is a former walk-on, and honestly his specialty may very well be special teams more than anything else. As mentioned earlier, he plays hard, but generally speaking there was just little-to-no production from him in 2006. Despite playing over 400 snaps, he registered only 26 tackles, no sacks, no interceptions, and no passes broken up. The Tennessee game provides a great example: despite Ainge throwing almost 50 passes and Johnson playing 60 snaps, he ended up with only two tackles (one solo, one assist), and no passes defensed of any kind. He seems like a good kid and a tough player, but there's just not much production to speak of from him.

Marcus Carter, while highly touted out of high school, is probably one of the worst safeties in the conference, and honestly he would be on the bench at most other SEC schools. He saw little meaningful playing time in 2004 and 2005, was terrible a year ago in 2006 as a part-time starter, and he looked just as bad at the A-Day game. He struggles in run support (see Keiland William's 38-yard touchdown run in the LSU game), plays with hesitance, and is poor in terms of pass coverage.

The harsh truth of the matter is that neither of these two guys are particularly good, and neither of them are "winning" starting jobs, so to speak. In reality, it's just that no one better has came along to beat them out, unfortunately. Honestly, we greatly need some other players to step up at safety. Michael Ricks could have probably started almost immediately, but he did not qualify. Justin Woodall is incredibly talented, but at the moment he still has not been able to crack the starting lineup. Corey Reamer has good size, but he's never been healthy, and doesn't seem to be contending for any meaningful playing time. Moreover, after knee surgery, his speed is a concern, which was probably one reason Saban experimented with him at linebacker in the Spring. Chris Lett could perhaps do it, but he hasn't practiced all Fall from complications with diabetes, so he is almost certainly going to redshirt. The truth is, if most practice reports are to be believed, Saban and company have tried a lot of different combinations at safety, and to this point nothing seems to be working particularly well.

All told, there are just a lot of problems regarding both safety positions, and unless someone else steps up over the next couple of weeks, those problems are likely to manifest themselves in a bad way once the regular season begins. With Carter and Johnson as the starters, at best they are serviceable players, and at worst they are major liabilities.

The truth be told, Saban will need to work his magic on these guys in terms of fundamentals, and also create a good bit of pressure on the quarterback for the Crimson Tide secondary to play near where most people think it will.

At the end of the day, things don't always turn out like you think. Don't be surprised if the front seven plays relatively well and the secondary struggles.

Recruiting: 1980-1982

2007-08-14T05:43:00.000-05:00

A friend sent me an interesting link yesterday. The link takes you to a PDF file that gives a pretty in-depth analysis of the Alabama recruiting classes from 1980-1982, the last three inked under Paul Bryant.

Click here for the entire thing.

It's pretty interesting stuff, and the overall conclusion has to be that recruiting fell off the final three years under Bryant. Certainly his age was used against him greatly by opposing coaches, and it does seem that there was a drop-off in the overall talent level.

But, then again, maybe not.

Bryant was always a bit of an odd-ball when it came to recruiting, and there is no disputing that. Certainly we signed our fair share of highly-rated recruits, but there was more to it than that. Bryant was also widely known for not even looking twice at recruits that other top schools were drooling over, and he often times went hard after recruits that no one else looked at.

Woodrow Lowe is the perfect example of the latter. Coming out of high school, he received no scholarship offers, and planned to enlist in the Navy. Bryant saw something, though, and offered him a scholarship when even the Sisters of the Poor wouldn't. Of course, Lowe became one of the greatest linebackers in Alabama football history (three-time All-American), and went on to play eleven years in the NFL for the San Diego Chargers.

It's evident in other players, too. Just look at Musso: he was small and slow for a tailback, but Bryant loved him as a player, and he thrived at Alabama in both a pro-style offense and in the wishbone.

Many people have pointed out that, had recruiting been as closely scrutinized then as it is today, most of Bryant's recruiting classes would not have been rated particularly high. And honestly, it's hard for me to disagree with that. At bottom, to a large degree, Bryant went after a lot of players that no one else saw anything in. Players like that were his specialty, and he was very open and honest about that fact. Admittedly, Bryant was often straightforward about the fact that he often times struggled to get the most out of the incredibly talented players. He literally thrived on players who weren't very good but didn't know it.

And it's hard to say that the talent was running out towards the end of the Bryant era. After all, as posted in this forum before, in Bryant's final year we were 5-0 and number one in the country after annihilating eventual national champion Penn State. It was the failure of Bryant's health that got us, not a lack of talent. We may not have had a lot of highly-rated players, and we may have not had a lot of players who went on to great success in the NFL, but you don't do things of that nature without a lot of talent on hand.

Play Breakdown: Dissecting A Disaster

2007-08-14T02:28:00.000-05:00

In the second installment of the play breakdown series, we're going to look at the play that likely cost us the 2006 Arkansas game. And no, I'm not breaking down a Leigh Tiffin kick, I'm looking at John Parker Wilson's fumble that was returned for a touchdown by Randy Kelly. At that juncture, we had the ball in Arkansas territory, leading 10-9, and the Arkansas offense was completely shut down. Even after the fumble return for a touchdown, the Hogs gained less than 75 yards of total offense the rest of the day (including overtime), and Mustain threw two more interceptions. Obviously it was a game-changing play for us, and arguably a career-changing play for Coach Mike Shula, so it warrants closer inspection.

The situation is 3rd and 12, Alabama football at the Arkansas 48. We need the Arkansas 36 for a first down. At the moment, we lead Arkansas in a close contest, 10-9, with 4:21 remaining in the third quarter.

Alabama comes out in a four wide receiver set. There are trips receivers to the right (Caddell, Brown, and Oakley, respectively), with D.J. Hall to the offensive left. Tim Castille is lined up six yards behind the line of scrimmage as the lone back.

Arkansas counters with a 3-3-5, but it's far from vanilla.

The following is a small diagram of how the Hogs and the Tide line up pre-snap. Right click the image and open the link in a new window to see the full size.

As you can see, the Hogs aren't in a vanilla formation. It's a 3-3-5, true enough, but one linebacker is lined up with the left tackle (24), and another is outside of the left tackle. Moreover, safety Randy Kelly (9), is slowly creeping up into the box. Oddly enough, the Hogs have two linebackers and two defensive backs on the near side of the field, where the Alabama offense only has one receiver (22, Hall). On the other hand, on the far side of the field, Alabama has trips receivers, but the Hogs have only three defenders on that side of the field (one of which is a safety who is so deep he can barely be seen on the film), and the inside receiver in the trips formation isn't even covered up.

Obviously, the Hogs have something up their sleeves. But what?

It looks like Arkansas is planning a blitz, but from where? Given safety Randy Kelly (9) is creeping into the box, the Hogs could pressure the quarterback with at least seven defenders.
One linebacker is lined up inches away from Alabama right guard B.J. Stabler (61), and the other two linebackers are roughly one yard away from the line of scrimmage.

The coverage appears to be man, but what about Matt Caddell (11)? No one is covering him, so are Wilson and company to assume that the deep safety (about 15 yards away from the line of scrimmage) is in man coverage against him? That doesn't seem right.

You have to give the Hogs credit where it is due. This is a nice formation that their defensive coordinator Reggie Herring has come up with, and it's disguising things quite nicely. It's hard to get a grasp on exactly what they are going to do.

But alas, the play clock is ticking down. Antoine Caldwell (59) snaps the ball to Wilson, and the play begins.

The following is a small diagram of the play itself. Right click the image and open the link up in a new window to see the full size version.

True enough, the Hogs have a blitz coming. The defensive line rushes, as does Sam Olajabutu (24), and Randy Kelly (9), who is coming on a safety blitz. At bottom, it's a basic thing: six blockers on five rushers. But it's still quite confusing because we had no idea exactly where it was coming from.

The question of Matt Caddell is answered quickly. He was uncovered, but it was actually man coverage. The linebacker lined up directly over B.J. Stabler (61), was in man coverage against Caddell, and quickly retreated from the line to cover Caddell. Yes, that creates a major mis-match (linebackers generally can't cover receivers), but the linebacker does have help over the top from the deep safety, and if things work out as planned with the blitz, he won't have to cover very long anyway.

Unfortunately though, there seems to be no audible in anticipation of the blitz. Despite the pre-snap read indicating a blitz is coming, even if we don't know where, Wilson takes a seven-step drop. Instead of switching to a three or five step drop to release the ball quickly, we apparently stick with our guns.

Once he drops back, Wilson first looks to his left, in the direction of D.J. Hall (22). But nothing is there for Hall. He runs a vertical route upfield, and, well, that's about all he can do. The Arkansas linebacker dropped into a soft zone coverage in the area, and the idea behind that was likely to prevent Hall from catching any quick curls, slants, or in routes as Wilson attempts to get rid of the ball quickly. It's a good call from the Hogs, and it works to perfection. The linebacker precludes Hall from running anything to the inside, and the sideline prevents him from running an effective out route. So, he does all he can (by design or not, perhaps it was an option route), he runs downfield, perhaps on a go route (you can't really tell by the game film).

As for the three receivers in the trips formation...

Will Oakley is the outside receiver, and he runs about a three-yard curl route. I would think that was an option route on Oakley's part with him reading a blitz (it'd be pretty dumb to call a three-yard curl route against press coverage on third and long), but it's not effective at all. Though it's a short curl, it makes for a very long throw for Wilson. In order to get the ball to Oakley, a pass would have to travel about twenty yards, and the proximity of the Arkansas cornerback would yield an easy pass break-up, or worse, an interception. If Oakley indeed chose the three-yard curl route, it was a very poor decision. It creates an impossible throw for Wilson. Oakley should have done something to come back to his quarterback and made for a shorter throw.

Matt Caddell is the inside receiver (I think, it looks like him, but I can't specifically see the number), and he is uncovered. At the snap, Caddell runs straight upfield. The Arkansas linebacker comes over to cover him, and Caddell's vertical route keeps him covered. Considering the safety is in front of him and the linebacker is right by him, it's essentially impossible for Wilson to drop the ball in between the two defenders. Perhaps he can get open if the play has a long time to develop, but here it obviously doesn't. The ideal thing would have been for Caddell to break off his route and cut across the middle on a crossing route. With the Arkansas linebacker going in the opposite direction to get to the area where Caddell is (remember, he was lined up nose-to-nose with right guard B.J. Stabler), Caddell could have cut to the inside and caused the Hog linebacker to likely fall flat on his face trying to quickly reverse field. Caddell would have been wide open, Wilson could have thrown an easy five-yard pass, with Caddell having a huge chance for a big play. A worse-case scenario probably has that completion going for nine or ten yards, but alas, Caddell continues upfield and remains blanketed.

Keith Brown (81) is the middle receiver, and he runs a quick slant over the middle. The cornerback covering him plays him close in press coverage, but nevertheless, Brown gets his job done. He is open, and a good throw from Wilson will likely yield a few yards, though not likely a first down. But Wilson doesn't throw the ball to Brown. He continues to look at Hall (22), though he is well covered, and by the time he actually gets around to looking at Brown (81) he is in major trouble.

Now let's look at the blocking up front.

Arkansas' star defensive end Jamaal Anderson (92) lines up over Chris Capps (72). At the snap, it becomes evident that Chris Capps is left on his own, with no help whatsoever, as was too often the case in 2006. Anderson -- as he almost always does -- uses his athleticism to rush hard to the outside, trying to beat Capps off the edge. And Capps does well, using good footwork to position himself in front of Anderson. Just when Anderson seems like he may be able to get past Capps, he suddenly cuts back inside, likely due to Wilson stepping up in the pocket. But in doing so, the play ends before Anderson can pressure the quarterback.

The Arkansas defensive tackle (DT) ferociously attacks the gap between Antoine Caldwell (59) and B.J. Stabler (61). But Caldwell is not regarded as one of the best centers in the country for nothing. He essentially puts on a blocking clinic, and stands up the Arkansas defensive tackle. The back-up Arkansas defensive tackle who was sitting on the bench got about as close to Wilson as did the starter on this play. B.J. Stabler technically "helps" Caldwell to a degree, but not really. He mainly just stands there while Caldwell and Capps take care of the two pass rushers on their side of the line.

The left side is where it gets interesting. Arkansas rushes three players: defensive end Antwain Robinson (97), linebacker Sam Olajabutu (24), and safety Randy Kelly (6). The Crimson Tide has three blockers: left tackle Andre Smith (71), left guard Justin Britt (50), and running back Tim Castille (19).

Unfortunately, it doesn't go well for the Crimson Tide.

Sam Olajabutu (24) rushes hard to the outside, where he is met with a hard block from Tim Castille (19). All in all, it's a nice block from Castille, and he effectively neutralizes the talented Arkansas linebacker. It's reasons like this as to why he is in the game on passing situations.

Randy Kelly (6) begin to creep up closer to the line, and as soon as the ball is snapped, he takes off full speed, looking for John Parker Wilson. But it doesn't really work. He has to run about ten yards to even get remotely near Wilson, and Justin Britt (50) does a very good job of picking him up once he enters the pocket. With a solid block, Britt neutralizes the talented Arkansas safety.

Antwain Robinson (97), however, is the one that ends it for the Tide. Andre Smith (71) nearly took his head off earlier in the game, but the time has come for Robinson to exact his revenge on Big Andre. Obviously, Andre is expecting a speed rush to the outside by Robinson, but that doesn't happen. Instead, Robinson rushes hard to the inside, and it takes Andre by surprise. Though he fights hard, Andre simply can't catch up with Robinson enough to force him out of the play, and Robinson is successful in getting to Wilson.

By this point, the play is over. Wilson should have taken the easy throw to Keith Brown (81) on the slant, but he locked onto Hall too long and by the time he saw Brown it was too late. Essentially, Arkansas has won this play. Their three rushers (97, 6, and 24) have gotten the job done against the left side of our offensive line. Neither Kelly (6) or Olajabutu (24) can get to Wilson, but they have collapsed the pocket, and with Robinson (97) beating Andre Smith, Wilson -- though he steps forward in the pocket looking for room, which is indicated in the diagram by the red line and circle -- is just trapped with nowhere to go. He doesn't have his feet set, and he really can't throw the football. Again, Arkansas has won this play, it's time for Wilson to cover up the football, take the sack, and send the punting unit onto the field.

But the youthful Wilson foolishly refuses to relent. Instead he chooses to fight to the death, and the death comes quickly. At the last second, he tries to get off a quick throw -- the only person he could have had the arm strength to get the ball to throwing in that awkward position would be Keith Brown (81) on the crossing route, but honestly the Arkansas linebacker in zone coverage would have probably snagged that ball -- but he is doomed. Before his arm begins to go forward, Antwain Robinson (97) hits him and the ball pops loose. It's a fumble. An alert Randy Kelly scoops up the ball and races to the end zone. No Alabama player has a chance of bringing him down, Arkansas touchdown.

Arkansas 17, Alabama 10.

The Hogs, with an impotent offense on the sideline and Alabama having the ball in their territory, have somehow created the eventual overtime causing touchdown.

What Could Have Been

2007-08-13T22:13:00.000-05:00

Some years, you are left with nothing more than thoughts of what could have been. The potential to win big was there, but somehow it just didn't work out. I was racking my brain the other day, and came up with a rough list of a few Alabama teams that could have certainly made the "What Could Have Been" list.

Here goes...

1982: Most people forget just how good this team was. We were high on everyone's list in the pre-season, and we did not disappoint early on. Finally, Penn State and Joe Paterno came to town, and we annihilated the Nittany Lions 42-21. After that, we were 5-0, ranked #1 in the country, and Bryant's seventh national championship was just sitting there for the taking. Unfortunately, Bryant's health failed, and we collapsed over the final weeks, losing to Tennessee, Southern Miss, Auburn, and LSU. Penn State, the same team we beat by three touchdowns earlier in the year, went on to beat Georgia in the Sugar Bowl and win the national championship. Three months after that victory over the Nittany Lions, Bryant was dead at 69.

1986: Coming off of a 9-2-1 season in 1985, everyone returned for 1986, including Mike Shula, Al Bell, Gene Jelks, Cornelius Bennett, Van Tiffin, and others. Most everyone had us as the favorite to win the SEC, and some had us as outside contenders for the national championship. We got off to a hot start at 7-0, and annihilated Tennessee by 28 points. The following week, we turned into a terrible performance out of nowhere, and Penn State drilled us in Tuscaloosa. Two weeks later, we squandered away a game with stupid penalties and turnovers against LSU, and the season ended with a loss to Auburn where we again largely beat ourselves. We blew out Washington in the Sun Bowl to 28-6 to finish 10-3, but we were major underachievers. Ray Perkins left shortly thereafter.

1988: The 1988 squad finished 9-3, and had a good year, but injuries killed us. Bobby Humphrey came into the year as Alabama's all-time leading rusher, and was considered by many to be the Heisman front runner. He was lost for the year early on with a broken foot against Vanderbilt, and Gene Jelks and David Smith also went down for the season. We went 9-3, losing two close games to LSU and Auburn. The Bayou Bengals won the SEC in Mike Archer's second year, but quite honestly they weren't very good (Miami beat them by 40+), and had the injury bug not hit us so hard, we'd have been SEC Champions and playing in the Sugar Bowl.

1990: Again with the injury bug. We lost three close games to open the season (a combined margin of loss of 8 points), and that set the tone. We rebounded late and played well, but it was largely all for not. Had Siran Stacy not gone down with a season-ending knee injury on the first play from scrimmage in the season opener, we could have won 10 games, and instead an impotent offense doomed us to 7-5, despite a great defense.

1995: The 1995 Alabama squad wasn't as good as in 1994, but it was doomed mainly by poor officiating and the NCAA. We lost to Arkansas when the Hogs scored a game-winning touchdown on a pass that I still swear was trapped, and we lost to Auburn when Curtis Brown's game-winning touchdown pass was ruled out of bounds, though a Post-Herald photograph the following day showed that Brown was indeed in. With better officiating, we end up 10-1. Unfortunately, to make things worse, shortly after the Auburn game the NCAA bans us from post-season play that year, and we end up sitting at home. With better officiating and some leniency from the NCAA (yeah, yeah, I know, snowball's chance on hell on both), we end up 10-1, win the SEC West, and face Florida for the fourth consecutive year in the SEC Championship Game.

2002: We went 10-3 in 2002, but it could have been much better. We lost heartbreakers to two top five teams in the closing seconds, but we were still 10-2 going into the Auburn game. That 10-2 record included blowouts over Ole Miss, Tennessee, LSU, and others. And then Fran left, and we bombed the Iron Bowl. Truth was, that squad had the highest Pythagorean Wins of any team in the SEC in 2002 (even more than Georgia), and it was most likely our best team in the post-Stallings era.

2004: Ah, the ultimate injury year. A piss-poor decision by Mike Shula ended with Brodie Croyle out for the year against Western Carolina, and the injuries only got worse from there. The truth is -- largely due to a much better offensive line -- the 2004 had more potential than the 2005 squad did, but injuries killed it. We finished 6-6 with several close losses, but with better injury luck, we probably end up with 9-10 wins and Mike Shula is still at the Capstone.

Introduction: Play Breakdowns

2007-08-13T17:52:00.001-05:00

Here at Outside The Sidelines, I've decided to introduce a new column. Each week, I'll be taking a key play, or perhaps two, from the Alabama game (and in weeks Alabama is not playing, another game), and having an in-depth play breakdown, complete with diagrams and explanations.

As the introductory column, I've decided to give everyone a sample by breaking down a key play from the 1993 Sugar Bowl.

Specifically, the play we'll be looking is George Teague's interception return for a touchdown in the third quarter.

The situation is first and ten for the Hurricanes at their own 29-yard line, with roughly ten minutes left in the third quarter. Moments earlier, Miami was trailing 13-6, and Tommy Johnson intercepted Gino Torretta's first pass of the second half. Several players later, Derrick Lassic plunged over the goal line on third and goal, extending the Tide lead to 20-6. The Miami offense needs to respond and narrow the gap.

The following is the play diagram:

And, well, there you have it.

Miami comes out with Torretta in the shotgun. There are trips receivers to the right. Number 3 is an unknown receiver, 36 is Lamar Thomas, and 88 is Horace Copeland. On the opposite side of the formation, there is a single receiver, number 5, Kevin Williams. Also, number 17, tight end Coleman Bell is lined up to the offensive left. As you can see, with four wide receivers and a tight end on the line of scrimmage, no backs are left in to protect Torretta.

Alabama responds with what was made into a legendary package in Crimson Tide lore after this night. Despite Miami spreading the field with dangerous receivers, defensive coordinator Bill Oliver puts all eleven defenders in the box.

In terms of personnel, we respond with:

Four down linemen: John Copeland (94), Eric Curry (80), and two interior defensive linemen I cannot identify.

Four cornerbacks: George Teague (13), Tommy Johnson (10), Antonio Langham (43), and a cornerback lined up over Kevin Williams (5) that I cannot identify.

Two linebackers: Lemanski Hall (11), and Andre Royal (36).

One safety: Chris Donnelly (21).

As mentioned earlier, as you can easily see, all eleven defenders crowd the line of scrimmage. All cornerbacks come up to the line against their receiver, and seemingly it is going to be man coverage with no safety help. Even the two linebackers and the safety are less than a yard away from the line of scrimmage.

Given the heavy blitzes that we had employed throughout the first half, combined with the great natural pass rush from the ends (Copeland and Curry), Torretta knows that he will have to release the ball quickly. Considering the cover package seems to be man on the wide receivers, Andre Royal (36) will likely to have to cover the cover the tight end (17) in man coverage. From there it's simple math, we can quickly blitz six defenders against their five offensive linemen, and you can do the math on that one. Hence, Torretta must work quickly.

Now, all of the background information aside... Torretta lifts his right leg, signaling to his center Tirrell Greene that it is okay to snap the football.

The ball is snapped.

Despite all of the posturing to the contrary, we bring only the standard four-man rush. Royal, as expected, is in to man coverage against the Miami tight end. Chris Donnelly (21) quickly retreats into deep zone coverage. Though the play never develops to the point where we could fully understand his assignment, it seems that Donnelly's role is mainly to give help to the unidentified cornerback covering the explosive Kevin Williams (5). Lemanski Hall (11), too, quickly backs away from the line of scrimmage and appears to be playing zone coverage in the middle of the field. In doing so, he shades slightly towards the far side of the field to put him closer to the trips receivers. Again, though the play never develop to the point where we can fully understand his assignment, likely, Hall's responsibility is to defend intermediate crossing routes.

Still, though Donnelly and Hall drop out into zone coverage instead of rushing the quarterback, it's still a risky call by Bill Oliver and company. The Miami receivers are explosive, and Gino Torretta is less than a month removed from picking up the Heisman Trophy. All three cornerbacks to the defensive left are in man coverage, with no help whatsoever. If they get beat, there is a very high possibility that this play turns into a big one for the 'Canes. Even the unidentified cornerback is a concern. Kevin Williams is one of the most explosive skill position players in the country, and Donnelly -- the transfer from Vanderbilt -- is not particularly athletic. If Williams runs a go route, there is no way that Donnelly will be able to retreat quickly enough to even remotely help the unidentified cornerback in coverage. At bottom, it's a risky call, and there is absolutely no margin of error for the four Tide cornerbacks.

At the snap, the Miami wide receivers quickly release off the line of scrimmage. The two outside receivers in the trips formation to the right quickly surge upfield. Horace Copeland (88) moves to the outside shoulder of Langham, and Lamar Thomas (36) moves to the inside of Johnson in order to release into their routes. Kevin Williams, too, moves to the inside shoulder of Williams and gets into his release. All three receivers surge upfield, but it's highly unlikely that all three of them are running go routes. In reality, the play never develops long enough for us to really figure out where they are going.

As mentioned earlier, the Tide rushes only four. Eric Curry (80) rushes to the outside in an attempt to beat the Miami left tackle off of the edge. John Copeland (94), his fellow bookend, initially rushes to the outside in an attempt to beat the Miami right tackle off the edge, but after charging upfield, he suddenly cuts inside. The Miami right guard and the center both block the left defensive tackle, and that combined with Copeland's rush creates a massive throwing lane for Torretta.

At this point, Torretta is clearly a confused and apprehensive quarterback. His actions are not indicative of a Heisman Trophy winning quarterback with two national championship rings. Upon receiving the ball, Torretta quickly maneuvers it to grip the laces properly, and instantly begins to throw the football. Despite having two fine receivers (88 and 36) isolated in man coverage with no safety help, Torretta never even looks in their direction. The entire time he stares down the inside receiver in the trips formation (3), and throws the ball in his direction as soon as physically possible.

The inside receiver (3) in the trips formation lines up with George Teague (13) immediately in front of him. At the snap, the receiver releases into a shallow crossing route over the middle. But Teague doesn't make life easy for him. He is physical with the receiver, and jumps the route. At this point, the massive throwing lane between the Miami right tackle and Miami right guard has opened, and Teague is a mere eight yards away from Torretta. The confused and apprehensive Heisman Trophy winner is already well into his throwing motion by now, and Teague sees the ball will be heading in his direction. Though he is man coverage, he is staring down Torretta, just waiting for the ball to be released. The receiver (3) seemingly starts to cut back to the outside (confusion between the quarterback and the receiver, perhaps?), but Teague does not budge an inch, and neither does Torretta.

The ball is thrown, and Teague (13) quickly snags the interception and races around the offensive left end. Considering he cut back the outside, the Miami receiver cannot make the tackle. The two receivers on the left side of the formation (Kevin Williams, 5, and the tight end, 17) are now too far down field to come back and make the tackle, and there were no backs to get him. The only one standing between Teague and the end zone is the slow-footed Gino Torretta, and he simply can't chase the speedy Teague down.

Teague darts around the end, races along the sideline, and into the end zone.

Alabama 27, Miami 6.

The Crimson Tide moves one step closer to its twelfth national championship.

Scrimmage Notes

2007-08-12T15:54:00.001-05:00

Fall practice is now well underway, and the first major hurdle has been cleared. On Saturday, the Crimson Tide conducted its first scrimmage.

A few general scrimmage notes:

We threw the football, a lot. By my count there were 63 passes to 29 runs. Now don't go crazy, we won't do that in the regular season, but it's an interesting note. And, moreover, it was pretty successful for the offense. On 63 passes, we threw for -- again, by my count -- a whopping 528 yards. We averaged around nine yards per attempt, over thirteen yards per completion, and a completion percentage of around sixty per cent.

Terry Grant continues to look like the starting tailback. On Saturday, he had 15 carries for 110 yards, and a touchdown. The touchdown came off of a 22-yard run. Glen Coffee got only 4 carries. Again, as mentioned earlier, it seems that as long as Grant stays healthy, he will be our starting tailback.

Jimmy Johns, as I noted earlier, will be used quite a bit in this offense. This is not going to be a situation like we had with Le'Ron McClain where he is a blocker and not much else; we will attempt to use Johns in a Jacob Hester-esque fashion. Saturday's scrimmage showed that quite nicely. All told, Johns had 10 carries for 39 yards and 3 catches for 26 yards. He's just too talented to be just a blocker. He's going to get a lot of touches this year, get ready for it.

John Parker Wilson had another nice day, going 13-22 for 231 yards, 2 touchdowns, and 1 interception. From everything we have seen in camp, he could have a very good year.

Roy Upchurch did not play. He is still in the black jersey due to some off-season shoulder surgery. There is no indication whatsoever as to when he'll return.

The defense is not playing well. Generally speaking, the defense usually plays better than the offense early in camp, but not so with the Crimson Tide this year. The quarterbacks have a field day of throwing the football, and we couldn't stop Terry Grant either. We've apparently got some major improvement to make on that front.

We seem to be doing pretty well in terms of place-kicking. On the day, we were four of five in field goal attempts. Christensen hit from 42 and 21 before missing from 31. Tiffin made a 21-yarder before connecting from 51. Sounds good.

P.J. Fitzgerald is showing some promise, and he has a nice upside. But he still needs to improve. On eight punts in the scrimmage, he averaged only about 37 yards per punt, which is about what he did last year. Unless he dramatically improved hang time from over a year ago, that needs to improve.

Thankfully, we got out of the scrimmage relatively free from injury. Of course, injuries hurt whenever they happen, but there is nothing worse than when you see a rash of injuries during practice. We have the potential to have a very good year if things come together, but we do not have anywhere near the quality depth needed to have a good year in spite of some poor injury luck.

Mission Impossible: The OTS Response

2007-08-12T02:07:00.000-05:00

A Sea Of Blue, one of the best Kentucky blogs around, had a very good article the other day entitled, "Mission Impossible: Growing a football program in the SEC."At bottom, the article details the perils of building a football program up in the SEC, coming to the conclusion that for a program like Kentucky, it's almost impossible to turn into a legitimate and consistent winner.

I must say, it's pretty hard for me to disagree with much of what they say. Granted, for the Kentucky faithful, it's a bitter pill to swallow, but bitter pills generally contain large granules of truth, so it is what it is.

And Sea of Blue is correct, it's a nearly impossible task for a lower tier SEC program. The level of competition in this conference is so ridiculously high that it is the athletic equivalent of scaling Everest with nothing but a Snickers bar and a Swiss Army knife.

Just think of the great quality teams in this conference. Alabama is the traditional powerhouse, and we arguably have the greatest tradition in all of college football. Tennessee is a traditional powerhouse, and one of the top ten great programs of all-time. Even teams like LSU, Georgia, and Auburn are generally considered as top fifteen programs, historically speaking. Florida traditionally hasn't been a powerhouse, but truthfully they have been the premier program in the SEC over the course of the past twenty years. If that is not hard enough, now throw in a historically good Arkansas program, and a steadily-rising South Carolina program.

The thing about the SEC is that it is so competitive from top-to-bottom. In the other conferences, it is generally a couple of schools at the top that win basically everything, and the rest are generally middling at best. The Big Ten has Ohio State and Michigan. The new ACC has Miami and Florida State (not so much now, but no one doubts that will be who dominates that conference once they get things together). The Big 12 has Oklahoma, Texas, and Nebraska. The Pac-10 has USC. The old Big East had Miami. The old ACC had Florida State. The old Big Eight had Oklahoma and Nebraska (as Bosworth put it, "The Big Two and the Little Six").

Break it down over the past several years.

In the Big Ten, either Michigan or Ohio State have won a share of the Big Ten championship in nine of the past eleven years.

In the Big 12, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have combined to win the Big 12 championship in seven of the past ten years. Moreover, one of the those three teams have appeared in the Big 12 Championship Game each and every year since its inception in 1996.

In the Pac-10, USC has won the conference championship the past five years in a row, and just being honest, with as much talent as they have, it will almost certainly be six in a row this year. Projecting that even further -- again, with all of the talent they have -- they could easily run off seven or even eight straight conference championships.

The SEC is very different. In the past nine years, eight different teams have appeared in the SEC Championship Game, and six different teams have won the SEC championship.

At bottom, the parity in this conference is just so high that going into any year, a large number of teams could win the SEC. As we've written about in the past, it's just damn near impossible to predict the eventual SEC champion, and that is due to the extremely high amount of parity to be found within the conference. Take LSU for example. They are likely to have a great team this year, and they are everyone's favorite to win the conference. But seriously, what are the chances that they actually get it done? Honestly, if I had to say, I'd probably say 25% or less. And that's nothing against LSU mind you, they are a great team, but the rest of the conference is just so tough and the least little slip-up will cost you the title. Hence why an pre-season SEC favorite hasn't won the SEC since Tennessee in 1997.

It's just a murderer's row, no two ways about it.

And keep in mind I'm not bragging here, and I'm not trying to start one of those god-awful "best" conference debates. I'm merely pointing out that the level of competition in this conference is so high that it is going to be almost impossible for a team like Kentucky or Vanderbilt to turn into a consistent winner.

Take a look at Arkansas, for example. Before the Hogs joined the SEC in 1992, they were one of the better football programs in the nation. They had won the old Southwest Conference thirteen times, and had winning records against every Southwest Conference team except Texas. From 1936-1989, they finished ranked in the final poll 25 times. Since moving to the SEC in 1992, however, things have not gone well for the Hogs. They have yet to win the SEC, and really haven't even gotten particularly close. Beyond that, in the fifteen years prior to their joining the SEC, the Hogs had five seasons of ten or more wins, but in the fifteen years since joining the SEC, they only have one. Moreover, they have losing records against several SEC foes since joining the conference (Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Auburn, Georgia, etc.), and have only been ranked in the final poll three times in the fifteen years since making the switch, compared to nine times in the previous fifteen years.

Even for one of nation's better programs, it is a tough road filled with peril. I can only imagine what it must feel like for those who bleed blue and white.

It's just these schools have everything against them. They are generally light years behind in terms of facilities, and really there's just no feasible way for them to catch up. Moreover, they can't replicate the tradition bit, and players who are looking for a quick-ticket to the NFL will not be headed to their campuses. Beyond that, they generally don't have the big bucks to pay the best coaches, so even if they hire a good coach they usually just use the school as a stepping stone, and many of these schools (Kentucky is a good example) are simply not in geographic areas where ungodly amounts of the football talent comes out of the high school ranks each year.

Just look at what these schools have to do in order to get a little talent. What little in-state talent there is grows up with little or no attachment to that particular school and thus it often leaves the state for greener pastures (see Shaun Alexander of Florence, Kentucky). So what are those schools to do? Obviously, recruiting out-of-state talent away from far superior programs who grew up bleeding their state school's colors just doesn't happen very often. So, at the end of the day, they just aren't left with very much talent, and it shows up on Saturdays.

And if you think this is just an SEC phenomenon, you are wrong. It's really true of all of the big conferences, honestly. Can Stanford really ever consistently run with the big dogs of the Pac-10? The same goes for teams like Baylor, Purdue, Kentucky, and others. They may have some success on occasion, but it is generally a one or two year stretch followed by years and years of below mediocrity.

All in all, despite all of the major rule changes by the NCAA in the name of parity and increasing competition over the past several decades, generally speaking, it's still a college football world divided between the haves and the have-nots. On the one hand you have the powerhouses with the almost endless resources, the magnificent facilities, the massive stadiums, the diehard fanbases, the talent-rich recruiting bases, and on the other hand you have those programs who, well, don't have any of that. And the results essentially show that.

At bottom, I think I would have to agree wholeheartedly with their conclusion. I'm just really not convinced that most of these programs, almost regardless of what they do, can really ever turn into consistent competitors in the true powerhouse conferences, particularly in the SEC.

Damien Square Commits To Alabama

2007-08-11T19:42:00.000-05:00

Damian Square has committed to Alabama.

Whoo-hoo!

If you will recall from an earlier article, I listed Square as one of the top recruits we were going after, and though he was a bit of a long shot, he was a possibility with Saban.

As it turns out, we've reeled in the long shot.

Square chose Alabama over the likes of Texas A&M, Miami, Florida, and others. We are recruiting him as a defensive lineman, and according to him, Saban and company told he that he was our number one defensive tackle recruit. Considering he has quickly jumped up from 230 pounds to 270 pounds, he should have no trouble putting on the added weight to move inside. Even so, if he cannot do that, given his athleticism, he could play defensive end at that size and be very effective.

Originally a Texas A&M commitment, Square had this to say to Scout.com's Andrew Bone:

“I will only visit Alabama. I won’t take any other visit. I love Alabama’s recruiting class. I can see the athletes in this class, and that’s why I can see a national championship coming soon."

The Crimson Recruiting Boom continues, and a top-five recruiting class seems closer than ever.

Old Playbooks

2007-08-10T12:35:00.000-05:00

I was browsing the Internet and came across a very good website: Fast and Furious Football. Essentially, they just post tons and tons of old playbooks on their website.

I've found three, in specific, that I'm sure the readers of OTS will find quite interesting.

First, there is the 1975 Alabama offensive playbook. Essentially, it covers a lot of the ends and outs of the wishbone. It's a neat deal, plenty of hand-written notes in it as well. Plenty of other good stuff tool, such as specific route trees. It even has a special teams breakdown and a good deal of stuff about the defense, though it's not quite as specific as the offense.

Second, the 1989 Alabama offensive playbook. This is straight from the mind of offensive guru Homer Smith, and it is quite good. It is very long, as you would expect, but it's a great thing to read. As you would expect with Homer, there is a lot of intellectual ramblings about football concepts and the like. Tons of football knowledge to be found here.

Third, we have the 1999 Alabama defensive playbook. It's good stuff, and honestly it's in a much more user friendly format. It's a lot easier to browse through and comprehend.

All in all, it's a neat site. You can even find some stuff about Saban while he was at LSU. Very informative.

Unit Breakdown: The Offensive Line

2007-08-09T17:03:00.000-05:00

With no doubt, the Alabama offensive line has been the most frustrating and derided unit on the team the past two years, and possibly even longer than that. Shula regime struggles aside, even I can't remember when we had a really good line in terms of pass blocking. 2006 was a particularly disastrous year in terms of running the football, particularly in short-yardage situations, and the pass protection wasn't particularly good either, though it wasn't as bad as some made it out to be.

The funny thing though was, when Nick Saban arrived, it was mentioned quite often in a variety of circles that Saban and offensive line coach Joe Pendry were pleasantly surprised at the potential of the offensive line. And perhaps that shouldn't be too surprising. After all, there is no doubt that we have plenty of talent on the offensive. For all of the shortcomings of Mike Shula, he recruited very well on the offensive line, he could just never get it, as a unit, to perform that well.

So how is the line stacking up in 2007?

To begin with, we know we have two very good football players.

Center Antoine Caldwell returns for his junior campaign, and Caldwell is one of the best centers you will find anywhere. He's a very bright individual (always important for the center position), very athletic, and a hard worker. Combined, all of that ability makes him very versatile, and he can truthfully play any position on the offensive line at this level. As a redshirt freshman in 2005, he played guard, then moved to center for the Cotton Bowl and the 2006 season. After the Chris Capps meltdown in the 2006 Iron Bowl, he was moved to right tackle on the fly, and he did quite well. Auburn defensive end Quentin Groves, who will be playing on Sunday this time next year, didn't put another finger on John Parker Wilson once Caldwell was moved to right tackle. There are no two ways about it, Caldwell is a fine player, and we have no concerns at the center position.

Left tackle Andre Smith, too, is a great football player. When he came out of high school, he was the top offensive line recruit in the country, and many (including ESPN.com) dubbed him, with little doubt, as the best left tackle prospect to come out in ages. He didn't disappoint. Despite playing overweight and out of shape, he started all year as a true freshman at the line's most difficult position, and looked very good. He even nearly killed a thief in Fayetteville, and ran for a touchdown in the bowl game. The truth is, the sky is the limit for Smith, particularly now that he has much better coaching and is in much better shape. He legitimately has the raw talent to end up with a bust in Canton. If he can stay healthy, he'll probably make some All-America teams this year.

The other three positions are the question marks.

At left guard, Justin Britt is the likely starter. After spending his first two years on the defensive line, he made the move to left guard last year, and started ten games. All in all, he played pretty well. He's a bit small for a guard, but he is an aggressive player, and that usually pays off pretty well in the running game for an interior lineman. As expected, he was a bit raw last year, especially in terms of pass protection, but seems to be progressing nicely. Britt is not the second coming of John Hannah, but he seems to have the capabilities to turn in a solid campaign.

Right guard will belong to redshirt junior Marlon Davis. In 2006, B.J. Stabler was technically the starter for most the season (Davis started three games late in the year to spell an injured Stabler), but he generally split snaps all season long with Davis. Now that B.J. Stabler has been moved to right tackle, Marlon Davis will be taking over full-time at right guard. The good news is that Davis has really gotten it done in the weight room this off-season, and is in noticeably better shape. All told, Davis has dropped 21 pounds according to RollTide.com, and looks to be in great shape. The coaching staff obviously likes Marlon Davis, and thinks highly of his productive potential. The bright outlook on Davis was the major reason why B.J. Stabler was moved to right tackle, so it's reasonable to expect a solid season out of Davis in 2007.

Right tackle is where it really gets interesting. B.J. Stabler, never a workout warrior, has gotten it together this year, dropping 13 pounds, and he has moved to right tackle, as mentioned earlier. Unfortunately, Stabler has been slowed his entire career by leg injuries (three left knee surgeries), but it seems he is finally healthy in that regard. But he's not winning the starting job at the moment. Instead, Mike Johnson, a 6'6, 296 pound redshirt sophomore, seems to be the front-runner for the starting job. Johnson is an extremely bright individual (4.0 GPA in high school, and a 27 on the ACT), and he is a hard worker who has apparently really impressed the coaching staff thus far. Moreover, his natural size (6'6 equals long arms) fits well at tackle, and apparently his footwork is good.

So, that seems to be it at the moment. If you had to say today, the starting offensive line would be:

LT: Andre Smith
LG: Justin Britt
C: Antoine Caldwell
RG: Marlon Davis
RT: Mike Johnson

Moreover, a few other players are certain to enter into the mix as well.

B.J. Stabler, unless he makes a big surge in the coming weeks, is not going to start this year. However, a much leaner, much healthier Stabler will still be a major contributor, if but for nothing more than this versatility (can play both guard and tackle). Moreover, given his history of leg woes, a somewhat limited role could be the ideal situation for him.

Chris Capps won't be starting this year, but he is a very valuable back-up. He is currently splitting time between left tackle and right tackle. Though Capps isn't a particularly good player, with some help (tight end or back helping him out, or shorter drops from the quarterback), he can be relatively effective. He is a senior and he has started for two seasons (24 starts). Few teams have the luxury of someone like that coming off of the bench.

Evan Cardwell is a fine center, and his only problem is Antoine Caldwell. He played some last year at center, and did quite well. Again, he's not going to start, but he is a fine player, and it is nice to know that if something happened to Caldwell, we have a player the quality of Cardwell to come off of the bench.

All told, believe it or not, things look good for the offensive line in 2007. Andre Smith is likely a legend in the making, and Antoine Caldwell is one of the best centers you will find anywhere. If we can just get solid play out of the other three starters, we'll be in good shape.

There are just a lot of reasons to be optimistic about the offensive line. Everyone returns from a year ago, the players are in noticeably better shape, the coaching will be much improved, and this line has a good bit of depth.

Perhaps this will finally be the year all of the talent up front turns into production.

Tailback: Is Size A Concern?

2007-08-08T22:12:00.000-05:00

Especially now that the bulky Jimmy Johns has been moved to fullback, some are worried about the lack of size for the likely starters: Terry Grant and Glen Coffee. Being specific, Grant is listed at 189 pounds, and Coffee is listed as 197. Obviously, neither of those two are the second-coming of Jerome Bettis, to say the very least.

So do Tide fans really have anything to worry about in terms of injuries to the tailbacks due to their small size? Well, let's look at history a bit first before we come to any conclusions.

Bobby Humphrey, for example, was probably the greatest running back we've ever had at Alabama, and during his prime he played at only about 180 pounds. After huge years in 1986 and 1987, Humphrey was the favorite to win the Heisman Trophy in his senior season in 1998. Unfortunately, he broke his foot early in his senior season (1988), an injury unrelated to his size, and that was the end of his career. Oddly enough, he suffered the injury when he was playing at his highest weight ever, just over 200 pounds. Since Shaun Alexander came along, most forget that Humphrey, despite missing almost all of his senior season, is only 145 rushing yards behind Alexander for the all-time Alabama record, and Humphrey still holds the all-time Alabama single-season rushing record.

Derrick Lassic, in 1992, was the key cog to our rushing attack, and one of the few bright spots we had on offense. Despite getting almost 200 carries that year, he ran for almost 1,000 yards, and was the Sugar Bowl MVP. He did so at a mere 186 pounds.

Sherman Williams was the Tide's leading rusher in both 1993 and 1994, yet he weighed in at well under 200 pounds.

Shaud Williams was one of the Tide's best all-time tailbacks. In his two years at Alabama, he rushed for well over 2,000 yards, and for 13 touchdowns, averaging over 5.5 yards per carry. In 2003, he had the third most single-season rushing yards in Alabama football history. He did it all at around 189 pounds.

And that's just a few Alabama players that I could think off of the top of my head. Beyond Alabama players, there are entirely too many other small tailbacks who have done extremely well with little or no injury problems at the collegiate level. Again, off the top of my head, a few players I can think of that did really well despite being a bit small are Barry Sanders, Emmitt Smith, and Warrick Dunn.

At bottom, there's just no legitimate concern with small tailbacks. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that they are more prone to injury than bigger tailbacks. If anything, smaller tailbacks are most likely less injury prone because they can use their small bodies and increased agility to avoid big hits. Bigger runners, on the other hand, have no other option but to endure the punishment, and of course the ensuing injuries. The same can't be said for the small guys.

Injuries can happen at any time, and tailback is one of the most injury-prone positions. It shouldn't be shocking at all to see either Grant or Coffee go down with an injury, but those injuries won't be related to their size. If anything, their small stature will likely assist in keeping them healthy.

Clarification: Jimmy Johns

2007-08-08T16:49:00.000-05:00

I've gotten a few questions regarding Jimmy Johns that past couple of days. If you recall, a few weeks back I wrote one article talking about, once you viewed it through the advanced statistics, how well Johns performed in the "big" games last year (eight conference games, plus Hawai'i and the bowl game), and another article analyzing how specifically how Johns was under-utilized as games wore on, after a hot start. However, now Jimmy Johns is apparently getting most of his work at fullback, and from all that we can tell, Johns is going to play fullback this season.

So, some readers want to know, how do those two things mesh? They seem a bit conflicting, so how do you reconcile those two things?

Personally, I think there are a few reasons.

For one, all of the numbers from a year ago with Johns were in a back-up role. Yes, he did very well in that limited role, no doubt about it. However, there is a major difference between doing things in a limited role and doing them on a full-time basis. Just because you were good over the course of 50 carries doesn't mean you will necessarily replicate that success over the course of 250 carries. In fact, the guys at Football Outsiders even have a term for players who do well on a limited basis, but then fall on their face once they take over full time. They call it the "Doug Johnson Effect" in "honor" of the former Atlanta Falcons quarterback. All the data I crunched on Johns from a year ago says is that he, more or less, should have been given more carries instead of riding the bench. That said, however, we can never know whether or not he would have actually been able to have the same success in an expanded role, all we can say is that he should have gotten the opportunity to do so. Perhaps Saban and company do not feel that Johns would be able to have the same success on a full-time basis.

Two, we need a fullback. I know that sounds elementary, but it's true. I've written in the past that, in 2007, our base set is likely going to be a singleback formation, with three wide receivers (Brown and Hall out wide, Stover in the slot), with a tight end. And I think that is mainly correct, we'll see that a lot in 2007. It just makes sense, if those three guys are healthy. If we put Hall, Brown, and Stover on the field at the same time, it will require the opposing defense to force either a linebacker or a nickel corner to cover one of those three players, and that's a match-up we will win almost every time. But, still, you need a fullback, particularly in short-yardage and goal-to-go situations. Beyond that, it would be nice to utilize the fullback in other situations as well, particularly when he has play-making abilities of Jimmy Johns.

Three, even without Johns, we seem set at tailback. Despite the disappointing injury to Demetrius Goode (torn ACL), Terry Grant is doing very well and is apparently at the top of the depth chart. Glen Coffee, now much leaner, is also doing quite well, and as a whole we seem to be set at tailback. By moving Johns to fullback, we can put more talent on the field at one time, without really giving up anything at tailback.

Four, even though Johns is working a good bit at fullback, he could still play tailback some. It's not like this means he'll never line up at tailback again. If we need him there, for injuries or whatever reason, he could quickly move back and re-acclimate himself to the position in no time.

Putting it all together, it's just a move that makes a lot of sense. No one knows if Johns can really get it done at tailback on a full-time basis, we're in need of a fullback with experience, we seem set at tailback, and even so, Johns could move back to tailback, if needed. Again, it just makes a good bit of sense.

At bottom, though, above and beyond all else, I think this is mainly a move to add an extra threat to the offense. Nothing against Baron Huber, but the harsh truth is that we are likely a more productive offense with Grant / Coffee at tailback and Johns at fullback than we are with Grant / Coffee / Johns at tailback with Huber at fullback. Doing this really adds an explosive element to our offense, and honestly that's something we didn't have last year with Le'Ron McClain. Though McClain was with little doubt the best pure blocking fullback in the country, he was never a real rushing threat (averaged less than seven yards rushing per game for his career), and he was never a real receiving threat, either. He did have 38 catches the past two years, but it was mainly as desperation dump-off passes by Wilson / Croyle in attempts to avoid sacks. Generally speaking, he was never a significant part of the passing game.

Jimmy Johns, with no doubt whatsoever, would change that. He would give us a player at fullback with the running and catching abilities of a good tailback. He has the ability to legitimately be a player that, once he touches the ball, could well rack up first downs, big yardage, and touchdowns.

I imagine that Saban and company are fully expecting to use Johns in a role very much like the current LSU coaching staff has used a former Saban recruit: Jacob Hester.

The Crimson Recruiting Boom

2007-08-08T00:16:00.000-05:00

Alabama football is currently experiencing a recruiting boom, no two ways about it. At the moment, some services already have us with a top ten class (Rivals, Inc.), and there is little doubt that we will finish with a top ten class with every major recruiting service. Truth is, it gets better, we have a great shot at getting a top five class.

According to Rivals, Inc., we have nine players rated as four-stars, and one player rated as a five-star. According to Scout.com, we have six players rated as four-stars. Either way you look at it, it is shaping up to be an incredible class.

Several more highly-rated prospects will eventually be committing to Alabama as well. Just to name a few possibilities (and keep in mind this list is not complete):

Star Jackson is one of the Elite 11 quarterbacks, rated a four-star player by both Scout.com and Rivals, Inc., and he is going to announce his collegiate decision on August 23rd. He has offers from the likes of Alabama, Auburn, Florida State, and West Virginia. He is expected to commit to Alabama then, and honestly, essentially everyone would be shocked if he didn't. He has praised Alabama in his comments the past few months about as much as the Pope praises Mary.

Mark Barron is a four-star wide receiver from St. Paul's Episcopal School in Mobile, Alabama, and sports offers from the likes of Alabama, Auburn, LSU, Florida, Florida State, and Miami. His teammates, Ivan Matchett and Destin Hood, have both committed to Alabama, and Barron is widely considered an Alabama lock.

Glen Harbin is a four-star defensive from Mobile's McGill-Toolen High School, and he could go to essentially any school in the country, with offers from Alabama, Auburn, LSU, Oklahoma, and others. According to Scout.com recruiting analyst Andrew Bone, "Alabama is the team to beat for his signature."

William Green is a four-star defensive end from Hoover High School, ranked the #13 defensive end in the country. He has offers from Alabama, Auburn, Florida, LSU, Oklahoma, and others. At the moment, it seems to be a battle between Alabama and Florida, and most expect him to stick with the in-state school and roll with the Tide.

Barrett Jones is a four-star offensive lineman from Tennessee, and is generally considered the top player in the state of Tennessee. He sports offers from essentially every major school in the country, and he has narrowed his list down to five. Considering that his father played football at Alabama, he is expected to eventually commit to the Crimson Tide.

And those are just people who are generally expected to sign with Alabama. But it gets even better for those who bleed crimson and white.

Julio Jones is considered by many to be the top player in the country, and any school in the country would do anything to get him. Fortunately, though he's been quiet on the recruiting front, most expect that he will commit to Alabama.

Jerrell Harris is a four-star linebacker from Gadsden, Alabama, and considered one of the top linebackers in the country, with offers from everyone. Alabama has a good chance of landing him.

Antoine McClain of Anniston, Alabama is a four-star prospect, and one of the top offensive line prospects in the country. Alabama will be one of the final teams in his decision. And seriously, when was the last time we lost out on a kid named McClain?

Damian Square is a four-star linebacker from Houston, Texas, and is considered one of the top Sam linebackers in the country. He was originally committed to Texas A&M very early, but backed out, and will now decide between Texas A&M, Alabama, Miami, and Florida. He took a trip to Tuscaloosa, and was apparently blown away. He makes his decision this Sunday, apparently.

Even Arthur Brown, considered by many as the overall number one player in the country (including by Scout.com), took a visit to Alabama and was blown away. A friend, Brian Butler, who runs a non-profit organization, went along with Brown and had this to say, "I can actually say the visit was phenomenal. I can't really think of any other adjective to describe it. It was fantastic, phenomenal, a first class organization. I would say I am very pleased with everything Alabama has to offer... I can say Alabama will play a factor in his final decision -- a critical factor."

Now will Alabama get all of those guys? Of course not, but with the way things are going with Saban on the recruiting trails, we'll get our fair share and then some.

Just a raw guesstimate, I think it's fairly reasonable to assume that, once this recruiting class is finally in the books, we'll add another seven or eight players players rated as four-star and higher, and quite possibly even more than that. Moreover, several of our current commitments could get a fourth-star as well. For example, Destin Hood was a three-star by both services, and when Rivals most recently updated their rankings, he got a fourth star, and it's only a matter of time before the same happens on Scout.com. Devonta Bolton has a great chance at getting a fourth star, as does Brandon Lewis.

There are no two ways about it, recruiting is experiencing absolutely nothing short of a boom period. The truth is, as I've noted before, we are likely to get as many four and five-star signees this year as we did in the entire four year period from 2002-2005. It's going to be a great class, no two ways about it. This will be, with almost no doubt, the best recruiting class to come to the Capstone in ages.

The Heisman Pundit Responds

2007-08-07T21:01:00.001-05:00

The Heisman Pundit -- almost without doubt the foremost internet authority on all things Heisman -- has read the earlier post here on Outside The Sidelines regarding the Heisman Trophy, and has taken exception to some of the things noted.

If you recall, the money quote from that column was essentially this: "The truth of the matter is that for a player to have any legitimate shot at the Heisman Trophy these days, his team almost certainly has to be playing for the national championship."

The Heisman Pundit had this to say regarding that particular thesis:

"It's really not that simple. In reality, it may be the other way around: To have a shot at the national championship you probably have to have a Heisman Trophy contender. Having one of what people regard as one of the best players in the country playing for your team at an important position like quarterback or running back is invariably a boost to ranking and record. Would Ohio State have made the national title game without Troy Smith under center? Doubt it. And that's the whole point: Heisman contenders usually make the teams, not the other way around.

So let's look at the main argument.

The Heisman Pundit explicitly stated that in order to have a shot at the national championship, you probably have to have a Heisman Trophy contender.

Does that argument have any validity? As best I can tell, no. Far beyond merely contending for the national championship, six national champions have emerged in the past eleven years with no legitimate Heisman Trophy contender whatsoever.

Among that group includes:

2006 Florida: Despite some ESPN rumblings about Chris Leak potentially being a Heisman contender, the Heisman voters never felt that way. Though the Gators were undisputed national champions, according to the expanded Heisman Trophy voting, he was not among the top 11 vote-getters.

2003 LSU: Though the Tigers won the BCS national championship, they did not have a player finish in the top 10 in Heisman balloting in 2003. In reality, they won it with a journeyman quarterback who came to Baton Rouge via Lansing, Michigan and Minor League Baseball (Mauck), and a tailback who was a one-year freshman wonder (Vincent).

2002 Ohio State: The Buckeyes may have shocked the world by knocking off defending national champion Miami in the Fiesta Bowl, but they did so with an unheralded quarterback (Krenzel), and a true freshman tailback (Clarett). No Buckeye finished in the final top 10 in Heisman balloting in 2002.

1999 Florida State: The Seminoles went undefeated and won the national championship with a convincing win over Virginia Tech in the Sugar Bowl, but didn't have a legitimate Heisman contender. Wide receiver Peter Warrick finished sixth in Heisman voting. He ended with approximately one-tenth of the total points as did Heisman Trophy winner Ron Dayne. Perhaps this is a subjective judgment, but I wouldn't consider finishing sixth in Heisman voting with only roughly one-tenth of the total points as the eventual winner legitimately "contending" for the award.

1998 Tennessee: The Volunteers went undefeated in 1998 and won the national championship, but did not have a player finish in the final top ten in Heisman voting. What's more, Florida State, the Volunteers opponent in the first ever BCS national championship game, did not have a player finish in the final top ten in Heisman voting, either.

1997 Nebraska: Though the Corhuskers went undefeated and won the third and final national championship for Tom Osbourne, they did not have a player finish in the final top ten in Heisman voting in 1997.

So, as noted earlier, that argument just doesn't seem to have very much validity. There have been, in my eyes, entirely too many national champions the past several years that have done so with no legitimate Heisman contender whatsoever for that argument to have any real validity.

Now, let's move to the other corollary of that argument:

"And that's the whole point: Heisman contenders usually make the teams, not the other way around."

On that point, I'd have to disagree. Successful teams, at bottom, are not about having one great player, but instead are about having great players at nearly every position, from top-to-bottom on the depth chart. To say that one player "makes" the team, in my eyes, is absurd. Certainly one player can be highly important to your team's overall successes, no doubt there. However, if all you have is one incredible player, you don't have very much, and aren't going to go very far. Calvin Johnson and 9-5 Georgia Tech provide the textbook example. Troy Smith and the Ohio State Buckeyes, on the other hand, prove the reverse of that point nicely. Though Smith was an integral piece, no doubt about it, Ohio State wasn't in the national championship game solely because of him. Rather, their national championship appearance was about a good offensive line, great receivers (Ginn and Gonzalez), a good running game (Pittman), a great defense (fifth in the country in scoring defense), and one of the best head coaches in the country. At bottom, football is the ultimate team sport, and is not defined by single good players. For any team to have any real national championship contender, they have to be good from top-to-bottom. True one man teams generally end up in mid-tier bowls at best, not hoisting the national championship trophy.

Moreover, if Heisman Trophy winners are really so integral, why have their teams struggled so much in national championship games? Since the inception of the BCS in 1998, Heisman Trophy winners have played in the national championship game six times, and generally it hasn't been pretty for those who have hoisted the Heisman. All told, their teams are only 1-5 in the BCS national championship game. More specifically:

2000: Florida State loses to Oklahoma, 13-2 (Chris Weinke)
2001: Nebraska loses to Miami, 37-14 (Eric Crouch)
2003: Oklahoma loses to LSU, 21-14 (Jason White)
2004: USC beats Oklahoma, 55-19 (Matt Leinart)
2005: USC loses to Texas, 41-38 (Reggie Bush)
2006: Ohio State loses to Florida, 41-14 (Troy Smith)

At bottom, having a Heisman Trophy winner on your team doesn't seem to pay off too much when it is all on the line.

Also, to close, if the Heisman Trophy is viewed as a total team award as opposed to an individual accomplishment, it does help explain why Heisman Trophy winners have generally struggled so greatly in the NFL the past few years. When looked at in that light, it makes a bit of sense. Arguably, the Heisman Trophy winners weren't particularly great players in their own right, but were mainly the by-product of great teams, and once they were faced with a much higher level of competition in the NFL and much more overall parity with their opponents, their true abilities were fully revealed. Certainly there are some exceptions to this rule (Carson Palmer, mainly), but generally that rule could be construed as valid (Jason White, Chris Weinke, Eric Crouch, etc.).

Either way, it's nice to get into a good debate with one of the best blogs you can find anywhere. I look forward to their response.

More On Kick-Off Rule Change

2007-08-07T11:57:00.000-05:00

Nearly two weeks, I wrote on the massive effects that the rule change regarding kick-offs would bring about. Some have speculated that now, teams would simply kick the ball out of bounds and let the opponent take it at the 35, instead of risking a bigger return.

As usual, things aren't just that simple. I found the following in the NCAA rulebook (warning: PDF, scroll down to the top of page 185) regarding kicks that go out of bounds:

"A kickoff from Team A’s 30-yard line goes out of bounds untouched by Team B, and no other foul (or violation) occurs. RULING: Team B may accept a five-yard penalty from the previous spot with Team A kicking from the 25-yard line, or Team B may put the ball in play at Team B’s 35-yard line at the inbounds spot or at the inbounds spot where the ball went out of bounds. Team B may put the ball in play following a penalty at the dead ball spot."

As said earlier, things just aren't that simple.

Say that you do choose to just kick the ball out-of-bounds. It won't work. If you kick it out-of bounds, the return team will simply accept the five-yard penalty, and you will have to re-kick from the 25 yard line. If you again kick it out of bounds, they will again accept the five-yard penalty, and you will have to re-kick from the 20-yard line. At bottom, kicking the football out of bounds only digs you deeper in the hole each time you do it.

The only way the return team would decline the penalty is if you shanked the kick-off (or got a poor subjective ruling from the officials as to where the ball really went out of bounds at), and then they would simply take the ball where it went at of bounds. Considering that would probably have them either near, or at, midfield, that wouldn't work. The average expected starting field position would be worse if they had just kicked it deep.

At bottom, all of this junk about kicking the ball out of bounds isn't going to work. It's a junk idea, and teams that try it (and I seriously doubt there will really be any) will soon find themselves in big trouble.

Moreover, even squib kicking -- while not as perilous as kicking the ball out of bounds -- is not likely to be particularly effective. In reality, generally speaking, the key to the squib kick is surprise. Return teams do not expect it, and a well-placed squib kick completely disorganizes the return. If you expect it, however, it's nowhere near as effective. The return team knows it is likely to come and they compensate accordingly. Return men will move up, then charge the ball to field it, and (as we've seen quite a bit in late-game scenarios in the NFL) even if the up-men grab the football, they will generally just immediately pitch it back to the returner and go about their business. Again, as noted earlier, the squib kick is just not going to be particularly effective if you use it on a regular basis.

At the end of the day, you simply are not going to weasel your way around this rule. You are going to have to kick the football deep, and you are going to have to go down and effectively cover it. And if you can't do that, well, you are in big trouble, and there is no real way around it.

As I said almost two weeks ago, this rule will have a massive impact, and teams that can cover kicks effectively and return kicks effectively will be in great shape to win a lot of games, and teams that cannot cover kicks effectively or return kicks effectively will be in big trouble, and could easily see wins turn into losses as a result of special teams meltdowns.

The Heisman Trophy: A Total Team Award

2007-08-07T02:43:00.000-05:00

Upon his retirement, Paul W. Bryant was asked whether or not he was disappointed in the fact that he never had a Heisman Trophy winner at Alabama. His reply was something to the effect of, "At Alabama our players don't win Heismany trophies, our teams win national championships," addressing the notion that the Heisman is purely an individual award and that he cared only about team accomplishments.

That may have been true during the time that Bryant said it, but today, it couldn't be farther from the truth.

In reality, the Heisman Trophy is now a total team award. It is not the total team award (that honored distinction remains for the national championship), but it is nevertheless an award marked by overall team success, and not merely individual performance.

The truth of the matter is that for a player to have any legitimate shot at the Heisman Trophy these days, his team almost certainly has to be playing for a national championship.

Let's look at recent history, looking at the past eleven Heisman Trophy winners.

2006: Troy Smith took home the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Ohio State Buckeyes were 12-0, had a spot secured in the BCS Title game, and were also a massive favorite over Florida.

2005: Reggie Bush won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his USC Trojans were 11-0, coming off of back-to-back national championships, and were going into the Rose Bowl as the #1 team in the country.

2004: Matt Leinart won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his USC Trojans were 11-0, coming off of a national championship season, and were going into the Orange Bowl as the #1 team in the country.

2003: Jason White won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Sooners were 12-1 and had a spot secured to play for the national championship against LSU in the Sugar Bowl. For months, his Oklahoma Sooners were talked about as one of the greatest teams in the history of college football.

2002: Carson Palmer won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Trojans were Pac-10 champions, and were going to play Big Ten champion Iowa in the Orange Bowl.

2001: Eric Crouch won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Cornhuskers were 11-1 and were slated to play Miami for the national championship in the Rose Bowl.

2000: Chris Weinke won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Seminoles were 10-1 and playing Oklahoma in the Orange Bowl for the national championship. Florida State was coming off of a national championship season, and were playing in their third consecutive national championship game.

1999: Ron Dayne won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Big Ten champion Badgers were slated to play in the Rose Bowl, and Dayne had just broken the NCAA all-time rushing record.

1998: Ricky Williams won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Longhorns were slated to play in the Cotton Bowl, and Williams had just broken the NCAA all-time rushing record.

1997: Charles Woodson won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Wolverines were 11-0 and were slated to play, effectively, for the national championship in the Rose Bowl against Washington State.

1996: Danny Wuerffel won the Heisman Trophy, and when the award was decided, his Gators were 11-1, SEC Champs, and were slated to play Florida State for the national championship in the Sugar Bowl.

So, that's it for the past eleven years.

All told, of the eleven last Heisman Trophy winners, eight of them were on a team playing in the national championship game, and the two that didn't had teams playing in the Cotton Bowl and the Rose Bowl, respectively, and had just broken the all-time NCAA rushing record. The only winner that did not fall into either category was Carson Palmer, the 2002 winner, and he was generally considered the best player in the country (he was the number overall selection in the NFL Draft six months later), and his Trojans at the end of the year were likely the hottest team in the country. Not exactly a mediocre squad, to say the least.

Let's look at combined overall records to drive home the point. If you omit the two who won the Heisman because they broke the all-time NCAA rushing record (Williams and Dayne), the other nine Heisman Trophy winner's team's had, at the time they were given the award, a combined 100-6 record, and eight national championship game appearances. Even if you include the 1998 Texas Longhorns (Williams), and the 1999 Wisconsin Badgers (Dayne), the overall record is 119-11. Quite impressive, to say the least.

In the end, it's a pretty simple analysis: If you want to win the Heisman Trophy, your team almost certainly must be in contention for the national championship (and by that I mean literally playing in a national championship game), or you must break one of the most highly regarded historical records.

Again, at bottom, despite assertions to the contrary, the Heisman Trophy is very much a team award. Unless your team is having a national championship contending year, you just aren't likely going to be able to win the Heisman.

2006 provided the perfect example. Everyone, and I do mean everyone, agreed that Georgia Tech's Calvin Johnson was the best player in the nation. Many contended, and still contend, that he was the best Division 1-A receiver in decades, and honestly it was / is a legitimate argument. Nevertheless, Johnson never had a legitimate shot at the Heisman Trophy because he was on a mediocre team, and actually was not even in the final three at the Downtown Athletic Club. In fact, Johnson finished tenth in Heisman voting, behind the likes of Ian Johnson and Ray Rice.

And what about 2007? Most people have John David Booty as the Heisman Trophy front-runner, even though most will contend that Arkansas' Darren McFadden is the best player in the nation. Why? Booty's USC Trojans are #1 in the country, and everyone's pick to be national champions. Arkansas, on the other hand, isn't even picked to win their division, and is ranked 20th.

Again, there are no two ways about it, the Heisman Trophy is a team award.

Preseason Rankings: Do They Matter?

2007-08-06T22:37:00.000-05:00

A few days ago, USA Today released its Top 25 Coaches' Poll. You've probably read about it by now, but in case you haven't, click here. The AP Poll, I'm sure, will be coming out shortly, though I don't know precisely when.

And, well, it is what it is. But the relevant question to it all is this: Do preseason rankings really matter? Do they have any real correlation with the actual end result, i.e. the final poll?

Well, that's what I wanted to know.

So, I did some analysis on the subject. All in all, I took the preseason AP Poll from 2002-2006, a five year stretch, and attempted to determine how well the preseason rankings correlated to the final rankings. In doing so, largely for simplification purposes, I decided to only look at the preseason top ten and then look how well those teams did in the final poll.

The following two images represent the entire data set summed up nicely. As you will see, team names are omitted, and only the raw ranking is shown. "Pre" indicates the slot that the particular team was ranked in the preseason AP Poll, and "Final" indicates where the team was ranked in the final AP Poll after the conclusion of the bowl games.

Here goes:

And that is all of the data regarding the subject analyzed here.

So, what did we find?

I ran the correlation numbers, and they were very hit and miss. Some years the preseason poll was pretty accurate, i.e. a pretty strong correlation, and in other years the correlation was almost non-existent. Here is the list of the correlation by year:

2002: .6068
2003: .6973
2004: .7901
2005: -.0105
2006: -.0657

So, as you can see, it's a bit all over the board. Some years you have pretty high correlation, and others there is effectively none whatsoever.

Going deeper than that, once you really look at the data past the raw correlation numbers, you see that even in the best years, the preseason poll isn't too accurate. Though they have a generally high correlation, nevertheless it's still very hit or miss, and the high correlation numbers are mainly due to the fact that a handful of teams were very close in terms of preseason ranking and final ranking.

Let's break things down year-by-year:

2002: As a whole, 2002 was one of the better years, but it still wasn't particularly good. Miami was the preseason number one, coming off of national championship. The Hurricanes didn't really disappoint, finishing second after a controversial overtime loss to Ohio State in the Fiesta Bowl. Aside from that, though, the rest wasn't particularly good. All told, three teams of the preseason top ten did not even finish in the final top 25. Six of the preseason top ten teams did not finish in the top ten; the preseason top ten accurately predicted only four of the final top ten teams. Ohio State, the 2002 national champion that went 13-0, was ranked 13th in the preseason poll.

2003: Much like 2003, 2002 was a good year in terms of pure correlation, but looking deeper it was still very much hit or miss. Three of the preseason top ten teams finished outside of the final top 25, and five of the preseason top ten teams finished outside of the final top 10. LSU, the team that took the Coaches' Poll national championship and finished 2nd in the AP Poll, was ranked 14th in the preseason AP Polll.

2004: The 2004 season had by far the highest correlation of any year, but even it had problems. Though it accurately predicted the eventual national champion (USC), the only time that happened in the five year stretch, and only one of the preseason top 10 teams finished unranked, six of the preseason top 10 teams finished outside of the top 10. The preseason top 10 accurately predicted only four of the final AP top ten teams.

2005: The 2005 preseason poll had effectively no correlation. It accurately predicted the final top two teams, but aside from that it was quite poor. Preseason number three (Tennessee), and preseason number four (Michigan), finished well outside the top 25, and Tennessee went 5-6. Though only two preseason top ten teams finished the season unranked, but five of the preseason top ten teams finished outside the top ten.

2006: The 2006 preseason poll was even worse than 2005. Though none of the preseason top ten teams finished unranked, four teams finished outside of the final top ten. Of the preseason top five, only one team (Ohio State) ranked higher than ninth in the final poll.

At bottom, the preseason rankings can be solid at times, but essentially pointless at others. They generally tell you who the top team is (though, being honest, that's a pretty easy thing to do), but aside from that, I don't think, generally speaking, they really have very much meaning. Every year there are usually two or three preseason top ten teams that finished unranked, and generally speaking around five of the preseason top ten teams finish outside of the final top ten. All told, again, it just doesn't seem like they mean too much. Being brutally honest, it just seems that there is entirely too many uncertainties in college football for preseason rankings to be particularly accurate.

And, well, that's it. A couple of administrative notes:

I used the AP poll in this analysis, simply because, for whatever reason, it was easier to find the older AP polls than the Coaches' polls. That said, it really shouldn't make a difference one way or the other. All told, the polls are just so similar, there is just no legitimate amount of disparity between the two. They basically come to the same conclusions, and I imagine the analytical conclusions would be the same as well.

For teams that finished outside of the top 25, I counted from 26 on down based on how many votes a particular team received. For teams that did not even receive a vote, I generally assigned them the spot immediately behind the last team that did receive a vote. I understand that there are no official rankings outside of the top 25, but this had to be done to complete the analysis.

Random Practice Notes

2007-08-06T00:40:00.000-05:00

As of early Monday morning, the Crimson Tide has completed their third practice. And the third, i.e. the one that preceded Fan Day, was open to the public. At this point, we've found out a few things here and there that we can safely say, one way or the other, about developments thus far in practice. Here goes:

Players, as a whole, seem to be in much better shape. Noticeably gone are the big bellies that we have seen the past few years. The apocryphal "Puddin' ass" and his cohorts in crime have apparently discovered, or perhaps I should say forced to discover, our world-class weight room facilities.

The defensive line is big, no two ways about it. Again, "Puddin' ass"... The thing is, even the defensive ends are huge, which is largely to be expected in the 3-4. Generally speaking, even the defensive ends now are mostly between 270 and 285 pounds. The defensive ends in 2007 will essentially be as big as the defensive tackles that we have had the past several years. And, not to be outdone, the defensive tackles are quite large as well, with both Chapman and McCullough reporting around 300 pounds each.

Prince Hall is not in the Saban doghouse. Some people concluded as such after Hall spent the first practice with the freshmen, but that's not the case. Apparently the staff is trying to get the young defenders (who, of course, we will need this season) acclimated to the environment and the college game.

Speaking of Hall, at the open practice, he was barking out orders to the defense. With little doubt, he seems to be the field general of the defense.

More on Hall, he's in much better shape this year. As well as he played last year, the truth was that he was a bit overweight and out-of-shape. Not anymore. He's dropped a good bit of weight and noticeably has the best physique since he has arrived at the Capstone.

Rolando McClain showed up as a beast, as expected. He has been shadowing Prince Hall, from all we can tell, and that's not too surprising. I believe, judging by the totality of the circumstances, that the coaching staff realizes that, if at all possible from a mental perspective, McClain needs to start this year, as soon as possible. I imagine that tutoring McClain may have been the main reason Prince Hall was with the freshmen on the first day.

Roy Upchurch missed the first practice, but he showed up today. However, he was wearing a black jersey signifying no contact. Then again, on the other hand, he was taking reps with the first-team offense. I imagine the only people who really know what is going on here is the players and the coaches, seems odd to say the least.

Chris Capps does not appear to be close to any meaningful playing time. Obviously, among other things, the shoulder surgery that caused him to miss Spring practice and much of the off-season workout program have hurt him greatly. He has taken some reps at left tackle, backing up Andre of course, and has also taken some reps at right tackle. However, it seems that he is noticeably behind both Mike Johnson and B.J. Stabler (a much leaner B.J. Stabler, I might add). Given how the coaching staff is flipping him around, I cannot help but wonder if they are trying to mold Capps into a multi-dimensional reserve player who could play a variety of positions if, or I should say when, one of the starters gets hurt. Starting doesn't seem to be in his future, either way.

Jimmy Johns is taken a high number of snaps at fullback. No, rumors of him being 250 pounds were incorrect, but nevertheless he is still taking reps as a fullback. I really do not know about this one, honestly. He was with the first-team offense during Spring practice, and you would assume he would be there again, but apparently not. Of course, this may be just Saban experimenting like the mad scientist that he is renowned for being on the practice field. And no one really knows if Johns is being used as a true fullback or more of a hybrid H-back. Again, lots of questions here, few definite answers.

Glen Coffee has dropped a good bit of weight, it seems. I don't know if the 28 pound figure at RollTide.com is correct, but it is obvious just from plain-sight that he is considerably leaner. That's huge news, to be quite reserved about the situation. A tailback at 225 pounds is a completely different player than a tailback at 197 pounds. It's two completely different running styles, etc. Again, much like with Johns, lots of questions here, few definite answers.

John Parker Wilson impressed several today at Fan Day, and many noted his seemingly improved arm strength. We'll see with the first scrimmage on that one, though there is little doubt that a rigorous workout program and improved mechanics (which probably wasn't a major problem with Wilson, but nevertheless) can improve overall arm strength.

Marquis Maze is impressing everyone in the return game. He's not ready to play on offense, but he is wowing people when he gets the ball in the open field on returns. Considering Arenas and Grant are already considered good returners, I'm not sure he will play this year, but it's good news nonetheless.

Though it shouldn't come as much of a surprise, the defense does seem much more complicated than in the past. Kines never had complex schemes; the underlying philosophy to the Kines' scheme in that sense was that we are going to be pretty simple, but we are going to be very good at those few things that we do. Saban is the exact opposite. Even going back to his time as defensive coordinator of the Cleveland Browns in the mid-1990's, Saban has been known for his extremely complex defensive packages, and that seems no different at Alabama. Unlike in the past, our guys will have to really keep their head in the playbook. No more simpleton stuff with the Nicktator around.

Lorenzo Washington has gotten noticeably bigger. He still has a ways to go, but for the first time he is seemingly making progress. He is in the mid-280's now, and it shows. He has bounced back and forth, seeing some time at tackle and some at end. Hopefully he's beginning to fulfill his promise.

Nikita Stover was hurt today, going out with an apparent knee / hip injury. He got tangled up going for a jump ball in double coverage, and I assume landed awkwardly. Nothing has been said of it thus far, so hopefully the silence is good news, especially considering how quickly the Demetrius Goode news came out.

And, well, that's about it. As expected, there are probably a lot more questions marks than answers, but again, that's expected. Thankfully, we should find out more in the coming days, and the first scrimmage will answer many of our questions. Either way, Fall practice seems to be off to a good start for the Crimson Tide.

Recruiting: Four and Five Stars

2007-08-05T12:09:00.000-05:00

In an earlier post, I tried to determine whether or not recruiting rankings mattered in terms of future team performance. One of the many conclusions of that post was that approximately 80 per cent of Alabama's roster (not the total roster, but only those on scholarship)the past few years has been comprised of players rated as three-star or lower by the recruiting services. Long story short, the argument was that number was / is entirely too low.

So, I decided to take the same time period (2002-2004) and determine how many four and five star recruits that each SEC team signed over that period.

The following is what I found, listing the number signed by each team per year, and then the total for the three year period:

So, how well did all of that correlate with overall winning percentage in a future time-frame (2004-2006)? Here is that data broken down:

Much like with recruiting rankings, as you can see, where you rank in terms of how many four and five star recruits you sign, compared to the rest of the conference, strongly correlates with overall winning percentage on down the road.

To be specific, the correlation between recruiting rank and winning percentage rank was a robust .7202. That's not quite as strong as the .8 that we saw between overall team recruiting rankings and winning percentage, but it's still very strong.

At bottom, the teams that sign the most four and five star players are generally the ones that do the best on the playing field. Certainly there were a lot of busts included in those numbers, but on the whole the teams that signed the most high-quality players did better than the rest. It didn't correlate quite as high as overall team rankings, I presume, because recruiting isn't just about signing four and five star players (although that's the majority of it), it's also about signing some players that are rated three stars and below and turning them into quality football players as well.

Nevertheless, at bottom, it just further seems to indicate that, regardless of how vehemently some people want to assert otherwise, recruiting rankings do matter.

The SEC East: 24 Questions

2007-08-04T11:57:00.000-05:00

We've looked at the SEC West. So now we turn to the SEC East...

Every team has questions marks. And how those question marks are resolved is largely the determining factor in the overall quality and level of success of a football team. So, six SEC East teams, four questions each. Twenty-four questions:

Florida

(1) Despite bringing home the crystal trophy in 2006, Florida wasn't particularly good on the offensive side of the ball. Oh, sure, they weren't bad, but they certainly weren't anything special. Chris Leak is gone, and now Tim Tebow is going to have to be much more than a glorified fullback and the key cog of a bunch of trick plays. The Gators don't really return that many starters on offense, but they are, without doubt, very talented. Can the Florida offense step it up in Meyer's third year and take off in terms of point production, or is another so-so year on the horizon?

(2) The Florida running game has not been particularly good since Meyer arrived in Gainesville. They have talented players, as expected, but that hasn't turned into production. Honestly, Tim Tebow in 2006 was the best running threat the Gators have had to date, and that needs to change. We'll see if Kestahn Moore, Chris Rainey, and others to turn this running game into something special. Will the Florida running game become one of the best in the conference, or will it be another mediocre year for the Meyer backfield in Gainesville?

(3) As said earlier, the Florida offense wasn't particularly good in 2006, and it was without doubt the Florida defense that brought the crystal trophy back to Gainesville. Problem is, the Gators are in for a major rebuilding on the defensive side of the ball, as only two starters return. At bottom, it's very young and inexperienced, though talented. If Florida wants to get anywhere near where they want to go, this defense is going to have to get it together and be productive quickly. Can the Florida defense quickly congeal and be near as productive of a unit as the Gators had in 2006?

(4) Without running the numbers, I imagine the place-kicking for Florida last year was the worst of any national champion in ages. Chris Hetland was only 4-13 overall, and was only 1-10 in kicks of 30 yards or more. Yet, somehow, the place-kicking woes didn't cost the Gators too much in 2006. Hetland is gone now, though, and a new face will be handing the place-kicking duties. Considering the extreme importance of accurate place-kicking in close games, will Florida be able to find a consistently successful place-kicker when it counts in 2007?

Georgia

(1) Matt Stafford returns for year number two, and the Bulldogs will sink or swim with him. He looked terrible part of last year, and then played pretty good football down the stretch. UGA will need him to do the latter if they expect any real success in 2007. Though Stafford is still at least a year or so away from peak performance, he still needs to have a good season in terms of both production and protecting the football. Can Matt Stafford continue to improve on the solid finish to his 2006 season, or will he regress into another Georgia nightmare of incompletions and interceptions?

(2) Aside from Stafford, there are some other uncertainties on the offensive side of the ball. The team's leading receiver from a year ago, Martrez Milner, is gone, and so are both offensive tackles, who were the key cogs to the Dawgs pass protection. The receiving corps, too, is a question mark. It's talented, but has some injury concerns and as a whole has never been particularly consistent. How well will Georgia be able to replace the tight end and the tackles, and will the receiving corps be able to stay healthy and consistently productive?

(3) Surprisingly enough, after we did a thorough analysis off the 2006 SEC pass rushes, Georgia didn't do particularly well. Despite having two of the best rush ends in the country -- Quentin Moses and Charles Johnson -- they finished only fifth in the conference in Adjusted Sacks. Considering both of those players have now moved on to the NFL, there should be legitimate worries over the effectiveness of the Dawgs 2007 pass rush. Will Georgia be able to handle the losses of Moses and Johnson and still effectively rush the passer, or will the Dawgs be giving opposing quarterbacks all day to throw?

(4) Defensive line aside, the Georgia defense as a whole is staring down the barrel of a massive rebuilding job. All told, they only return three starters on defense, and the defensive back seven will be almost wholly new. Considering the UGA pass rush may not be particularly good, will the defensive back seven be able to quickly replace starters from a year ago and form an effective unit?

Kentucky

(1) Despite a lot of firepower at the offensive skill positions, the Wildcat offensive line is a bit of a mess. The left side is perhaps okay, but the center position and the right side of the offensive line is in trouble. There is no depth to the group, and a true freshman (Stuart Hines) is likely to start at right tackle. Will the Kentucky offensive line be good enough to allow all of the of the firepower at the skill positions to take off and rack up a lot of yardage and points?

(2) Despite an overall powerful offense last year, Kentucky wasn't particularly good in the red zone, and had some definite problems. No, they weren't Alabama bad in that sense, but they weren't particularly good either. As Alabama fans saw in 2006, it doesn't really matter how well you move the ball if you stall out inside the 20. Will the Kentucky offense put its 2006 red zone problems aside, or will they continue and be a major roadblock in their quest for back-to-back bowl appearances?

(3) The defensive line is a major problem for the Wildcats. Two projected starters, Josh Minton and Ventrell Jenkins, are unlikely to be able to play this year due to injuries, and overall the unit just lacks depth. Moreover, they get no real help from the incoming recruiting class, where arguably the only player ready to perform at an SEC-caliber level, DJ Stafford, did not qualify academically. Can the Kentucky defense play respectable football, or will they be torn to shreds by quality offensive lines?

(4) Kentucky was one of the worst teams in the conference last year in terms of pass defense, and a variety of metrics here at Outside The Sidelines have confirmed that. Though much of the defensive backfield returns, they have a lot of progress to make. Will the Kentucky secondary be able to produce a semi-effective pass defense, or will opposing teams continue to throw effectively at will?

South Carolina

(1) Blake Mitchell could probably be the textbook example of the usual love / hate relationship that Steve Spurrier has with his quarterbacks. He looked surprisingly good for most of 2005, then flopped in early 2006, which landed him a spot on the bench, and that suddenly rebounded to close the year. If Mitchell plays like he did late in 2006, South Carolina could have a potent offense, but if not, they are likely in big trouble. Much like with Georgia and Matt Stafford, which players shows up in 2007?

(2) Mitchell aside, the major question mark to the Gamecock offense is the offensive line, which includes replacing the center and the two starting guards from a year ago. Though their appears to be plenty of talent at the skill positions, it will all go for not if the Gamecocks lose the battle in the trenches. Will the offensive line be good enough to allow Blake Mitchell and the other skill position players to rack up big yardage and points?

(3) The South Carolina, secondary, without doubt, has a good deal of talent and a good deal of potential. The defensive front seven for the Gamecocks is about as good as you'll find anywhere, and if the secondary can step up and live up to its talent, it could turn this defense into one of the best in the nation. Can the secondary take a step forward and turn this defense into a true shutdown defense?

(4) South Carolina is not without talent, but in terms of depth, they probably still aren't as deep as the big boys of the SEC. Spurrier has done a fine job in recruiting, but it takes time and South Carolina is still not as deep, from top-to-bottom of the depth chart, as are some other SEC teams. And that will be a major problem if injuries arise for the Gamecocks. While they should still be pretty good, if injuries arise you can pretty much cancel out any chance of an appearance in Atlanta. Can South Carolina get the injury luck needed to not have to rely greatly on their depth chart and thus make a push for Atlanta?

Tennessee

(1) Tennessee loses the three leading receivers from their high octane passing attack of 2006, and they will have a lot of young guys with little experience at wide-out this season. Granted, Erik Ainge is a fine quarterback, but the Tennessee passing offense is never going to take off like it did a year ago unless those young receivers can step up and play good football. Can the youthful Tennessee receivers step up and play good football, allowing Ainge to replicate his successes of a year ago, or will inconsistent play at the wide-out position result in a drop-off in the passing attack?

(2) Offensive Coordinator David Cutcliffe is wanting to get back a power running game at Tennessee, and that didn't work in 2006. Despite a lot of talent at tailback, the offensive line wasn't particularly suited for that job, but another year will help their development. Can the Tennessee rushing attack be as powerful as it was on days gone by, or will it be another poor rushing attack for the Vols, who will have to hope that Ainge and company can get it done through the air?

(3) The Tennessee defensive line has a few key replacements to make. However, they do have several very talented and experienced players from which to make those replacements (such as Demonte Bolden, Antonio Reynolds, etc.). The only problem is, none of those guys have ever played that all. To paraphrase an old saying, they look like Tarzan but have played like Jane. Much like a lot of the Tennessee roster the past few years, thus far they have been great players who have never lived up to their potential. Will those defensive linemen finally play up to their potential and create a top-notch defensive line?

(4) The Vol secondary returns Jonathon Hefney, who is a great player. Aside from that, it's a major question mark, and the other three sports are up for grabs. We don't know who will grab them just yet, but whoever it will be will generally be very young and inexperienced plays. Can the young Vol secondary form around Hefney and produce an effective pass defense, or will they struggle in terms of pass defense again in 2007?

Vanderbilt

(1) Chris Nickson surprised most in 2006 with his performance in replacing Jay Cutler. However, Nickson's game did leave a lot to be desired, and he was very inconsistent at times. He had some big games (mainly Florida and Kentucky), but in nine games he failed to throw for more than 150 yards. All told, Nickson has to be consistently better all across the board. Will Nickson's overall performance improve, or will he continue to be the boom and bust quarterback that he was in 2006?

(2) Cassen Jackson-Garrison is a pretty talented running back. He has good size, and is a pretty good runner. Unfortunately, last year the Vanderbilt offense was built solely upon either Chris Nickson passing or running around with the ball. Garrison did well at times, but never really got the ball, as he saw more than 18 carries only once all season. If Vanderbilt is to be effective in 2007, they have to actually develop a running game, and it has to be more than just Chris Nickson. Will Cassen Jackson-Garrison be given the opportunity to create a legitimate running game, or will it be The Chris Nickson Show: Part II?

(3) Earl Bennett had a good year in 2006, but it was very streaky. He had more than three times as many catches as the team's second leading receiver, and more than three times as many yards as well. Problem was, as noted earlier, his production was inconsistent at best. The majority of his production came in four games, and in the other eight games he often times struggled to make an impact. For the Vanderbilt passing game to take off, aside from better play from Nickson, it needs Earl Bennett to become more consistent. Can Earl Bennett consistently put up big numbers in 2007, or will it be the same boom and bust as of 2006?

(4) The Vanderbilt pass defense in 2006 was simply terrible, no two ways about it. It was, with almost no doubt, the worst in the conference. They have some experienced players returning in 2007, but this unit still has to improve by leaps and bounds. Considering the front seven should be pretty good, if this unit can even put together a relatively decent performance, the Vanderbilt defense should be fairly good. Will the Vanderbilt secondary play relatively well and create a solid overall defense, or will atrocious pass defense ruin an otherwise solid defense for the second year in a row?

The SEC West: 24 Questions

2007-08-03T19:56:00.000-05:00

Every team has questions marks. And how those question marks are resolved is largely the determining factor in the overall quality and level of success of a football team. So, six SEC West teams, four questions each. Twenty-four questions:

Alabama

(1) The offensive line struggled a year ago, to put it mildly. However, everyone returns, and the old coaching techniques have been ditched. The S&C program is much more difficult under Saban, and the offensive linemen have reported in much better physical condition than a year ago. It's almost a given that the line will improve, but how much? Will they go from poor to mediocre, or will they emerge as one of the best offensive lines in the conference?

(2) The running game last year was quite bad, likely the worst since 1993. Ken Darby is gone, though that is unlikely to be a major loss, and there are several backs who may seize the starting job, including Jimmy Johns, Glen Coffee, Roy Upchurch, Terry Grant, and Demetrius Goode. Which one(s) will step up, and how effective will they be in carrying the running game?

(3) The Crimson Tide defense definitely has some talent, but is generally young and inexperienced. Notably, several true freshman expect to see a good bit of meaningful playing time in conference play, including Rolando McClain (LB), Kareem Jackson (CB), Alfred McCullough (DT), Josh Chapman (DT), and Luther Davis (DE). And some other young players, such as Justin Woodall, will likely start. All told, for better or for worse, the performance of the younger players will go a long way to determining the overall quality of the defense. Exactly how will those players perform, and how will the defense as a whole perform with several young and inexperienced players in the line-up?

(4) In terms of special teams, Alabama was one of the worst teams in the conference last year. We struggled with place-kicking, punting, kick-offs, punt coverage, and kick coverage. There were really no bright spots, for the most part. And with the new rule change on kick-offs, special teams figure to be more important than ever. With a new coaching staff in place, and a new special teams coach (Ron Middleton), how will the special teams perform?

Auburn

(1) The Tigers must rebuild their offensive line for 2007, which is a bit of a concern considering the Auburn offense was mediocre at best in 2006. The Tommy Tuberville offenses are generally built mainly around an effective power running game, and everything else works off that once it has been established. Obviously, power running games only work effectively with good blocking from the big uglies. Will the new starters be able to replicate the success of the Auburn offensive lines from the past three years?

(2) Offensively, at the skill positions, proven talent is very short on the Plains. Courtney Taylor and Kenny Irons are both gone, and there are really no proven skill position players. At tailback, the two leaders are Brad Lester and Ben Tate, but both are unproven. Brad Lester looked okay last year, but racked up most of his yardage against inferior opponents, and was generally a moderately successful boom or bust back (occasional long run, but overall a very low Running Back Success Rate). Ben Tate, on the other hand, never really had a meaningful carry all year, and racked up his yardage against the Sisters of the Poor. At wide receiver, neither Rodgerigus Smith or Prechae Rodriguez were particularly good last year, and they both need to make major strides in 2007. Will the offensive skill position players step up and give Auburn an explosive threat, or will they be in for another mediocre year on offense?

(3) Though defensive end Quentin Groves returns, Auburn did lose their best cornerback, David Irons? Auburn had a decent pass defense in 2006, but nothing particularly good, finish sixth in the conference in opposing quarterback passer rating. Will the loss of Irons spell a mediocre, or perhaps worse, year for the pass defense, or will we see some improvement and really see the Auburn defense blossom into one of the best in the country?

(4) Auburn loses both specialty kickers, place-kicker John Vaugn, and punter Kody Bliss. Vaughn was arguably the best kicker in the conference when not playing LSU, and Bliss was without doubt the best punter in the conference. Their replacements will have big shoes to fill to say the least. Can the new Auburn kicker win games that come down to place-kicking, and can the new punter keep the field position battles tilted in his team's favor?

Arkansas

(1) The Mitch Mustain Melodrama has headed West, but quarterback play is still a major issue for the Hogs. Casey Dick will be the starter, but Dick has never looked particularly good in the past, even with arguably the best running game in the country at his disposal. He's generally played like, well, dick. Regardless of how good McFadden and Jones are, it's going to be quite tough for them to really take off with no effective passing game. So, how will Dick and the passing game develop in 2007?

(2) The Hogs had arguably the best offensive line in the conference in 2007, but it must now be almost completely rebuilt from top-to-bottom. Of course, offensive line play is key to the running game, and even with fantastic backs, you aren't going to have a great running game if your offensive line is struggling. Considering the absolute necessity that the Arkansas running game being great in 2007 (due to a likely poor passing game), can the inexperienced Arkansas offensive line congeal and produce like their predecessors so that McFadden and Jones can make for a truly great Arkansas rushing attack?

(3) Two starters from last year's defensive line, Keith Jackson and Jamaal Anderson, are gone. The two returning starters are also questionable. Antwain Robinson (of Andre Smith fame) was arrested for theft in a local Dillard's department store, and Marcus Harrison is still hurting from a Spring knee injury that resulted in torn cartilage and a bone bruise. He missed the rest of Spring, and nearly all off-season conditioning work, and will likely miss the season opener as well. Can the Arkansas defensive line be as stout as last year, or are they in for a long year of getting shoved around by opposing big uglies?

(4) Defensive line worries aside, the Arkansas defense loses quite a bit in the back seven, including leader Sam Olajabutu, and star cornerback Chris Houston, among others. Can the Hogs quickly rebuild the back seven, in light of defensive line concerns, or will inexperienced players yield a relatively poor overall defense?

LSU

(1) Matt Flynn is a fifth-year senior, and the Bayou Bengals will sink or swim with him. His health is a concern, but it's not a question mark. If he goes down for any significant time, LSU is unlikely to get anywhere near where they want to go, no real uncertainty about that. In reality, the question mark surrounds a single fact: he has never really played before. He may be good, he may be poor. He's only seen meaningful playing time once in his career, in the 2005 Peach Bowl. There he did well with the help of a great rushing attack against an ACC team of questionable quality (Miami). To be quite frank, to this point, his resume is exactly like that of former Alabama quarterback Brian Burgdorf. If you don't recall, Burgdorf signed with Alabama in the early 1990's, but never played because of the presence of Jay Barker. Finally, after Barker tore his ACL against Auburn in 1993, Burgdorf took over for the Gator Bowl, and went 15-23 for 166 yards and 2 passing touchdowns, plus 6 carries for another 48 yards and a touchdown, leading the Tide to a win over an ACC team of questionable quality (North Carolina). It was his only legitimate playing time, and people had high hopes for when he finally assumed the starting job. Of course, Burgdorf, when he finally assumed the starting job as a fifth-year senior in 1995, only after Barker graduated, was a complete flop, and quickly found his way to the bench. Will Matt Flynn be good enough to get the job done, or will he fade away in the spotlight, and become the LSU version of Brian Burgdorf?

(2) The LSU offensive line wasn't particularly good last year, and they really struggled in terms of run blocking. Their only saving grace was in pass protection, where an incredible deep threat passing game, and an almost un-sackable quarterback combined to make their life very easy. With Russell, Bowe, Davis, and offensive coordinator Jimbo Fisher gone, the deep threat passing game is largely gone too. The new look under Gary Crowton will feature a lot of short passes, and should require a much improved running game, and all of that means the LSU offensive line must improve drastically if they want offensive production be as good as it was a year ago. Ciron Black and Brett Helms are good players, and so is Will Arnold (voted pre-season All-SEC), but even Les Miles isn't sure just how much Arnold can even practice, much less play, due to a variety of injuries that have plagued him the past couple of yearas. Worse still, the now-former offensive line coach Stacey Searels is gone to Georgia, and the line will have to adjust to new offensive line coach Greg Studrawa's blocking schemes. At bottom, is this line going to step up and give the rest of the LSU offense the full opportunity to get the most production possible, or is it going to remain so-so and force the Bayou Bengal faithful to hope that Matt Flynn is really that good and the rest of the skill position players can put points on the scoreboard, despite mediocre line play?

(3) The LSU defense should be good, no two ways about it. The loss of LaRon Landry and Jesse Daniels will hurt, but it should still be very good. However, last year, the Tiger defense was the epitome of great injury luck, as no starter missed any legitimate playing time. If LSU is to have that good of a defense again this year, they'll have to get the same injury luck, and that may not happen two years in a row. A couple of key injuries (particularly if Glenn Dorsey's leg injuries get worse) could quickly turn this great defense into a good but not great defense, and that could be a death knell for LSU's chances to get to where they want to go. Will the LSU defense be able to stay healthy enough to fulfill its lofty expectations?

(4) For a team with such high expectations, LSU has a good deal of changes on the coaching staff, and they all come on the offensive side of the ball. Long-time offensive coordinator Jimbo Fisher went to Florida State for the same position, and offensive line coach Stacey Searels went to Georgia for the same position. Moreover, wide receivers coach Todd Monken went to the Jacksonville Jaguars, where he, too, assumes the same position. And, well, that leaves a lot of big question marks for an offense that already has quite a few question marks as it is (see questions one and two). Gary Crowton is the new offensive coordinator, and no one really knows what he is going to bring. If it's anything like he showed at Oregon or BYU, though, it's going to be nothing like LSU has ran before. And who knows how the wide receivers and offensive line will adjust to new coaches (D.J. McCarthy and Greg Studrawa) and, likely, new techniques? Generally speaking, the LSU offense has a good deal of talent, but aside from raw talent, there are a lot of question marks, and three new offensive coaches only highlight that underlying reality. Will the LSU offense be able to successfully integrate the coaching changes and still be productive, or will the very high volume of coaching turnover be just one more obstacle that will keep them from replicating the offense's successes of a year ago?

Mississippi State

(1) Believe it or not, Mississippi State did something down the stretch in 2006 that it hadn't done in a long time: they played competitive football. After playing West Virginia tough for three quarters, they blew out Jacksonville State. After that, they lost a heartbreaker to 9-4 Georgia, in Athens, after a game-ending fumble that occurred at the Georgia 23, well within field goal range. After that, it was another hearbreaking three-point loss, this time to 8-4 Kentucky. From there, we know what happened, they became a crimson nightmare, and got Mike Shula fired in the process. A week later, they out-gained 10-4 Arkansas by 100 yards, but lost a close game largely due to special teams breakdowns. In the season finale, they out-gained Ole Miss by over 100 yards, in Oxford, before losing another heartbreaker on a special teams breakdown. Can Mississippi State carry that competitive play into 2007, or will it be a half-year aberration?

(2) The Mississippi State offense must have Chad Henig stay healthy, no questions there. Another injury to Henig is simply an unacceptable scenario for the Dawgs if they want to do well offensively in 2007. The question is, even if Henig can stay healthy, can they consistently produce yards and points?

(3) Despite competitive play a year ago in the second half of the season, special teams play really doomed Mississippi State, specifically with a kick return for a touchdown from Arkansas, and a game-winning punt return for a touchdown against Ole Miss. Beyond that, all in all, they simply weren't good in terms of special teams in 2006. Will special teams improve, or will they again be the final blow to Mississippi State's chances of winning close games?

(4) The Mississippi State defense has more question marks than a mystery novel, and even their faithful are very concerned over it. Quentin Culbertson is gone, and there are some question marks at linebacker. The defensive line, despite having Titus Brown (one of the most underrated players around) has no real depth or experience, and it is likely to give up some massive rushing days. Even the secondary is unsettled with position changes. Will the Mississippi State defense be able to form and produce a good enough effort to give their team as a whole a chance to win games?

Ole Miss

(1) Seth Adams is the starter at quarterback, no real doubt about it. Brent Schaeffer, the savior from a year ago, will be the back-up, and Johnny Reb will sink or swim with Mr. Adams Adams. And, believe it or not, Adams has a decent unit around him, particularly in the backfield, and he looked good in Spring practice. Can Adams consistently lead the Ole Miss offense to a decent amount of yards and points points, all the while protecting the football, or will he implode in a Schaeffer-esque meltdown of no production and costly turnovers?

(2) The Rebels are, objectively speaking, about the youngest team in the conference, and last year they played a scary amount of true freshmen. But, you have to give credit where its due, a lot of the young guys showed some raw talent in 2006. Obviously, much of Ole Miss' overall success will be directly linked to how quickly can their young players can develop into quality, SEC-caliber players. So, will the young Rebels be able to make the quick leap from young to quality, experienced football players in the course of less than two years?

(3) Patrick Willis was arguably the best defensive player in the country last year, and he was really the key to what little defensive successes the Rebels had. Obviously, Willis has now moved on to the next level, and Ole Miss must find a replacement. Can Ole Miss find a remotely similar replacement, or will they suffer from what Alabama fans may call Demeco Ryans Replacement Syndrome?

(4) Aside from Patrick Willis' linebacker position, there are ten other defensive positions that are just as important. Unfortunately, the Rebs generally didn't fare too well at those positions last year, and they lose a lot of those starters to graduation for the 2007 season. True, it's not like they lose any great players, but nonetheless they still have to rebuild. Can the replacements play to a productive-enough level to where the Rebels will have a chance to improve upon 4-8 and challenge for a small bowl game, or will defensive miscues be the ultimate factor in dooming the Rebels to a fourth straight losing season?

Recruiting Rankings: Do They Matter?

2007-08-03T13:28:00.001-05:00

It's almost a timeless question: Do recruiting rankings really matter? Does highly-rated recruiting classes mean that you will win a lot of football games in the future? In more statistical terms, do recruiting rankings correlate with future team performance?

As said earlier, it's essentially a timeless questions, and just about every college football fan you'll ever run across will have an opinion on the subject one way or the other.

So I want to see how it stacks up empirically, and to that end I've done some research on the subject.

Basically this is what I've done: I've taken the team recruiting rankings from 2002-2004 from both Scout.com and Rivals, Inc, the two major recruiting services. Once compiling the data as to where each SEC team ranked in those three years (on a national basis, out of the one-hundred plus Division 1-A teams), I simply divided by three and came up with a three-year average recruiting finish for each SEC school. I took that three-year average recruiting finish, and ranked all twelve SEC schools on it, from one to twelve. From there, I stepped forward in time a bit, compiling the overall win-loss records (note overall, not conference) for each SEC team in the three-year stretch of 2004-2006. After that, I ranked the SEC teams by overall winning percentages, and then I started to compare all of the information that I compiled.

So here we go. The following is the three-year rankings for Scout.com, including the three-year average recruiting finish, and the conference rank:

And now here is the exact same data, except this time using Rivals, Inc. as the source:

Now that those two are out of the way, next let's move on to the three-year overall records in terms of winning percentage:

So that's basically all of the data in a spreadsheet format, for those who wanted it. But we can trim all of that down, simplify it greatly, and make things just much more easy to comprehend by collapsing a lot of that into one spreadsheet image, so here goes:

At bottom, Scout Rank is where that particular team finished among SEC teams in average recruiting rankings, and Rivals Rank is the exact same thing except it, of course, uses the Rivals, Inc. data. Win Rank is simply how that particular team finished among SEC teams in overall winning percentage the past three years.

So, all of that out of the way, what do we see?

It's quickly obvious that there is a very high correlation between good recruiting classes and future wins. If you run the numbers, there is a .8 correlation between Scout.com average recruiting finish rankings and future winning percentage rankings. And there's actually a little higher correlation for Rivals, Inc. as it crunches out at a robust .818.

What can you say? That's a pretty solid case. After all, a correlation in the neighborhood of .8 is very high, no two ways about it.

Moreover, just eyeball it, things are generally dead on. Take a look at the Scout.com average finish rankings. All told, eight of the twelve SEC teams finished in terms of winning percentage rank either exactly where they finished in Scout.com average recruit finish rankings, or within +/- one spot. The same goes for Rivals, Inc. as well. Again with Rivals, Inc. that same occurrence happened with eight teams. Beyond that, it's just elementary. The teams that did well in recruiting (LSU, Florida, Georgia, Auburn, and Tennessee) are the ones that generally did well on the field, and the ones who struggled in recruiting (Ole Miss, MSU, Kentucky, Vanderbilt, and Alabama) generally struggled on the field.

Again, what can you really say? Despite some people vehemently arguing to the contrary, the harsh statistical truth is that high recruiting rankings do correlate very highly with future wins, no two ways about it. Aside from a couple of exceptions (mostly Auburn), you just aren't going to finish low in terms of recruiting rankings and do particularly well in the SEC in the coming years.

I think you have to give the recruiting services a good deal of credit here. I personally believe they have improved by leaps and bounds over the over-inflated rankings of the late 1990's, and today they generally present very accurate overall projections. Sure, they miss on individual players (of course, nothing is perfect, and granted individual prospect ratings are very speculative), but as a whole, average team rankings over the course of several years seem to make a major impact later on in terms of how many games you win.

So, at the end of the day, to answer the question, "Do recruiting rankings matter?" Yes, they matter very much.

2007 Roster Released

2007-08-03T12:47:00.000-05:00

Finally, the 2007 roster has been released at RollTide.com.

I wanted to track the weight changes a bit, and that has been relatively interesting stuff. Generally speaking, guys who needed to get bigger have generally done so, and those that needed to trim down have seemingly done so as well.

A few notes on that front:

D.J. Hall, who nearly everyone pointed out needed to get more physical, gained 9 pounds, going from 186 to 195.

Jimmy Johns is bigger than ever, up 6 pounds to 233 pounds. No, those rumors of him being up to 250 are obviously incorrect, but he's big, to say the least. I don't think I can ever recall us having a true tailback at over 230 pounds, not in a while at least.

Prince Hall has apparently made major strides, thinning down big time, as all had hoped he would. He has apparently trimmed off 20 pounds, going from 255 to 235.

Justin Woodall, too, has made major strides, going from 213 pounds to 224 pounds. He's legitimately big enough to play linebacker now, but if he stays at safety he is going to be as physical as they come. Just another reason as to why I think he gets a starting job this year.

Justin Britt has trimmed down by six pounds. Not too surprising considering a lot of people thought dropping a few pounds would help him in pass protection.

Glen Coffee apparently lost a ton of weight. The 2006 roster has him at 225 pounds, but the 2007 roster has him at only 197 pounds. That's a loss of 28 pounds, and unless that is a typo, that is very odd.

B.J. Stabler has apparently gotten in shape, big-time. He was never regarded as a "workout warrior" before, but if the rosters are accurate, that has changed. He has dropped 13 pounds, going from 307 to 294. Big strides from him, and that will certainly make it much easier for him to play right tackle, if that needs to be the case.

Andre Smith has dropped a much needed eight pounds, going from 348 to 340. That's good news, as it could put his actual playing weight around 330-335 during the season itself, so that's definitely good news for us, and well, bad news for everyone else.

Marlon Davis has really busted his tail in the S&C program, apparently, as he's dropped a full 21 pounds. He has went from 311 to 290.

Mike McCoy has also leaned down big time. 'BamaMag ran an article a couple of weeks ago about how players felt he was really going to surprise this year, and how he had made massive strides in the S&C program. According to the rosters, he has dropped 18 pounds, going from 217 to 199. Apparently he's dropped a lot of weight and got in great shape.

Earl Alexander has gotten bigger, as you would expect from someone with a 6'4 frame. He's gained nine pounds, going from 201 to 210.

Nick Walker has dropped a good bit of weight, going down 15 pounds from 270 to 255. I think it shows that the coaching staff now is looking for a more nimble guy at tight end who can be a legitimate receiving threat.

Preston Dial, too, has trimmed down big-time. He has dropped 17 pounds, going from 240 to 223. At 223 pounds, I don't see him at tight end. I'm imagining that the coaching staff has him pegged for the H-back position. He certainly has the athleticism from that spot to be a threat.

Lorenzo Washington has bulked up a good bit, gaining 14 pounds. He went up from 269 to 283. He's still too small for defensive tackle, but he could play end quite well at that weight.

Brandon Fanney dropped a ton of weight, as expected. He has moved from the defensive line to the Jack position, and has dropped 12 pounds. He has went from 253 to 241. Not too surprising, I don't believe.

All in all, it seems to be very positive stuff from the off-season S&C program. Guys who needed to get bigger generally got bigger, and guys who needed to trim down generally got smaller. It's good news, on the surface. I can't recall us ever making leaps like this in the S&C program under Shula.

Finally, the incoming freshmen have also been added to the roster, so I'll go ahead and post the reporting weights for a few players:

Rolando McClain reported as the absolute beast that everyone expected. It's no secret he had been following the Saban workout regimen religiously with his own personal trainer, and it shows. He showed up at 6'4 and 255 pounds, and everything I have seen has people gushing over his condition. Much like how Jimmy Johns blew everyone away a couple of years ago.

Luther Davis reported at 6'4 and 275 pounds. That's good news, to say the least. At 275 pounds, he could easily see playing time at defensive end this year.

Alfred McCullough apparently gained a good bit of weight from the end of his senior season, and reported at 317 pounds.

Josh Chapman, too, showed up at a nice weight, coming in at 300 pounds.

Patrick Crump will almost certainly be headed for a redshirt year. He showed up at 267 pounds, and that's not near big enough to play on the offensive line. Not that he was expected to anyway, but the point remains the same.

All in all, it's pretty good news. The defensive linemen generally showed up in good shape. Considering McCullough and Chapman reported at 300 pounds and above, it's likely due to lack of depth alone that they will be destined to play this year. And the same largely goes for Luther Davis as well.

And Rolando McClain looks like he could start from day one.

Seemingly a good news day all the way around.

Clarification: Medical Scholarships

2007-08-02T22:52:00.000-05:00

Coach Saban announced earlier today that four players had been placed on medical scholarship: Tyrone Prothro, Byron Walton, Jake Jones, and Aaron McDaniel.

But exactly what does "medical scholarship" mean in real terms? Essentially it means their football days are over.

Coach Saban specifically said:

[W]hen we put guys in these situations, the medical staff is 99.9 percent sure that this is a long-term issue that we are dealing with and it would be unusual that a guy could ever come back.

So, basically, as said earlier, it means in real terms that neither Prothro, Walton, Jones, or McDaniel will ever play football at Alabama again.

Jones had re-occurring leg injuries (no specifics), and McDaniel apparently blew out his knee very badly in the 2006 Arkansas game (missed that one). Prothro has the obvious leg injury, and apparently Byron Walton had some very serious heat-related issues. Saban had this to say:

"This is the one that I really don’t want to get involved with because I don’t know the technical names of this. I think you should ask the medical staff about that one. But this was a heat-related issue that has been reoccurring for him since high school. When he exerted himself at the level that he would have to to condition and do the things that you need to do here, he put himself at tremendous risk. And he actually had issues in the summer conditioning program, went through some tremendous lab work and there is a name for this. It’s not an unusual thing but he would have been in danger of having a heat-related problem or a physical exertion related problem moving forward. And it has something to do with how your muscles break down and how your body dissipates that and how it affects your kidneys and liver with serious issue."

Sounds like very scary stuff. Though I cannot help but wonder why the medical staff didn't notice this when he came out of high school.

Roster Notes

2007-08-02T18:47:00.000-05:00

Finally... The University of Alabama football team has reported by Fall practice. As expected, we found out several things as a result. The following is an incomplete list of things we know thus far:

Tyrone Prothro has been moved to a medical scholarship, and thus will not count against the maximum of 85 scholarships. He can return to play football at a later date, however. According to Nick Saban, there is a plan in place, and if -- and it's reasons like this as to why they say if is the biggest word in the English language -- he can become healthy again, he will get a sixth year of eligibility from the NCAA and be able to play again. For now, though, he will miss all of 2007 and be on a medical scholarship.

Michael Ricks did not qualify, contrary to his own reports. As a result, he will not be playing for Alabama this year, or at any point in the future. I imagine we as a whole should stop trusting the specifics of what he says.

Johnathon Lowe, the shifty kick returner transfer from Mississippi Stat who was expected to return some kicks this year, is academically ineligible, and will not play in the 2007 season. No word one way or the other on his future, though I would imagine he would stay with the team and try to regain his eligibility.

Ezekiel Knight has been given a medical hardship waiver, and will thus be a junior, not a senior. This is huge news for us, because Knight, with the extra year, will likely take over for Keith Saunders at the Jack position when Keith graduates after the 2007 season.

Darren Mustin, the walk-on transfer Mike from Middle Tennessee State, has been moved to a scholarship. We will still, however, be under the limit of 85. Congratulations on a job well done, Darren.

Byron Walton, a freshman defensive tackle, has also been moved to a medical scholarship. All that is said now for a reason is "heat-related issues," so I have no clue on this one. I was not expecting him to play very much, but I certainly was not expecting this. Apparently it was a major problem that could have serious repercussions, so he is on the shelf for 2007.

Jake Jones, a freshman wide receiver out of Mountain Brook (and son of former Tide legend Joey Jones), has also been moved to a medical scholarship. It is listed as leg related, but again I have no clue. He missed all of Spring and all of summer workouts with the same affliction, but I have no clue as what is precisely wrong.

Nick Gentry, the 2007 signee from Prattville, will start Fall practice rehabilitating a shoulder injury that required surgery, and will not partake in team drills. In other words, he'll likely redshirt this year, and coaches will try to figure out where to play him. The injury is a high school injury that the coaching staff and the Alabama medical staff advised him to have corrected via a surgical procedure. Again, most likely it means a redshirt is on the way for Mr. Gentry.

Terry Grant was not mentioned as getting a medical hardship waiver. I fully expect him to be granted one, but as of this point, it has not been officially indicated.

Kerry Murphy, as expected, did not qualify, and will now enroll at Hargrave in the coming weeks. Hopefully he can become eligible and return to the Tide next Fall. Lord knows we could use him at defensive tackle.

Ross Applegate has transferred to Alabama. Applegate is a 6'5, 197 pound freshman quarterback who had committed to Boston College a year ago. He is from Marietta, Georgia, and is now with the Tide. No reason as to why he transferred.

Apparently the roster will be posted in the coming days on RollTide.com, so we'll see if there are any more changes, but for now that is it.

Recruiting Analysis: 2002-2005

2007-08-02T15:54:00.000-05:00

I usually try to take any research topic suggestions that I can get, and a good one came from a friend and reader of this blog. It's a pretty simple topic really: take every four and five star recruit that we have signed the past several years and see how they have panned out. He felt that we tended to get more quality players from two and three stars than from four and five stars.

So, let's look at it.

The Scout.com recruiting database goes back to the 2002, so let's start there. We'll go from 2002-2005, looking at each four and five star recruit that we have picked up in that four-year stretch, and then broke each one of them down individually.

All told, from 2002-2005, we signed fifteen four or five star recruits, according to Scout.com. They include:

Kyle Tatum
Chris Browder
David Scott
Derrick Pope
Jeremy Clark
Le'Ron McClain
Chris Felder
Matt Caddell
Dominic Lee
Chris Felder
Lorenzo Washington
B.J. Stabler
Nikita Stover
Brandon Deaderick
Mike Ford
Chris Keys
Brandon Fanney

So that's the total list. It includes fifteen guys over a four year period, fourteen of which four-star recruits, with one being a five-star recruit (Derrick Pope).

Now let's break them down individually:

Kyle Tatum was a four-star defensive line prospect out of Prattville. He was generally considered one of the top linemen in the state, and could have went anywhere in the country. He signed with Alabama, and then redshirted, as expected. He played as a redshirt freshman in 2003, and looked pretty good; people loved his intensity and his motor. Then, Shula moved him to right tackle, where he effectively fell into a black hole in 2004 and 2005. He started, but wasn't very good, and finally in 2006 he was apparently in Shula's doghouse, and that was the end of his career.

Chris Browder was a highly touted defensive end, rated as a four-star the 26th best defensive end in the country. He did not qualify academically, and went to junior college. He resurfaced a couple of years later with Auburn, but as far as I can tell never made any real impact.

David Scott was a four-star JUCO cornerback out of Mississippi. He signed with two years of eligibility, and played a fair amount as a nickel corner in both 2002 and 2003. It's not to say he was a bad player, but everyone thought he would be a true shutdown corner when he signed, and the truth was he never even became a starter.

Derrick Pope was a five-star JUCO linebacker, and he was as good as billed. He played great in 2002, and was about the only bright spot in 2003. The only problem was, as with most JUCO players, he was only here for two years.

Jeremy Clark was a four-star defensive line recruit out of Daphne, second only in the state to Kyle Tatum. And he started most of his career at Alabama, but he was never an impact player of any sort. At best, he was pretty mediocre, and the main reason he started was because of an overall lack of quality depth at the position.

Le'Ron McClain was a four-star running back recruit, and generally regarded as the top fullback in the country. He lived up to that expectation fully. He became qualified, started four years, and when he left was he was considered the best pure fullback in the country.

Matt Caddell was a four-star wide receiver recruit and a member of the vaunted triumvirate of receivers to come out of the state in 2003 (the other two were Chad Jackson and Jayson Swaine). Unfortunately, Caddell has struggled at Alabama, and has never developed into a consistent. He looked good as a freshman in 2004, especially considering the poor quarterback play that year, but he hasn't done anything since. He has made a few memorable catches (2004 LSU comes to mind), but generally struggled with tentative play and poor hands. Going into his senior season in 2006, he seems, at the very least, behind D.J. Hall, Keith Brown, and Nikita Stover on the depth chart.

Dominic Lee was a four-star recruit out of Huffman, and was generally considered the top defensive line prospect in the state. We signed him, and despite high expectations, he never did much of anything. He never became a consistent starter, and his best times were playing in the defensive tackle rotation as a back-up in 2005 and 2006. His biggest contributions to the Crimson Tide by far was the wooing of his cousin Andre Smith -- yes, that Andre Smith -- to sign with Alabama.

Chris Felder was a four-star cornerback recruit out of Thomasville, Alabama, and he was generally considered one the top cornerback prospects in the country (ranked 13th overall by Scout.com). Unfortunately, he did not qualify academically, and has seemingly fallen off the face of the Earth in terms of information regarding his where-abouts.

Lorenzo Washington was a four-star defensive line recruit generally considered one of the top defensive tackle prospects in the country (ranked 18th in the country by Scout.com), and he was a good student as well. Unfortunately, he shocked everyone by not qualifying, and when he returned after a tour of Hargrave, he didn't exactly set the world on fire. In his two years thus far at Alabama, he has yet to see any meaningful playing time, and has struggled to gain weight. At the moment -- barring major changes in Fall practice -- it is unlikely that he sees meaningful playing time this season.

B.J. Stabler was a four-star recruit, and was generally considered one of the best offensive line prospects in the country (ranked 26th by Scout.com). And, honestly, he has done pretty well, it's obvious the kid has a good deal of talent. Unfortunately, leg injuries have slowed him, and are apparently still slowing him. Either way, though, when he has been healthy, he has started the past two years, and will do so again in 2007.

Nikita Stover was a four-star recruit, generally considered the top wide receiver prospect in Alabama, and in the country (ranked 14th overall by Scout.com). He didn't qualify, and went to junior college, finally arriving at the Capstone for the 2006 season. He showed promise late in the year, despite conditioning problems, and will see a lot of playing time in 2007. Odds are that he will start in 2008.

Brandon Deaderick was a four-star defensive line recruit out of Kentucky. He was highly-touted, by like so many other players he hasn't been able to find a definite position (either end or tackle), and has never played any meaningful snaps. Honestly, I did not hear his name mentioned a single time this Spring. And then he raised some hell on the Strip and was arrested. I assumed that, as I type, he's running his butt off, and probably about to vomit somewhere. That's graphic, I know, but probably nonetheless true.

Mike Ford was a four-star tailback recruit out of Florida, and considered one of the best in the country (18th overall by Scout.com). He didn't qualify initially, went to Hargrave, and didn't qualify the second time around. After that, he ended up at South Florida somehow or another, and he was expected to play this Fall. And then it comes out that he has been arrested for a variety of offenses.

Chris Keys was a four-star safety prospect, and was considered one of the best in the country (7th overall by Scout.com). He was committed to LSU, but left when Nick Saban went to Miami, and jumped ship the Tide. He had a lot of talent, but couldn't stay out of trouble. Finally, Mike Shula -- unable to control him -- kicked him off the team. He's playing football now at a lower level, but I forget where.

Brandon Fanney -- coming out of Hargrave -- was a four-star defensive line recruit. He hasn't seen any meaningful snaps so far, but that may change. He's been moved to the Jack position, but he was involved in the incident on the Strip. Much like Deaderick, it's likely that as I type, he's running his butt off and probably about to vomit at the moment. Again, graphic but true.

So that's it. That is all fifteen of the four and five star recruits that we signed from 2002-2005.

To break it down further:

One player was a five-star (Pope).

Fourteen players were four-stars.

Three of the fifteen never qualified academically (Browder, Felder, and Ford).

One player was kicked off the team (Keys).

Three players qualified, but nevertheless never lived up to anywhere near their expectations, for whatever reason (Tatum, Lee, and Scott). All three have since graduated / eligibility expired.

Two players really lived up to their expectations and did as well as everyone expected they would (McClain and Pope).

Three players qualified, are currently on the team, but unfortunately none of the three have lived up to expectations thus far, nor do they seem destined for any legitimate playing time in 2007 barring some Fall practice surprises (Washington, Fanney, and Deaderick).

Two players are currently on the roster, showing promise, with two years of eligibility left, and both seemingly are in line to be good, quality football players before they leave after the 2008 season (Stabler and Stover).

All told, it's not too good.

And the reader is correct, we have gotten more good players out of two and three star prospects than we have four and five star prospects. With that said, however, I wouldn't read much into that. Yes, more good players emerged from the two and three star prospects, but two and three star prospects also comprised about 80% of our overall classes, so it only makes sense that more of those guys turned out to be good players. After all, they outnumbered the four and five stars at a rate of about 4:1, so that's how it should be.

So it really doesn't say anything bad about the recruiting services, for the most part.

What it does show, however, is the complete lack of highly rated recruits that we have signed. On average, we racked up less than four of the four or five star recruits per year, and that's simply nowhere near enough. As mentioned earlier, roughly 80% of our classes over a four-year stretch was comprised by recruits rated three stars and later. Hell, it's still one month until kick-off, and Nick Saban has already racked up six four star recruits thus far, and honestly we'll probably have at least eight by the end of August. Truth be told, Saban and company will reel in almost as many, if not as many, four and five star recruits in this recruiting class alone as we reeled in, as a whole, in the four-year stretch from 2002-2005.

Moreover, it is also an indication of poor coaching. Never underestimate the importance of good coaching in getting a prospect to realize his full potential, and you have to be brutally honest: the guys we signed from 2002-2005 simply, for the most part, did not get it. Great prospects will often times become poor-to-average players with poor-to-average coaching, and I think that is reflected to a degree here.

Again, it's not really an indicator of poor ratings. The raw number of four and five star recruits is mainly an indictment of terrible recruiting in that stretch, more than anything else. And, fortunately, that latter has drastically changed since Nick Saban stepped off of that airplane in early January.

The rest is largely an indictment of poor coaching. And fortunately, that, too, has drastically changed in the past few months.

Roster Screengrab: Just In Case

2007-08-02T00:36:00.000-05:00

Members of The University of Alabama football will officially report tomorrow on Thursday.

One word, when hyphenated, comes to mind: Whoo-Hoo!

When the players report, they will be given numbers, so that will end speculation on that front. I know it's pointless, but I always enjoy seeing who gets what. But anyway...

Moreover, and more importantly, a new roster should be forthcoming, and hopefully that new roster will also include official weights. Now don't get me wrong, I understand the pitfalls of "official" weights, but it will be nice to compare the two if they do actually update the player weights.

Obviously, it could give us a big clue as to the strides we've apparently been making in the strength and conditioning program. No doubt about, if we are to improve, first and foremost we must get bigger, faster, and in better condition, and that could give us an initial indicator of the progress we are making.

So, just in case they do update the weights, etc., I took a Screengrab of the 2007 Spring roster so we will have something to compare it to if the new roster contains all of those updates.

Hopefully they will update everything in the next few days, and that will give us some concrete information as to the gains that individual players have made in the S&C program.

Home Field Advantage: More Ramblings

2007-08-01T17:40:00.000-05:00

In the last post, I looked at home field advantage and generally made the case that it does not have a legitimate impact on the outcome of games, and any advantage that it generates -- if there is any at all -- is essentially so small that it is statistically insignificant.

In this post, things will be a bit more general and a bit more rambling, with little concrete conclusions. That aside, it will still contain relevant things.

For starters, exactly what gives home teams an advantage?

In football, unlike baseball, the dimensions of the playing field are static, and never change regardless of where you play. It doesn't matter if you play in Tacoma, Washington or Miami, Florida, the field is still 100 yards long, 53 1/2 yards wide, with two end zones both 10 yards long. The uprights, too, are the same. The base of the crossbar is 10 feet high, and the width of the uprights is 16 1/2 feet. Same goes for the pylons: 4 inches by 4 inches, and 18 inches high. Hell, even the directional arrows by the yard markers are the exact same: an isosceles triangle with two sides at 36 inches, and the base at 18 inches. At bottom, there are no differences whatsoever in the dimensions of the field, regardless of where you play, so it's not like baseball where hitter's parks v. pitcher's parks can give a particular team an advantage.

Moreover, there's no special object on the field to make a difference. In basketball, though the dimensions of the court never change, different arenas have different tightness levels to the rim, and that can dramatically change a team's shooting abilities, and therefore have a major impact on their overall scoring. But again, in football you have nothing like that.

Playing surfaces can make a difference, no doubt there. In the past, particularly in the NFL, teams with fast surfaces (Astro Turf, primarily) built teams around speed, and they would have an advantage at home, and of course when they would go to opposing team's stadiums with poor, slow surfaces, they would be at a disadvantage, thus giving the opposing home team an advantage. But in the SEC -- and most places for that matter -- you just don't have very different playing surfaces. Generally speaking, they are all pretty much the same. Just about everyone uses natural grass, and even the ones that don't use the FieldTurf that is highly similar to natural grass. At bottom, there's nothing between those two that would create an advantage for one team and a disadvantage for the other. Moreover, no one in the SEC pulls a Notre Dame (letting the grass grow ridiculously high and thick before a big game) in order to slow down faster teams. In reality, the only real differences in playing surfaces at SEC schools are the aesthetic differences. At bottom, the playing surfaces are just so similar throughout the SEC that it can't really make any real impact.

Climates, too, can also create an advantage for one team and a disadvantage for others, no doubt about it. Teams used to playing in the muck and mud of a torn up field (a good example is the Chicago Bears), build teams designed to play in those conditions, and when speedy teams that often play in domes (a good example is the New Orleans Saints) must go on the road to play those teams, that creates a distinct advantage for the home team. But again, we really don't have that in the SEC, or anywhere else in college football for that matter. Conferences are so geographically based that the climates are generally the same regardless of which school is in question. The SEC is the perfect example; generally all SEC games are played in roughly the same conditions, aside from a game in which it might randomly rain, and even those are rare (Alabama usually averages less than one game per year that is affected in any way by the rain). So, that too has no real effect.

So then what is it that makes a difference?

Could it be that teams are generally afraid of going on the road?

That's something that I could very easily imagine a juvenile (in terms of maturity, not age) fan saying, but that's really laughable more than anything else. Seriously, exactly what is there to be "afraid" of? For one, players are rarely subjected to physical danger outside the playing field, and even if they were, so what? Modern day Division 1-A football players are largely physical freaks of nature, and they could rip a normal person to shreds if they wanted. You can rest assured they aren't worried about that. So again, what is there to be "afraid" of? Or, forget that, Hell, what is there to not even like about a road trip? Think about it, these guys are chauffeured to airports in swanky buses, with a full police escort the entire way, at which point they board luxurious charter jets. Once boarded, they get big, roomy seats with newly-released in-flight movies, customized to player and coach preferences, and world-class cuisine; sufficed to say, no pack of peanuts and a twelve-ounce Diet Coke for these guys. Once they arrive at the final destination, they unload and again they are chauffeured in swanky buses, with a full police escort, to the finest hotel in the surrounding area. Once there, they are waited on hand and foot, and in most cases later go out on the town. So, again, exactly what is there to be "afraid" of on a road trip? If anything, it seems like these players are having the time of their lives. All I can say is that I wish I got a similar weekend getaway four-to-five times per year for free like those guys do. At bottom, though, as said earlier, this argument is just laughable.

The only thing left that I could think of is crowd noise, and honestly that is the one that is generally most talked about. But exactly what impact does crowd noise have?

Supposedly opposing team's players get "rattled," but I have to admit that I really don't know what that means. And I really don't think there is much to it. Crowd noise is crowd noise, and believe it or not this is not NCAA Football 2008 where players become mentally retarded and physically inept. Much like the "afraid" notion, there's probably not much to this.

The notion that crowd noise affects communication, particularly with audibles, does seem very plausible, which puts it much higher than most other arguments regarding a real rationale for home field advantage. But really, how big of an impact can be that be? As we've seen in the past, coaches at this level are very good, and players are generally well prepared. Coaches know they will be going into loud environments, and they do game-plan accordingly. They install more hand-check audibles (as opposed to verbal audibles shouted out to other players), and they also install default adjustments if an opponent gives a certain look. Moreover, let's be brutally honest here, coaches generally keep their quarterbacks walking the tight and narrow, and most are on a short leash in terms of audibles. They simply aren't allowed to do it very much, for the most part, and the ones that are allowed to do so generally can only check into a few plays. This isn't like the NFL where quarterbacks routinely have the permission to completely change a play to whatever they want at their own volition. So, the impact there is largely limited by quarterbacks not being able to change the play that much in a given situation, particularly one that the coaching staff expected and are therefore presumably prepared for.

Moreover, the most important point regarding crowd noise is that, unlike everyone assumes, it makes it difficult for both teams. Fans don't really cheer for or against anyone, for the most part. At bottom, as a whole, it's just a whole bunch of yelling and screaming, and all told it's just loud. It's not like it's like a rock concert for the road team and it's quite as a museum for the home team. Both must deal with the crowd noise effectively. You may say that the crowd noise affects the road team's offense from audibling, but at the same time it also equally affects the home team's defense from audibling (and yes, defenses do audible, and often times they do it just as much as the offense).

Then some people say that they want the stadium silent when the home team has the ball, but rocking when the opposing team has the ball. And that's absurd, it makes no difference whatsoever. Sure, it's quiet for your offense, but it's quiet for the opposing defense too. You can freely adjust with no crowd interference, and so can they. And of course the exactly same thing goes for the opposite situation, where the noise makes it more difficult to adjust for both the opposing offense and the home defense. There is simply no net advantage for the home team.

At bottom, it's hard to see much of an advantage from crowd noise. After all, how can crowd noise be an advantage for the home team and a disadvantage for the road team, when it seemingly has the exact same strategical effect on both teams?

All told, the crowd noise argument is more plausible than most other rationales for the existence of home field advantage, but it too is not particularly convincing.

And beyond that, how do we know which stadiums are really the loudest?

I know the answer to that one: We don't.

Don't kid yourself, we have no clue whatsoever as to which stadiums are the loudest, nor does anyone who claims to know so. The reason for that is simple: no one has ever done any empirical test whatsoever of stadium noise levels. And until someone does a legitimate empirical study in which they take decibel meters into every Division 1-A stadium and measure the loudness of those stadiums on a consistent basis, and then rank them based on how loud they were on the decibel meter, we won't know. And, of course, no one has ever even attempted something remotely close to that.

Moreover, first person testimonials saying X Stadium is the loudest are simply not legitimate in any real sense. For one, you can find testimonials of people saying about thirty or more different stadiums are the loudest, and that's not quite the case, obviously. There can only be one "loudest" stadium, by definition, period. Moreover, individual testimonies are subject to bias and other perception-based distortions. For any findings to be credible and legitimate, crowd levels must be measured on an objective basis that is free from human biases. Finally -- and this is the main reason first person testimonials are not legitimate -- the level of crowd noise as perceived by an individual is determined almost wholly by the noise in the area immediately surrounding him / her. As a student at Alabama, you would have times in which the stadium seem deafening, but it was really just the student section. Again, from one physical location -- which of course is the most any human can be at during one time-frame -- you are not hearing how loud the entire stadium is, but how loud the immediate area surrounding you at that time. Even if you did a study with decibel meters, you would have to place them strategically throughout the stadium in order to figure out how loud the stadium was as a whole. Again, first person testimonials to stadium noise levels are simply not legitimate.

The bottom line is this with regard to stadium noise levels: Until someone does an empirical study in which they measure the noise levels in stadiums with strategically played decibel meters on a consistent basis, and then does a comparison analysis, we don't know which stadiums are truly the loudest. I don't care how many juvenile fans brag about their stadium being the loudest. I don't care what ESPN sideline reporters say. Bottom line. We. Simply. Do. Not. Know.

Home Field Advantage

2007-07-31T21:34:00.000-05:00

Now we turn to the next vaunted topic, "Home Field Advantage."

Admit it, you hear about it all the time, you probably talk about it all the time, and you probably think it is a very significant factor in the outcome of games.

But is it really? Does home field advantage really make a difference in the outcome of games? Oh sure, the talking heads go on and on about it, but does it really count?

Well that's a good question, and believe it or not, it's a very complex question. Some would like to paint that question in simple terms of "Team X has the loudest stadium, and it's much tougher to beat Team X in Team's X's home stadium." But, of course, things in life are rarely that simple, and the phenomenon of home field advantage is no different.

In fact, believe it or not, there is a lot of data, and I do mean a lot of data, that indicates that there really is, effectively speaking, no such thing as home field advantage. This forum will be one of the few places you hear that, but it is nevertheless true.

For example, if you break down the results in SEC games (48 SEC intra-conference games per year), there seems to be little legitimate correlation between the overall results and where the game was played. In most years, the home teams wins slightly more games than the road team (usually about one game more, a 25-23 overall record for the home team), but that's not always a given. It's pretty common for the road teams to actually have a better overall record in conference play than the home teams. In the end, it's very close one way or the other, with neither the home teams or the away teams having any real advantage, and honestly what very little difference that actually exists between the two being almost certainly statistical white noise.

Beyond that, we have further evidence.

Let's take a look at the last five years. If you had to say, which two SEC teams performed better at home, relative to their road performance, than the rest of the SEC? Surely, if a team does have a home field advantage, and if that advantage really makes a tangible impact on the outcome of games, then the teams with the biggest home field advantage would generally speaking have the best home performance relative to their road performance, right? Not quite. In fact -- get ready for a shocker -- the two SEC teams that have performed the best at home relative to their performance on the road have been -- again, get ready for a shock -- Ole Miss and Mississippi State. And correct me if I'm wrong, but you never hear anybody talking about how difficult it is to play in Vaught-Hemingway, or Davis Wade Stadium.

So what about some of the big boys of the SEC with those massive 90,000+ seat stadiums? Surely there is a big home field advantage there with those extremely loud crowds. Uh, well, not quite. Take LSU for example, and their vaunted Tiger Stadium. Believe it or not, despite all of the talk about supposedly how difficult it is to play in "Death Valley," in the five-year stretch from 2001-2005, LSU was 15-5 at home in conference play, and 15-5 on the road in conference play. At bottom, it was the same record, regardless of where they played. We'll go even deeper than that, looking at Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee in that same five-year stretch. Despite massive stadiums, it did them little good. In fact, all three teams had a significantly better record on the road than than they did at home. If anything, for that group, playing at home was at times seemingly a death knell more than anything else.

At bottom, as a whole, big-time programs have big-time winning records at their home stadiums, compared to their road records. And the reason is simple, when you take into account all games, you take into account all of the Sisters of the Poor that a team will play, and those patsies greatly inflate the overall home record (even we went 6-2 at home in 2006, for example). And obviously, since you don't play home-and-home series with the Sisters of the Poor, you never play them on the road to where you greatly inflate that record too, which causes the disparity between the overall home and away records. So, as expected, once you filter out all of the Sisters of the Poor, that inflated record goes away. At bottom, you generally win fewer games against better teams, and more games against poorer teams, regardless of where you play the game itself. For example, we all know the argument from the 2006 LSU season. They went 4-0 at home in SEC play, but 2-2 on the road, and the argument was that had those four road games been played in Tiger Stadium, they would have won them all. In reality though, that argument doesn't hold water. The disparities between the two records did not result from the location of the games, but the overall quality of the opponents faced. The four home games included three teams with losing records, and the overall record of those four teams was a measly 21-28 (42.8%). On the other hand, the four road games included the eventual national champion, a top ten team, a top fifteen team, and also a team that went 9-4 and finished in the top 25. All told, the overall record of those four teams was 43-11 (79.6% winning percentage). Had the schedule been reversed, it's very likely they would have went 2-2 at home and 4-0 on the road. Again, it wasn't the location of the games that made the difference, it was the disparity in the quality of opponents that mattered. The point of the matter is that when playing similar teams (such as conference games), teams tend to win more games against lesser opponents, and win fewer games against better opponents, regardless of whether the game is played at home or on the road.

Going even deeper than that, you often here that home field advantage really makes a difference in close games. So is that valid or not? In a word, no. Brian C. Fremeau, who publishes a college football rating system called the Fremeau Efficiency Index, did the research for a November 9th, 2006 column at Football Outsiders. In it, he compiled a list of every Division 1-A college football game that was decided by seven points or less, and he came to the conclusion that 172 games fell into that category in the 2006 regular season. Want to guess the home record and the road record? All told, in the 172 games, home teams went 86-86 (.500), and road teams went 86-86 (.500).

Fremeau later summed it up best: "Home-field advantage may be an emotional factor, but it does not appear to be a significant statistical one."

In fact, several coaches have indicated that they feel it to be advantageous to play on the road. That may sound odd at first because you hear so much about home field advantage, but there's a legitimate rationale behind it. Pat Dye, arguably, is that viewpoint's most prominent proponent, and he long stated his belief that playing on the road presented a more advantageous situation. According to Dye, teams are more focused on the road due to fewer off-field distractions (especially the day before the game and the day of the game), and also going into a hostile environment forces teams to band together as, well, a team, which though not quantifiable, is an important factor in winning football games.

Again, that probably sounds odd because you never hear it, but nonetheless it is a pretty solid rationale.

At the end of the day, the only real support for home field advantage seems to be what people say. In other words, support for the existence and legitimacy of home field advantage usually amounts to nothing more than unqualified verbal and written speculation from fans and / or questionably-qualified "experts" like the Lee Corsos of the world.

But why does everyone so badly want to believe in home field advantage? I say two main reasons.

For one, teams that lose games on the road suddenly have a convenient excuse for the loss. You hear it all of the time, as we mentioned earlier. Though it's a weak-at-best argument (it doesn't matter the least bit the speculative outcome of a game when played somewhere else, all that matters is the outcome of the game where it is played), fans cling to it passionately, even to the point of absurdity. Again with the 2006 LSU team, even most LSU fans continue to cling to the notion that they would have beaten Florida had the game been in Baton Rouge instead of Gainesville. Only one problem with that: the game wasn't even close. Florida took a 23-7 lead early in the third quarter, and from there sit on it. Only did a long LSU field goal four minutes into the fourth quarter bring the game within two touchdowns, and they never got closer. Truth is, even the people who think home field advantage has a massive impact on the outcome of games would have easily said it would never have made that much difference in a game like that. And keep in mind I'm not trying to pick on the LSU people here; if it is being read that way then that is incorrect. This type of rationale is common among all college football fans, unfortunately. At bottom, people will cling to the notion that "Oh yeah, well we would have won had it been at our stadium" (as if that doesn't sound like a middle school argument), even in the fact of sheer absurdity.

Two, you have to consider this: If home field advantage is legitimate and significant, a fan literally is part of a win. The fan literally plays a role in his team winning, and in that sense he's essentially like a player on the team; it produces the feeling that, hell, the common fan may as well have caught the game-winning touchdown pass. And of course, fans desperately want to believe that. They want to believe that their actions have a very tangible, very real, and very significant positive impact on their favorite team, even if there is no real evidence indicating anything of the sort. No one wants to believe that they pay ungodly amounts of money and yell and scream in support of their favorite team for it to have essentially no impact. Fans want to believe the former notion.

But wanting to believe something doesn't make that something true. Nor does everyone talking about it, even if it ESPN and the like doing the talking.

At bottom, despite vehement assertions that home field advantage is real and significant, there is simply little to no actual empirical evidence that there is any such thing as a home field advantage in college football, and what little "advantage" could possibly be rationally construed from the data seems to be so small that it is essentially insignificant in statistical terms. Just because something is constantly repeated does not make it true, and home field advantage in college football seems to be a good real-world example of that.

Again, Fremeau summed it up perfectly. Home field advantage may represent a significant emotional attachment to the fans, but in an empirical real world sense, it seemingly has simply has no real, legitimate, or significant impact on the outcome of college football games.

A Synthesis: Sacks And Pass Defense

2007-07-31T16:26:00.000-05:00

Earlier I made a post about 2006 SEC pass defense, and also about 2006 SEC sacks, analyzing each separately.

In reality though, considering it is all one defense, the two things are related, or are they? That's basically what I set out to determine. At bottom, is there any correlation between the number of sacks a team generates and how well their pass defense performs? Or does that number of sacks created have little if any correlation to how well a pass defense performs, as Joe Kines contended?

To figure it out, I ran the numbers on how well Adjusted Sacks correlated to a variety of different measures of performance for a pass defense, including opposing quarterback's average passer rating, yards per completion, yards per attempt, completion percentage, interception rate, and touchdown rate.

Before I list the results of what I found, I'll give a very brief primer on correlation for those who may not be familiar with the concept. At bottom, correlation ranges from 1 to -1, and values that that are near 1 or -1 have correlation, and values near 0 essentially have no correlation. Going up to 1 means there is positive correlation, i.e. the more x happens, the more y happens. Going down to -1 means there is negative correlation, i.e. the more x happens, the less y happens.

So, with that in mind, the following is how well Adjusted Sacks correlated to that variety of measures, in descending order:

Opposing QB average passer rating: -.4997
Touchdown rate: -.4693
Completion percentage: -.4660
Yards per attempt: -.4489
Yards per completion: -.3087
Interception rate: -.2573

As you see, opposing team's passing numbers generally tend to go down greatly as the number of Adjusted Sacks increase.

Opposing quarterback average passer rating, touchdown rate, completion percentage, and yards per attempt all have a pretty high negative correlation with the number of Adjusted Sacks. Again, there's just no real way to dispute the data, for the most part. Unless it's just an odd-ball deal with a one year sample size, which I highly doubt given the breadth of the statistics, it generally just showcases that pressuring the quarterback pays off.

I was thinking, perhaps, that would I might find would be a good bit of teams that racked up a lot of Adjusted Sacks did so by blitzing heavily, and that would even things out in the end with that defense giving up a lot of big plays and completions. But, as the breakdown showed, that simply wasn't the case. Certainly some teams did get a high number of Adjusted Sacks by blitzing heavily, but they didn't seemingly give up very many big plays or lot of completions. I suppose it isn't quite like the old Joe Lee Dunn days at MSU, where two sacks would be followed by a 38-yard completion against a seven man rush. You have to give credit to defensive coordinators and other defensive coaches; generally, it seems, even when they bring lots of pressure, the defensive backfield still, relatively speaking, prevents big plays.

The only snafu to the entire analysis was Interception Rate. There was a -.2573 correlation between Adjusted Sacks and Interception Rate, meaning that as Adjusted Sacks went up, the Interception rate tended to go down. Perhaps this should have been too shocking, especially considering the result of LSU, Arkansas, and Alabama, but it still is just a bit. You would think, intuitively, that more pressure would result in more bad throws and more interceptions, but the reverse is true. I suppose that the man-to-man coverage on the outside, combined with the shorter throws when the blitz is expected, means that defensive backs are not in as good of a position to intercept the football. And moreover, again since they are in man-to-man coverage, cornerbacks may not want to be as aggressive, knowing that they would have no help over the top if they made the slightest mistake. I know, it doesn't seem right intuitively, but more sacks correlates with fewer interceptions, at least in this data set. I would point out, however, that a correlation of only .2573 isn't particularly high, so maybe it is just statistical white noise that would work itself with a larger sample size. I suppose we'll see when we run the same numbers this time next year.

At the end of the day, you just have to be brutally honest about it. At bottom, it seems that if you were going to be successful in pass defense, you had to get after the quarterback. If you didn't, you just weren't going to be very good in defending the pass.

As for Kines, I certainly don't want to criticize his philosophy, because obviously he's forgotten more about football than I will ever know, but the numbers just seem to invalidate his defensive philosophy. Kines essentially betted that we could drop seven and eight defenders into heavy zone coverage, and opposing quarterbacks wouldn't be able to beat it. Unfortunately, at least in 2006 (that philosophy worked with all of the talent we had in 2005), that didn't work. Quarterbacks did effectively pick apart the defense with a relatively high degree of regularity, and with that in mind we struggled greatly in terms of pass defense. And, honestly, a lot of that credit goes to opposing quarterbacks. Perhaps there was a time when you could count on opposing quarterbacks to make a lot of mistakes throwing into heavy zone coverage, but that time seems to have passed.

The good news is that with Saban in charge now, Adjusted Sacks will go way up, and that should drive opposing team's passing numbers considerably lower.

New Rule Set For Massive Impact

2007-07-30T23:32:00.000-05:00

You may or may not have heard about it yet, but there is a new rule change in college football for the 2007 season. Kick-offs, which had previously taken place from the kicking team's 35-yard line, will now be moved back to the kicking team's 30-yard line.

On the surface, that may seem like the textbook definition of a minor, insignificant change. But you would be very wrong.

In fact, Kentucky head coach Rich Brooks was quoted as saying, "It’s going to be one of the most significant rule changes to come about in recent years, maybe in a decade in college football."

So how exactly will it change things? Well, Coach Brooks had something to say on that as well. Specifically, he had the following musings:

"You’re gonna see offenses starting with a lot better field position. You’re gonna see scoring averages go up because of this rule change. You’re gonna see a lot more gimmicks on kickoff coverage. By gimmicks I’m talking with pooch kicking, possible squib kicking. There may be some people that decide they want to kick it out of bounds and give it to the team on the 35-yard line rather than kicking it deep and having a return out to the 40 or 45."

Florida Coach Urban Meyer later agreed with Rich Brooks' comments. In fact, he specifically mentioned a study that has concluded that the average kick-off will now be fielded at the nine-yard line.

Georgia Coach Mark Richt even went as far as stating that last year his team returned approximately 25 per cent of all kick-offs, but that now he expects his team to return somewhere between 75 and 90 per cent of all kick-offs.

The are no two ways about it. This rule change may seem minor on the surface, but it is not. This is a massive rule change that will have a massive effect.

So exactly what will be the end result?

Well, I don't know for certain, of course, but we can speculate to a great degree about what the effect be.

For starters, at Mark Richt noted, a much higher percentage of kicks will be returned in 2007. In fact, it will be very much a rarity for a kick to not be returned, and honestly it will still even be a rare occurrence when kicks are not returned even when a great distance kicker is handling the kick-off duties.

Moreover, the starting field position is, of course, going to be much higher. Considering historically the average kick return generally hovers somewhere between twenty and twenty-five yards per return -- if the Meyer-referenced study is correct in their projection that the average kick will be fielded at the nine-yard line -- the average starting position for teams will be somewhere between the twenty-nine and thirty-four yard lines. And again, that's just the average. Teams that struggle in kick coverage and kick distance will routinely see opponent's starting beyond their own forty-yard line.

The better field position, of course, will also greatly increase the chances of scoring. It goes without saying that the further advanced the ball is, the greater the odds of scoring are. For example, take this into consideration: When the NFL kicked off from the 35-yard line, teams that got the ball first in overtime won 50% of the time, and teams that kicked won 50% of the time. When they moved the kick-off back five yards to the 30-yard line, however, it made a big difference. Since then, teams that get the ball first in overtime win 60% of the time, and teams that kicked won only 40% of the time. Again, moving the ball five yards further back can make a massive difference in the chances that the receiving team will score on the ensuing possession because the odds are scoring are much higher due to better field position.

And, of course, the greater chances of scoring on each drive following a kick-off will result in higher scoring games. In 2006, the average SEC team scored 20.6 points per game, and that number is likely to creep up towards, if not beyond, 22 points per game in 2007.

Coaches, as alluded to earlier by Rich Brooks, will compensate in a variety of ways. To begin with, we'll see more pooch kicks and squib kicks, and we'll see much more complex kick cover schemes in an attempt to limit returns. In the past, kick cover schemes have often times been pretty vanilla, but that is likely a thing of the past now. Beyond that, you are almost certainly going to be see much better players on special teams. In the past, many coaches have opted for lesser players (often freshmen and others buried on the depth chart) when composing their special teams unit, but 2007 will see, generally speaking, much higher quality players on both the kick coverage and kick return teams. The much higher potential reward / potential loss simply dictates that coaches will be forced to take more risk in that sense.

Of course, having better players on special teams will impact the rest of the game in yet another big way: injuries. It's no secret that the two most dangerous plays in all of football are the kick-off and the punt (massive men hitting each other at top speed, going in opposite directions, you do the math). And with much better players on special teams, it's inevitable that those much better players will occasionally get hurt. Again, that could make a huge difference when, for example, a star player who before 2007 wouldn't have even been playing special teams goes down for the year with a torn ACL on a kick-off. Say, for a more concrete example, Demeco Ryans would have broken his ankle covering a kick against Southern Miss in 2005, when he would have otherwise been sippin' Gatorade on the sideline; exactly how do you think that would have impacted our season? I'm pretty sure you get my point now. The injury impact of the move could be very significant, and likely will be very significant for the unfortunate few teams that lose a key player in the process.

All told, it's going to greatly emphasize both kick coverage and kick returns. Both coaches and players are going to focus greatly on kick coverage and kick returns, and you'll quickly see the difference when you watch games either on television or at the stadium.

The bottom line is this: teams that can cover kicks and return kicks well will be in great shape, and teams that can't cover kicks very well or return kicks very well are going to find themselves losing a lot of football games.

This is a major rule change, and it will have a massive overall impact. How well each team adjusts its performance to the rule change will likely have a significant impact on the team's final win-loss record. At bottom, if you are looking for a good season in 2007, you had better get your kick-off team in tip-top shape, or it's going to be a tough road to hoe.

2006 SEC: Adjusted Defensive Sack Rates

2007-07-30T19:54:00.000-05:00

We've already covered offensive sack rates to help determine who protected their quarterback the best in 2006, so we'll now turn to defensive sack rates to help determine which teams rushed the quarterback the best in 2006.

As was the case with total offensive sacks allowed, defensive sacks created on its own is a pretty meaningless number, and only takes on real meaning when you put it into the context of pass attempts. Long story short, a team that piles up a lot of sacks can be a relatively poor pass rushing team, and a team that has only a relatively few sacks can in fact be a good pass rushing team, depending on how many passes they have thrown against them.

So, what I have done is taken the total number of sacks created by a particular team in SEC play in 2006, and divided that by the total number of pass attempts against the same team. That division yields a percentage of passing plays that I call Adjusted Sack Rate, which of course is the percentage of passes that resulted in a sack.

The following is how the SEC ranked in terms of sacks in 2006:

Moreover, we'll break things down a bit further. I understand that Adjusted Sack Rate can be a bit hard to grasp, being a raw percentage and all, so I also added Adjusted Sacks. Basically, Adjusted Sacks is the number of sacks that a team would have gotten had they faced the league average of pass attempts (223). Again, it doesn't change the data at all, it just makes it a bit easier to comprehend and fully understand by putting it in concepts more familiar to football fans.

Also, I've looked at teams not just by sacks alone, but also the lost yardage from those sacks. As you'll see, I've ranked the SEC in terms of the average yards lost per sack as well.

Without further adieu...

So there it is. If you've ever wanted better statistics regarding sacks in 2007, now you have them.

Honestly, I really don't have a whole lot to say regarding the data itself, and the main reason I did this was to get data needed for a later post.

Why do you ask?

At bottom, a sack is a pretty meaningless thing, in and of itself. You often times see teams that have a lot of sacks because they consistently blitzed everything but the kitchen sink, and while that did accumulate a lot of sacks, it still did not mark solid defensive play. Opposing teams would know their heavy blitz tendencies, and game-plan accordingly with a lot of max protect packages and short drops, with the end result being lots of completions and many big plays when a defensive back, playing man-to-man coverage, would miss a tackle and there would be no one over the top to clean it up. So really the reason I did all this is to compare it (hopefully in a post coming shortly) to 2006 SEC pass defense results. Again, hopefully that post will be coming shortly.

But I will say a few things...

Namely, Alabama just didn't get it done. The pass rush was a little better than most would have thought (eleventh instead of dead last), but there wasn't much to it. As I've posted before, the underlying idea behind the Kines scheme with regard to pass defense was to drop a lot of defenders into coverage, usually only rushing three or four defenders, and then forcing the opposing quarterback to throw into heavy zone coverage. And, well, that's exactly what we did. It just didn't work. We didn't get very many sacks (as expected, even by Kines), but we also didn't force incompletions with the heavy zone coverage. Again, at bottom, it just didn't work. You really can't put it any way other than that.

Georgia does need to be mentioned. The Dawgs finished third in the conference in total sacks, which sounds about right, considering their two outstanding defensive ends Quentin Moses and Charles Johnson. However, once you analyze the Dawgs through Adjusted Sack Rate, they only finished fifth in the conference, and really just looked like a very mediocre pass rushing team. Honestly, that shocked me. I fully expected Georgia to be one of the, if not the, top pass rushing teams in the conference. With Moses and Johnson gone to the NFL, and Georgia having to replace eight starters on defense in 2007, perhaps there are some signs for concern in Athens. All told, the Dawgs were the textbook example of racking up a lot of sacks against the Sisters of the Poor, racking up ten sacks against the, shall we say, vaunted triumvirate of Western Kentucky, Colorado, and UAB (a 6-5 Division 1-AA opponent, and two D-1A opponents with a combined record of 5-19. If you ever wanted a case study of why I only look at conference games, this would be a good one.

The rest really aren't too shocking. The teams that you thought rushed the quarterback really well (LSU, Florida, etc.) in fact did so, and the teams that you thought rushed the quarterback poorly in fact did so, too.

The only other mild surprise, to me, was Tennessee. The Vols are always very talented in the front seven, and I expected them to be a pretty solid pass rushing team, and they were far from it. For whatever reason, the Vols struggled to get after the quarterback, finishing tenth in the SEC in Adjusted Sack Rate, and had only about two Adjusted Sacks more than Alabama and Ole Miss. Yikes for the Vols. Not what I expected.

Finally, let's look at average yards lost per sack. Arkansas, LSU, and Florida (i.e. three of the top four teams in Adjusted Sack Rate), finished 9th, 10th, and 12th, respectively, in terms of average yards lost per sack. At bottom, teams knew they had a great pass rush, and planned shorter drops accordingly. And, of course, shorter drops equals less yardage lost when in fact a sack does occur. On the other end of the spectrum, the two teams that finished first and second (Alabama and Tennessee) in average yards lost per sack were about the two worst pass rushing teams in the conference. Opponents saw the lack of a pass rush, and planned deeper drops and longer routes, accordingly. That, in turn, resulted in a higher amount of yards lost per sack, when in fact a sack did occur.

Later we'll put all of this together with 2006 pass defense and see what we find. It should be interesting stuff.

The Scoreability Index

2007-07-29T22:16:00.000-05:00

A couple of days ago, I posted about the Bendability Index, and made the case for its high relevance in college football.

Today, we'll move from a statistic that focuses mainly on the defensive side of the ball to a statistic that focuses mainly on the offensive side of the ball: the Scoreability Index. Whereas the Bendability Index determines how many yards it took an opponent to accumulate to score a point on a team, the Scoreability Index determines how many yards it takes an offense to score a point on their opponent. Just like was the case with the Bendability Index, the Scoreability Index is not solely a measure of offensive prowess, but instead a measure of overall team efficiency that takes into account a variety of factors, such as red zone offense, special teams performance, defensive performance, and turnovers.

The following is how the SEC finished up in terms of the Scoreability Index in 2006:

Now let's look at things closer, beginning with my beloved Crimson Tide.

Unfortunately, well, it's just not pretty for those clad in crimson. As you can see, we finished eleventh in the conference in the Scoreability Index, and combined with us finishing eleventh in the Bendability Index, well, no one should be surprised that we went 6-7 and Mike Shula was fired. In terms of the Scoreability Index, the offense moved the ball relatively well. We racked up 2,691 yard of total offense -- granted, keep in mind I understand that looking at things by total yardage alone doesn't tell you much, which is why we're going farther in this analysis -- and moreover we were very consistent in racking up yardage. We weren't boom and bust (400 one week, 150 the next), we consistently put up over 300 yards almost each and every week (the only two exceptions were Tennessee and MSU). But unfortunately, those yards didn't really translate into very many points.

At bottom, though we moved the ball relatively well, it didn't translate into points. Poor special teams (all across the board, in terms of punt returns, kick returns, punting, kicking, and punt and kick coverage), and below average defensive play meant that we generally didn't have great field position, so we had to move the ball long distances to score. Beyond that, once we did move the ball downfield, we bogged down in the red zone, so we never saw the full potential point value of all of the yards that we had accumulated. For example, moving the ball 74 yards isn't very meaningful if you can only get three points on the board when it is all said and done.

At the end of the day, it was just bad from top-to-bottom. There are no real bright spots to the matter.

Now just a few thoughts on the rest of the SEC...

Vanderbilt was the only team that finished behind Alabama, and in reality we should have been behind even them. Vanderbilt's yards-per-point ratio was skewed massively by the fact that in one game (Kentucky) they put up 621 yards of offense. For the other seven games, we were a good bit worse than even the Commodores. Bad stuff.

Arkansas just set the world on fire in this category, needing only 11.5 yards per point. You have to give the Hogs credit, they were good from top to bottom. They played great defense, capitalized on turnovers, had good special teams, and ran all over just about everyone when they actually got the ball on offense. What can you say? They were the epitome of how it is supposed to be done.

Auburn did not have a very good offense in 2006, but they did quite well in the Scoreability Index, finishing third in the conference. Again, they weren't very good on offense, mainly due to injuries to Brandon Cox and Kenny Irons. However, they still did the things, as an entire team, needed to be successful. They got great special teams play, and great play from their defense. Though their offense wasn't particularly good, it was efficient and capitalized quite well off of what their special teams and defense created for them.

And finally, to close, one of the keys to always look at with any statistic is how well that particular statistic correlates to winning or losing football games. Some stats -- despite people talking about them all the time and you hearing it talked about on ESPN 24/7 -- have essentially no correlation to winning or losing football games, but that is not true of this statistic. Much like the Bendability Index, the Scoreability Index has a very high correlation to actual wins. Just look at the teams that finished in the top five in the Scoreability Index versus those who finished in the bottom five. The teams that finished in the top five of the Scoreability Index were a combined 54-13 (80.59 percent winning percentage). The teams that finished in the bottom five of the Scoreability Index were a combined 28-33 (45.9 percent winning percentage).

Small wonder Cold, Hard Football Facts -- the inventor of this statistic -- refers to it as one of the "Stats That Matter."

Update: SEC Favorites

2007-07-29T21:41:00.000-05:00

In a previous post, I looked at how the consensus SEC favorites have fared over the course of the past decade.

I recently ran across an article, however, that detailed the official SEC champion selection at SEC Media Days, and how they have historically performed.

According to this article in the The Advocate, only twice has the media successfully predicted the eventual SEC champion in the fifteen year history of the SEC since the implementation of the divisional format in 1992. The media correctly predicted the eventual SEC champion in 1994 and 1995, both times when they selected the Florida Gators. In the other thirteen years, the media has been dead wrong.

So, in reality, the "official" SEC favorite hasn't actually won the SEC in the eleven seasons, going 0-11 in the process.

Interestingly enough, teams not picked to win the SEC include five national champions (1992 Alabama, 1996 Florida, 1998 Tennessee, 2003 LSU, and 2006 Florida), and one team that went 13-0 despite being jilted at the ballot box (2004 Auburn).

I can't help but wonder if being the favorite makes teams prepare for you harder, and play harder against you, thus almost wholly ending your chances of the winning the SEC? And perhaps that same phenomenon allows other teams to sneak up a bit and get the job done? Right or wrong, it seems something is amiss. I understand the media isn't the most football savvy group in the world, but you could probably do better than 2-13 just by throwing darts at a dartboard.

But alas, back to the original point at the hand, if LSU can pull it off this year, you'll have to give the Tigers and Les Miles all the credit in the world. They will truly have pulled off a very rare feat.

More On Pass Defense

2007-07-29T16:55:00.000-05:00

In the past few weeks, I've made several posts on 2006 SEC pass defense. The problem with it all, however, is that its hard to put together. You analyze a ton of pieces, but at the end of the day it can be difficult to put them all together and determine what they mean as a whole.

But what we can do is take the combined statistics (attempts, completions, yards, touchdowns, and interceptions) of every SEC pass defense and convert them into one simple, easy-to-understand formula: the quarterback passer rating.

Granted, the quarterback passer rating has some flaws, but generally it presents a good overall summary of performance.

Thus, here you go, the 2006 SEC pass defenses ranked in terms of opposing quarterback's cumulative passer rating:

And that sums things up quite nicely.

As you can see, the Crimson Tide ranked ninth in the SEC in terms of opposing quarterback's cumulative passer rating. At bottom, we looked good on total pass defense (4th in the conference) because we allowed so few passing yards. But the dirty little secret behind that was we saw the fewest passes thrown against us of any team in the conference. In reality, we were a quite poor team in terms of pass defense, better than only lowly Mississippi State, Kentucky, and Vanderbilt.

Bayou Bengals Fighting History

2007-07-28T18:23:00.000-05:00

2007 SEC Media Days recently concluded with the media voting the LSU Tigers the overwhelming favorite to win the SEC this season. But the Tigers are very much fighting history. Being tabbed as the favorite to win the SEC has very much been a kiss of death the past decade.

Just look at the past nine seasons.

In 2006, everyone and their brother thought the Auburn Tigers had it locked up. And then the season started, and they finished second in their own division. 2005 had no true favorite (though Tennessee would have likely came closest), for the most part, but the team that did win it, the Georgia Bulldogs, were picked by effectively no one after they lost media darlings David Greene and David Pollack to graduation the year before. Tennessee, who was likely the main favorite, went 5-6, and a purge of their coaching ranks ensued.

In 2004, many expected Georgia to rebound for the SEC title, and some others expected Florida to break through in Zook's third year. As it happened, Auburn came out of nowhere and went 13-0 en route to an SEC championship. In 2003, Auburn was everyone's favorite, but they crashed and burned to a five-loss season in which head coach Tommy Tuberville came this close to getting fired. No one expected LSU to do it, coming off of an 8-5 season in 2002, but they did just that, winning the SEC and a share of the national championship.

In 2002, Tennessee, with Casey Clausen returning, was dubbed by most as the eventual SEC Champions. The Vols imploded amongst team dissension, and the Georgia Bulldogs came out of nowhere to go 13-1, win the SEC, and go on to a victory in the Sugar Bowl over Florida State. In 2001, the Florida Gators were pegged to win the SEC, and possibly the national championship. But the Gators fell to Auburn and Tennessee, and didn't even win the SEC East. LSU, the actual 2001 SEC Champion, shocked everyone by pulling it out. No one even thought they would win it even when they advanced to the SEC Title Game against Tennessee.

In 2000, our beloved Crimson Tide was the unanimous favorite, and uh, yeah, we all know how that one turned out. Florida ended up as the SEC champions, facing little resistance on their way to Atlanta or in Atlanta against Auburn. In 1999, everyone had either Tennessee, Georgia, or Florida as the SEC Champions. As it turned out, Alabama came out of nowhere and beat Florida twice, winning the SEC in a route of the Gators in Atlanta.

In 1998, the Florida Gators were dubbed by most to win the SEC after the departure of Peyton Manning, but surprising Tennessee -- led by Tee Martin -- came out of nowhere and went undefeated, winning the SEC en route to a national championship.

Finally, you have to go all the way back to 1997 until the favorite went on to win the SEC. That year, after Peyton Manning opted to forgo the NFL Draft and return for his senior season. The media picked up on it, and dubbed Tennessee as the SEC Champion. Though the Vols were blown out by Florida early in the year in the Swamp, they made the SEC title game when Florida surprisingly lost to two inferior teams (LSU and Georgia), and narrowly edged out Auburn 30-29 in the SEC Championship Game.

In the nine seasons since the Vols' SEC Championship in 1997, the preseason SEC favorite has combined to go 0-9 in their pursuit of the SEC title. More damning, however, is this fact: Of those nine favorites to win SEC, only one time did anyone remotely close to being considered a favorite has actually advanced to the SEC title game (the 1999 Florida Gators), and even the one team that did came in a year when there was no clear-cut favorite.

To sum up -- and this is something you are probably only going to read here regarding media favorites -- the harsh truth of the matter is that none of the past nine favorites to win the SEC have actually won it, and only one time did a favorite even make it to the SEC Championship game.

The perilous road to a championship doesn't simply end there, however.

It is an almost equally perilous route for those attempting to win the SEC with a first-year starter at quarterback.

Just look at the past eight seasons. In the past eight years, every team that has won the SEC championship has done so with a returning starter at quarterback.

In 2006, Florida won the SEC and later the national championship under the leadership of Chris Leak, a four year starter playing as a senior. In 2005, Georgia won the SEC with D.J. Shockley, who had started several games in his career in Athens, and had generally split playing time with David Greene.

In 2004, Auburn won the SEC with Jason Campbell under center. Campbell was a fifth-year senior who had started nearly his entire career. 2003 saw the LSU Tigers win the SEC with Matt Mauck, who had started the previous year, and who was older than most college quarterbacks (Mauck was 24, due to a minor league baseball career).

In 2002, David Greene led Georgia to its first SEC championship in twenty years in his second full season as a starter. In 2001, Rohan Davey led LSU to the SEC championship as a senior who had started off-and-on his entire career at LSU (he generally split starts from 1999-2000 with Josh Booty). Finally, Alabama won the SEC in 1999 with Andrew Zow in his second full season as a starter.

You have to go all the way back to the 1998 season to find a team that won the SEC with a first-year starter. The Tennessee Volunteers did it that year with Tee Martin, and no one has done it since.

So what does all of it mean?

At bottom, it means that the SEC is an incredibly tough conference with an amazingly high level of parity. No matter how good one team is thought to be, the truth is that the conference is just so strong from top-to-bottom that the odds are very much against even the favorite winning the SEC. And, moreover, if you generally want to have any real chance of winning the SEC, you had better have a quarterback with at least a year of starting experience. Apparently this league is generally just entirely too tough to throw a first-year starter to the wolves and expect a champion to emerge.

As LSU embarks on its 2007 campaign, they will do so as the undisputed SEC favorite, and also with a first-year starter at quarterback: Matt Flynn. If the Tigers can win the SEC this season, they will not only have out-fought eleven opponents in a brutally tough conference, but they will have out-fought history as well.

Big Recruiting News

2007-07-28T18:07:00.000-05:00

Only twenty-four hours after landing a huge prospect in Tyler Love, Nick Saban and company have apparently struck gold again.

Melvin Ray, one of the top wide receiver prospects in the country, has committed to Alabama. Ray is a 6'3, 202 pound receiver out of Tallahassee, Florida. He was one of the most widely sought-after recruits in the nation, with offers from the likes of Alabama, Florida State, Florida, LSU, Georgia, Clemson, and South Carolina. Now don't think this recruiting battle is over just yet. Ray is from Tallahassee, and admittedly he and his father have always been big FSU fans. And while he says he would not have committed now if he thought he would back out later, he also did say that he would take a visit (I assume an official visit in December or January) to Florida State. It's not over yet, but it's just the point of the matter that Saban is going out-of-state and freely reeling in such great prospects.

What can you say? Nick Saban is certainly earning that four million dollar paycheck on the recruiting trails. I've said it before and I'll say it again, this class will, as a worst-case scenario, be a top ten class, and has a great shot at being a top five class.

Many of the issues that we analyze around here can largely be addressed with a massive upgrade in the talent level of the entire roster, and Nick Saban seems to be doing just that.

2006 SEC: The Bendability Index

2007-07-28T14:27:00.000-05:00

In the previous post, I introduced the Bendability Index, and made the argument for its relevance in college football. Though I focused on Alabama, I nevertheless had to do the research for the other eleven SEC teams just to see how the Crimson Tide stacked up by comparison. And since the research has already been done, I might as well go ahead and publish it.

The following is how the entire SEC ranked in Bendability Index:

All told, I wouldn't really say there are any major surprises. The teams generally stacked up about like you thought they would have, with a few exceptions here and there.

One point, though, that should be made regards Georgia. Though the Dawgs had one of the best defenses in the conference -- if not the nation -- in 2006, they were very low in terms of Bendability Index, ranking tenth in the conference by that measure. The problem was a struggling Georgia offense that often times committed devastating turnovers. Again, as said earlier, the Bendability Index is not solely a measure of defensive prowess, but of overall team efficiency. The 2006 Georgia Bulldogs proved that point quite nicely.

The Bendability Index

2007-07-28T02:07:00.000-05:00

The Bendability Index is something you probably haven't heard of before. But it's something you are about to hear about, and it's something that you should know. It's a very relevant statistic, and it should be tracked, though -- for the usual reasons regarding a lack of in-depth analysis in most circles -- it is not.

So just what is the Bendability Index?

Cold, Hard Football Facts -- insofar as I can tell -- is the inventor of this statistic, and they have this to say about it:

This is the first stat that chronicles the phenomenon of the "bend but don't break" defense and provides a measure of defensive efficiency. The Bendability Index is obtained by dividing a team's total yards allowed by total points allowed, yielding Yards Per Point allowed. A team that ranks high on the Bendability Index has the defense that opponents must work hardest to score upon

In other words, you literally have to do more to score points against teams that rank high in the Bendability Index. You have to gain more yards, move the ball farther, pick up more first downs, etc.

But is the Bendability Index merely a measure of defensive prowess? No. Again quoting Cold, Hard Football Facts:

The Bendability Index is not purely a defensive yardstick. It is, instead, a great barometer of team success, of overall team strength and efficiency. It is a function of many team-wide factors, including general defensive strength, special teams proficiency, turnover differential, and Red Zone defense.

Though the Bendability Index measures defensive prowess, as noted earlier, it also indicates overall team strength. Poor play from the offensive and special teams (namely offensive turnovers, and poor punting and kicking) also have a massive impact on the number of points allowed. So it's not just a measure of defensive performance, but of the efficiency of your team as a whole. Never forget, it's not just defenses that give up points. Teams, as a whole, give up points.

Moreover, it's a highly relevant statistic. Double Extra Point -- a blog similar to this one dedicated to Nebraska football -- crunched the numbers and found that the Bendability Index correlated with winning significantly higher than total defense, pass efficiency defense, run defense, third down efficiency defense, and fourth down efficiency defense. The only thing that correlated higher with winning than the Bendability Index was scoring defense, and it did so only very slightly. In the big picture, the Bendability Index may even be a more important statistic than even scoring defense, as was noted by Cold, Hard Football Facts.

So how did my beloved Crimson Tide stack up in terms of Bendability Index in 2006?

Not well at all, unfortunately.

All told, when you run the numbers based on conference play, we finished 11th in the conference in the Bendability Index, ahead of only Mississippi State. At the end of the day, opposing teams generated only 13.39 yards per point scored. By comparison, Florida led the conference, as opposing teams generated over 19 yards per point scored. For another comparison, our 2005 team forced opposing teams to generate 23.75 yards per point scored (I don't have the full SEC data for the 2005, but I'm sure that led the league by a mile).

Certainly that is a sign of a poor play in 2006 by our defense. The loss of the stars of the 2005 defense, being brutally honest, hurt much more than anyone expected. I'm not even sure rival Alabama haters expected the drop-off that we ultimately saw.

But, again, it's not just the defense. It's a measure of overall team efficiency, or in case in 2006, a lack thereof. The Alabama offense turned the ball over entirely too much, and in some cases those turnovers led directly to points. Take Quentin Culbertson's interception of John Parker Wilson returned for a touchdown in the Mississippi State game for example, the Bulldogs put seven points on the board with the offense sipping Gatorade on the bench. But it was also indicative of other problems, particularly on special teams. No one needs to be told special teams were atrocious in 2006. We finished near the bottom in punting, kick-offs were generally short, and we generally allowed big returns. All told, it all combined for opposing teams to have short fields, if not points directly, and that made it much easier to score points by having to move the ball a much shorter distance to get the ball either into the end zone and / or between the uprights.

And, really, that's about all you can say. Unfortunately, it's just another statistic showing just how bad we were in 2006. Hopefully that will change dramatically in 2007 with the new coaching regime.

Either way, the Bendability Index is certainly something you should be keeping your eye on.

Snap Distribution

2007-07-26T23:03:00.000-05:00

A reader asked in a previous post for my opinions on how snaps should be distributed between starters and back-ups, so here goes:

At bottom, how should snaps be distributed between starters and back-ups?

Well, the simple answer is that the proper snap distribution depends on a variety of factors, and the distribution itself changes based on the unique circumstances of situation in question.

To begin with, there are no hard and fast answers to the question. There's just no way you can really run the data and somehow conclude that starters should play x percentage of snaps and that back-ups should play z percentage of snaps. Something like that would require the situation to be very black and white, but in reality it's all one massive gray area.

Generally speaking, though, you would like to give back-ups a good bit of meaningful playing time. Doing so would not only build for the future, but it would also create a more experienced squad with more quality depth, and as we all know, quality depth is largely what wins football games. However, though you would like to do that, the harsh reality is doing so is simply not a feasible option in most cases. Conference games (and all "big" games, for that matter) are generally always close, even for bad teams (look at our 2006 season), and you simply cannot afford to not have your best players on the field the overwhelming majority of the time. The games are just too close and the end result could completely change with just one play, so you must play your best players (i.e. starters) as much as you possibly can.

Beyond that, the snap distribution between the starters and the back-ups should also depend on the disparity of the talent levels between the two groups. If you have great starters and poor back-ups, it only makes sense to give the overwhelming majority of meaningful snaps to the starters; honestly, you may as well play them 'til they drop, because even in that scenario they are still likely your best players. On the other hand, if the talent level between the starters and back-ups is closer (say, Shaud Williams and Santonio Beard, as we saw in 2002) then you should alter your strategy to split the snaps more equally. Doing so limits the odds of one player getting injured, and the lesser physical pounding keeps them fresher, healthier, etc., and overall more productive in the long-run.

A sizable lead, too, can alter the ideal strategy. If you find yourself in an unusual number of blowout games (regardless of which end you are on), the ideal strategy would be to play the back-ups more. If you are blowing a team out (say, for example, like LSU blew out Kentucky 49-0 a year ago), you should bench the starters and play the back-ups. Doing so limits the risk your starters will suffer injuries, and moreover it will also help, albeit slightly, increase experience and quality depth. On the other hand, if you are getting annihilated, you should give the back-ups more time. Just as playing starters when you are ahead by a wide margin is a poor idea, so is playing them when you are behind by a wide margin. By that point, considering it is likely later in the game, a win is impossible, and all you will do by playing starters is stretch the game out and increase the risk of injury for your starters. You may as well give the back-ups some quality snaps to improve your overall team, and shield your starters from potential injuries.

The position of a particular player can also change the snap distribution. At one extreme, the starting quarterback is generally going to play every meaningful snap, as long he remains remotely healthy. At other extremes (generally interior defensive linemen), players rotate almost continuously, with back-ups often getting as many snaps as starters.

At bottom, despite the extreme importance of finding the right snap distribution between starters and back-ups, it's a complicated question with no clear-cut answers. There are a literal ton of factors that could influence the ideal snap distribution strategy, and figuring out the ideal snap distribution strategy in any game is a very complex matter. It's yet another gray area in which good coaching can come into play and make a massive difference in the overall performance of a team.

And finally, to close, never think that proper snap distribution is not important. No, we can't quantify it, and we can't put those numbers in an Excel spreadsheet and come up with an ideal strategy. But nevertheless, it's very important. Never think that just because you can't quantify something into a tangible product that it is not important. Proper snap distribution is just one of many things of that nature that are very important.

Wilson v. The Average

2007-07-25T14:40:00.000-05:00

Now that we have relatively advanced statistics regarding the performance of the 2006 SEC pass defenses, we can do a few other things.

For one -- and first and foremost here -- we can compare an individual quarterback's performance versus the average performance of the eight SEC quarterbacks that a particular defense faced in a given year. At bottom, it gives a lot of context to exactly how well a quarterback performed. Raw numbers only tell us, generally speaking, whether or not a player performed well in a game or a season, but comparing their raw numbers to the overall league average tells us not only how well they performed, but how well they performed in comparison to how well other players at the same position performed against those same teams.

So how did John Parker Wilson do as a whole, compared to the overall leave average?

All in all, Wilson's numbers were almost exactly identical to the league average, not really better and not really worse. Being very picky about, Wilson's numbers were generally just a hair below the league average, but by a very small and essentially insignificant amount. All told, Wilson had a higher completion percentage (56.52 for Wilson, to the league average of 56.37), and he also threw for slightly more yards per attempt (7.07 for Wilson, to the league average of 7.00). However, Wilson did have a lower touchdown rate, and a higher interception rate. All told, the combined QB rating of conference opponents against the eight SEC teams we faced in 2006 was 124.3, and Wilson clocked in just a hair below that at 122.4.

In terms of over / under performing the average, Wilson's best day came against LSU in Tiger Stadium. Though LSU held quarterbacks as a whole to under 150 passing yards per game and a completion percentage of lower than 50 per cent, Wilson threw for 291 yards against LSU, and completed 62.8 percent of his passes. Wilson's worst day came, oddly enough, the week before against lowly Mississippi State in Bryant-Denny Stadium. The Bulldogs struggled to defend the pass all year long, as opponents, as a whole, completed almost 60 per cent of their passes for over 220 yards per game, with a 3:2 touchdown to interception ratio. As with most other things that day for the Crimson Tide, it didn't quite go as planned. Wilson completed less than 50 per cent of his passes for under 200 yards total, and threw two interceptions against no touchdowns. Given the succession in games, I suppose an outhouse to penthouse reference would be fitting here.

All in all, though, the results are pretty good. Wilson was a first year starter, suffering from poor coaching and likely poor play-calling. Moreover, the offensive line was poor, and the running game was completely ineffective; arguably our worst since 1993. On top of all of that, Wilson played nearly all year with a badly sprained right ankle (i.e. his plant foot). About the only thing that Wilson had going for him in 2006 was a good receiving corps, and while good (Hall was great), after Brown was injured in the Ole Miss game, we never had another solid receiving threat. All told, while the wide receiver corps was pretty good (due to Hall's performance), it was far from extraordinary. Still, despite all of that going against him, Wilson put up average production numbers in 2007. Not a bad showing at all when you consider the circumstances.

It's just another good sign about the ability and potential of our starting quarterback.

At last... Football

2007-07-24T23:09:00.000-05:00

Thankfully, believe it or not, football season is right around the corner. Hard to believe -- after months and months of waiting -- but it is this close.

SEC Media Days is currently underway, and a week after Nick Saban goes to Hoover (along with Antoine Caldwell and Simeon Castille), Fall practice will begin. The freshmen will arrive, heads will be shaved, jersey numbers will be assigned, the pads will shortly start popping, we'll ooh and ah at players that are -- whoa, big shock -- not fat and out of shape, and once again for the second time in 2007 the practice facility will see more pizzas made than the Domino's on 15th Street. Spectators will crowd around the green-tarp-covered gates, the truly dedicated will get a glimpse via binoculars from the 4th floor of the south end of Mary Burke East (it's a nice view, trust me), tens of thousands will watch over-and-over two minute clips of the Tide running elementary drills on TideSports, and the position battles will quickly take shape.

I say to hell with the flowers blooming and the days getting longer, nothing is better than football right around the corner.

So what do we plan to do around here on Outside The Sidelines?

We're going to have some in-depth coverage, to say the least. I don't know exactly what we're going to do, but we'll try to get quite a bit done. I must say that I do enjoy this blog. It combines two of my favorite things: empirical analysis and Alabama football. So, I'll try to do as much as time permits.

For certain I am going to do game-charting, so we can have some very in-depth data to analyze. Unfortunately, at the moment I only have the play-by-play data from RollTide.com, ESPN.com, and other sites, and while decent, it's nowhere near as in-depth as I would like for it be. There are simply so many questions that I have that I simply cannot answer with the data that I have at hand. However, with me doing game-charting for the 2007 season, I'll have that data at my fingertips. At the end of the day, it's just going to improve the quality and depth of the content here by leaps and bounds.

I do plan on doing a very in-depth game-by-game recap, and I have a few more ideas.

If you have any suggestions, drop me a line in the comment box.

Safety Position: Big News

2007-07-24T22:54:00.000-05:00

Usually this site does not deal with things of this nature, but of course there are always exceptions to general rules...

According to various sites, Michael Ricks has qualified, and will report for Fall practice for August 3rd.

And hey, even us nerds have to celebrate once in a while.

At bottom, this is pretty big news. If you recall from my earlier prognostications on starters for 2007, you know about our safety situation. I said that that Ricks, if he qualified, could take one of the starting jobs. Rivals.com, and I'll be doing an in-depth analysis in the next few months on recruiting services (just a little FYI), rated him as one of the top five JUCO prospects in the country, and he could make a huge impact.

In a worse-case scenario, Ricks will see a good bit of playing time in 2007 if he can stay healthy ("good bit" means somewhere in the range of 300 snaps), and will more than likely get a starting job.

This is big news for us. Ricks' presence could, and should, have a very tangible impact on the overall quality of our defensive production in 2007.

2006 SEC Pass Defense

2007-07-24T19:05:00.000-05:00

After posting the analysis of the 2006 Alabama pass defense, I said a post on the 2006 overall SEC pass defense would be forthcoming. Thus...

LSU and Arkansas were two of the top pass defenses in the SEC in 2006. Interestingly enough, though, on the surface you might not expect that they were all that good. Combined, they gave up twice as many touchdowns as they created interceptions, and the Bayou Bengals and the Hogs finished tenth and eleventh in interception rate, respectively. But make no mistake about it, these two pass defenses were damn good. LSU and Arkansas finished first and second in completion percentage, and third and fourth in yards per completion, respectively.

LSU and Arkansas bring an opportunity to make a great point about effective pass defense. In reality, in terms of coverage of pass defense, all that really gets any real attention is touchdown passes and interceptions. That's what Stu Scott blows his load over on SportsCenter, and that is what is replayed a million times on YouTube. But that is far from what effective pass defense is about. As LSU and Arkansas made a great example of in 2006, effective pass defense is mostly about forcing a large number of incomplete passes, and limiting the yardage allowed when a pass is completed. Oh sure, limiting touchdowns and maximizing interceptions are things that you should certainly strive for, but in reality touchdowns and interceptions are a relative rarity, with a touchdown or an interception occurring on only about 8.5% of total pass attempts (8.47% of the time in 2006). Even the SEC leader in interception rate snagged interceptions on only a mere 5.53% of all passes thrown (South Carolina). At bottom, the truth of the matter is that the best pass defense is a pass falling harmlessly to the ground, or if a pass is caught by the offense, tackling the receiver immediately and limiting him to a relatively short gain. If you can consistently do that, almost regardless of what happens with touchdowns and interceptions, you are going to have a good pass defense. Again, LSU and Arkansas proved that point quite nicely with their 2006 performances. On the other hand, if you can't consistently force incomplete passes -- however you go about doing that -- and if you can't limit yardage in the event that there is a completion, you are in major trouble. Even if you snag more interceptions than any other team in the conference, interceptions are such a rarity in terms of overall passes that if you can't force incompletions and limit yardage on the other 95% of throws, you are not going to have a very good pass defense.

South Carolina exemplifies the last point. The Gamecocks in 2006 were great at intercepting the football, as they led the SEC in interception rate. They snagged eleven interceptions on 199 passing attempts, giving them a league-leading 5.53% interception rate. However, they finished seventh in the conference in completion percentage (58.29% of passes against them were completed), and finished tenth in the conference in yards allowed per completion, giving up roughly 13.5 yards per catch. And, of course, the South Carolina pass defense was pretty mediocre, all things considered. Again, it doesn't matter if you are great at intercepting the football, interceptions are such a rare occurrence that you will not be able to build a good pass defense off of just intercepting the football. You must be able to force incompletions and limit the amount of yardage gained when the ball is caught. South Carolina was not able to do that particularly well in 2006, despite their knack for interceptions, and as a result they did not field a particularly good pass defense.

Georgia, too, brings about an opportunity to showcase another point. The Dawgs had a very good pass defense in 2006, no two ways about it. Though they finished sixth in the conference in completion percentage, they were second in yards per completion, second in interception rate, and fourth in touchdown rate. At bottom, this was a good pass defense. But what is the point I'm getting at? The point is that the Dawgs had a very good pass defense, and that was due in large part to a great pass rush from the defensive ends. All told, Quentin Moses and Charles Johnson combined for 15.5 sacks in 2006, and are now playing in the NFL. The point is that good pass defense can come from either a good pass rush from the defensive line, and / or good pass coverage from the secondary. You often times see teams with relatively poor secondaries do quite well against the pass because the rush the passer so well with their front four, and likewise, you often times see relatively poor pass rushing teams do quite well because the secondary covers so well. Georgia proves that point quite nicely. Their secondary -- though stocked with solid players -- perhaps didn't have as good of secondary players as the numbers would suggest, but nevertheless they had a great pass defense because they got such a good, consistent pass rush from their defensive ends.

And that's going to be about it for the lessons, but moving on...

I said earlier that LSU and Arkansas were two of the best pass defenses in the conference, but I didn't say they were the best. Reason being: the Florida Gators. Though the Gators did allow opponents to complete a lot of passes (9th in the conference), they were exceptional in every other category. Granted, they did give up quite a few completions, they generally didn't give up very much yardage. They finished first in the conference in yards per completion, and did so by a very wide margin over second place Georgia. Moreover, despite the fact that teams threw more passes against the Gators than any other SEC team (290 attempts), they allowed the fewest touchdown passes in the SEC, thus leading the SEC in touchdown rate by an incredibly massive margin. Beyond that, the Gators had more than twice as many interceptions as touchdowns, thus leading the conference in interception-to-touchdown ratio, again by a massive margin. What can you say? These guys really had it together in 2006.

The Auburn pass defense was generally regarded as good, but it wasn't anything overly special, and it was a bit intriguing. They didn't give up very many completions (fourth in the conference in completion percentage), but when they did give up completions, they generally went for big yardage (eighth in the conference in yards per reception). Moreover, they didn't intercept the ball particularly well (ninth in the conference in interception rate). However, they did finish third in the conference in touchdown rate, which makes me wonder a bit. It wasn't a particularly great pass defense, so why did they finish so high in that category? A few reasons are possible. One, they may have not given up very many long passes; two, they may have tightened up considerably in the redzone, where teams could have opted more towards the run; or three, they may have just played that much better in the red zone with a smaller space to defend. Either way, it'd be nice to break things down even further to see exactly what was going on there.

Tennessee, as a whole, was pretty middle of the road. They did quite well in a couple of categories, finishing third in completion percentage and fourth in interception rate. But they also didn't do too well in a couple of categories, finishing seventh in yards per completion and ninth in interception rate.

The Ole Miss pass defense was probably a bit better than most gave it credit for being, at least in the eight conference games. They finished fifth in completion percentage, and fifth in yards per completion. They were the definition of average in touchdown rate, finishing sixth in the conference. The problem with the Rebels was interceptions. For whatever reason, Johnny Reb couldn't get an interception if their life depended on it. They racked up a mere three interceptions, and finished dead last in terms of interception rate, with its interception rate a puny 1.72%. Again, though, this was a better pass defense than most gave it credit for. The Rebs only went 2-6 in conference play, but they scared the living hell out of Auburn, Alabama, LSU, and Georgia, and came very close to knocking each member of that group off. Obviously, it wasn't the atrociously anemic offense that kept them in those games, and run defense alone can't do it. The Rebs pass defense, while not particularly good, was pretty decent.

And then we get to the really ugly pass defenses...

Kentucky finished tenth in the league in completion percentage, and as often as they gave up completed passes, those completions nevertheless went for huge yardage. These weren't dink and dunk throws that failed to rack up very much yardage. All told, UK finished dead last in the SEC in yards per completion, giving up 15.66 yards per catch. They were the only SEC team to give up more than 14 yards per reception. Though they intercepted the ball quite well (5th in the SEC in interception rate), they struggled in terms of touchdown rate, finishing 8th. At bottom, this pass defense was just terrible. All year long, teams consistently threw the ball at will with little trouble. How in the world Mike Archer, the defensive coordinator, was hired by NC State, I'll never know.

Mississippi State, too, was equally terrible. They finished eleventh in completion percentage, and eleventh in yards per reception. They did intercept the ball relatively well, sixth in the conference in interception rate, but did give up a lot of touchdown passes, as they finished eleventh in the conference in touchdown rate. At bottom, it was a terrible pass defense. Teams completed a high percentage of passes, and those completions went for a lot of yards. All year long, teams easily moved the ball through the air on the Bulldogs. About the only good game their pass defense had was, unfortunately, against Alabama. What can you say? They went 3-9 for a reason.

And last, and certainly worst, we have the Vanderbilt Commodores. The enlightened 'Dores might win in the game of life, but they didn't win on the field in 2006, and their horrendous pass defense was a large reason why. The 'Dores finished dead last in completion percentage, as teams completed almost 65 per cent of their passes against them. Vanderbilt was the only team to have a completion percentage above 60 per cent. They finished ninth in yards per completion, seventh in interception rate, and dead last yet again in touchdown rate. What can you say? They were just, well, Vanderbilt.

2006 Alabama Pass Defense

2007-07-23T20:58:00.000-05:00

Generally speaking, the 2006 Alabama pass defense received good reviews for their performance. They were generally considered the strength of the defense, and it is often pointed out that as a unit they finished fourth in the SEC in overall pass defense.

Overall pass defense, however, ranks teams based on the total number of passing yards allowed. And, as Football Outsiders pointed out, "Ranking pass defenses on total yardage allowed is phenomenally stupid. Poor teams will give up fewer passing yards because opponents will stop passing and run out the clock instead." Of course, the inverse of that is also true for good teams. And, without going too in-depth here, there are other pitfalls with ranking teams based on pure yardage allowed alone.

So, I decided to do an in-depth analysis of the 2006 Alabama pass defense. As usual, I looked at every SEC team in conference play (eight games), and saw how they all stacked up.

Long story short, for the Crimson Tide, it's not too pretty.

The best part of our 2006 pass defense was that we intercepted a relatively high number of passes. We snagged 10 interceptions in conference play in 2006, which tied us for 3rd in the conference in interceptions. Moreover, those interceptions weren't just a fluke due to opposing teams throwing a ton of passes against us (thus giving our defensive backs more chances at getting interceptions). We finished 3rd in the conference in interception rate (total interceptions divided by total pass attempts), as 5.21% of passes thrown against our defense resulted in interceptions.

But, honestly, we shouldn't read too much into those interceptions. Yes, we did intercept ten passes in 2006 conference play, but those interceptions were sporadic at best. Six of those interceptions came in the first two conference games, when we faced a redshirt freshman quarterback in his first SEC game (Chris Nickson, Vanderbilt) and a true freshman (Mitch Mustain, Arkansas). After that, though, things fell off dramatically. Over the course of the final six conference games, we racked up a mere four interceptions, and three of those came in the first half of the Tennessee game. Combined in the Florida, Ole Miss, Mississippi State, LSU, and Auburn games, and the second half of the Tennessee game, we intercepted one pass. In those 150+ passing attempts, the only interception was Jeffrey Dukes interception returned for a touchdown against Mississippi State.

At bottom, we really didn't force turnovers that well, as a whole, in 2006.

After that, though, it gets worse.

In terms of completion percentage, Alabama finished eighth in the conference in 2006, as opposing quarterbacks completed almost 59% of their passes against the Crimson Tide (specifically, 58.85% of passes). That's a very disappointing statistic, to say the very least. The entire Kines' defensive scheme -- in terms of defending the pass -- was built upon abandoning an aggressive pass rush in favor of dropping multiple defenders into zone coverage, thus forcing opposing quarterbacks to throw into heavy zone coverage. The underlying idea to it was that opponents would not be able to complete a high percentage of passes, and those that were completed would generally go for a relatively short gain. People often made a big deal about our lack of sacks (last in the conference in total sacks and adjusted sack rate), but that really would not have been a problem at all if we had successfully defended the pass with the heavy zone coverages.

Unfortunately, at least in 2006, that didn't work as planned. As noted earlier, teams did complete a high percentage of passes (almost 59%, eighth in the conference), and what was worse is the fact that when those passes were completed, they gave up relatively large chunks of yardage. All told, we gave up on average 12.44 yards per completion, which put us sixth in the conference in yardage allowed per completion.

Moreover, we gave up touchdown passes at an alarmingly high rate. All told, we allowed a touchdown pass on 5.73% of the passes attempted against us, and that put us tenth in the conference -- trailing only pass defense hapless Vanderbilt and Mississippi State -- in terms of touchdown rate (passing touchdowns divided by total passing attempts).

What can I say? Despite assertions to the contrary that the 2006 pass defense was quite good, that argument simply doesn't hold water once you analyze it. The truth of the matter was that the 2006 pass defense was, at absolute best, mediocre. The Kines defense was based on not rushing the passer, and dropping multiple defenders (usually between six and eight) into heavy zone coverages. As noted earlier, the idea was that opposing quarterbacks would have trouble completing passes against the heavy zone coverages, and when they did complete passes, those passes would generally go for small gains. But, again, it just didn't work that way. Opposing quarterbacks did complete a high percentages of their passes, and those passes, when completed, generally went for relatively large gains. Moreover, passing touchdowns came at an alarmingly high rate, and though from a raw numbers perspective we intercepted the ball quite a bit, the truth of the matter is that the interceptions were very sporadic at best, and after the Arkansas game we really just could not get it done on that front.

Despite what has been often repeated, the 2006 pass defense just wasn't that good.

Since I broke down the entire conference, I'll make a post tomorrow analyzing the rest of the SEC in 2006 pass defense.

Clarification: Play-Calling, Balance, and 2006 Red Zone Production

2007-07-22T23:53:00.000-05:00

I noticed in several comments regarding my most recent article on red zone production that some people have concluded from my analysis that play-calling was not a problem. At bottom, that's wrong.

We were "balanced," by most definitions of the term, offensively inside the red zone in 2006. However, never think that being statistically balanced in terms of a run-pass ratio means that play-calling is therefore, by extension, good.

You have to realize that effective play-calling and offensive balance are two very different, and often unrelated, concepts. Effective play-calling involves calling the correct plays based on what the opposing defense does, and whatever objective you are trying to accomplish at the time (whether it be scoring points, controlling the ball, or running out the clock). You can be balanced offensively and still have horrible play-calling.

For us in 2006, it means that when people say that play-calling wasn't bad based on my previous red zone analysis, they are wrong and mis-interpreting what the analysis really says.

What I did find in the analysis was that the "conservative" argument for our red zone struggles was not true. The argument goes something like this: The offense did fine until we got in the red zone, and for whatever reason, Shula and co. ran the ball entirely too much, opposing defenses knew what was coming, and they easily stopped it, hence our red zone troubles. And that is demonstrably false. The truth is, we were very balanced in the red zone, it's just that neither the run or the pass worked particularly well. And actually, believe it or not, we had more success running the football in the red zone than we did throwing the football. Running the football netted, on average, 1.98 yards per carry, while passing the football we only netted, on average, 1.56 yards per carry. Moreover, passing players much more often than running plays resulted in very bad plays, such as fumbles, turnovers, and large amounts of lost yardage.

But does that balance mean play-calling was good? Again, no. Play-calling, despite being balanced, may well have been terrible in 2006. In fact, given the overall incompetence of the Shula regime, I very much expect that it was terrible, but we can't prove that one way or the other with the data I have compiled at the moment.

Though we were balanced, I imagine that play-calling was indeed a major problem with the lack of production of our 2006 red zone offense.

Pythagorean Wins Revisited

2007-07-19T13:13:00.000-05:00

I was browsing Football Outsiders today and noticed that they posted a link to a Pro Football Reference article regarding Pythagorean Wins.

At bottom, the guys at Pro Football Reference wanted to know if capping blow out wins in the NFL would make the Pythagorean projection more accurate.

And what did they find?

They found that capping blowout wins in the NFL does not make the formula any more accurate in terms of determining how good teams truly are. However, they did note that capping blowout wins in college football would make the that formula more accurate in terms of determining how good teams truly are.

If you recall from making posts on Pythagorean Wins, I have been doing the same thing for months in regard to college football. I've been making the argument that games against the Sisters of the Poor (Western Carolina, etc.) should not be used in Pythagorean projections because the talent disparities between the teams are so great, and one team is effectively guaranteed a win. The bigger opponent can basically name the score on the Sister of the Poor in question, and that massive blowout win inflates that team's Pythagorean projection to make it look like they should have more games than they did.

At bottom, when you do it for the entire SEC, it essentially means that basically every SEC team underachieves in a year, i.e. they didn't win as many games as the formula says they should have.

The same analysis, as the guys at Pro Football Reference noted, does not work for the NFL because the teams are so similar. Even when the best NFL teams play the worst, for example the Raiders, the teams are still relatively closely matched. You never run into anywhere near the disparities that you do in college football when, for example, when USC plays Idado (as they do in the 2007 season opener). To get that same disparity in the NFL, you would have to have a team like the New England Patriots play someone, for example, from NFL Europa, and of course that never happens.

So what does it mean for Pythagorean wins for college teams?

It means, as I've been saying for months, you should not factor in the cupcake games, and focus much more on conference games.

Perhaps I should tweak my Pythagorean formula slightly more, say including all "big" games (conference opponents and legitimate out-of-conference opponents, including possibly bowl games), or perhaps I should count the games against the Sisters of the Poor, but somehow weight down that game to where it is not very important. Doing so, of course, has pitfalls of its own (namely, you are comparing apples and oranges because then teams are playing very different schedules, unlike when you compare only conference play when schedules are very similar, so strength of schedule would became a major factor that would have to be evaluated), but perhaps it would make the formula more accurate.

Maybe that should be a research topic for another day.

Wilson Turnovers: How Costly Were They?

2007-07-18T21:37:00.000-05:00

John Parker Wilson pleasantly surprised nearly everyone in 2006, and his play was generally lauded by nearly everyone. Despite being the pleasant surprise, however, Wilson did turn the ball over quite a bit in 2006, throwing eight interceptions in the eight conference games, with four fumbles lost. And, it takes no in-depth analysis to figure out that turnovers are deadly to your team's chances of winning.

But, of course, all turnovers are not created equal.

Despite early football research (The Hidden Game of Football, by Pete Palmer and Bob Carroll) indicating that the value of a turnover had a fixed points value, regardless of where it occurred on the field, later research showed that the value of a turnover increases when you get closer to the end zones, and decreases when you get closer to mid-field. It doesn't matter if you turn it over near your own goal line, or near your opponent's goal line, because it is costing you points either way; where you turn it over in that sense only influences whether you will lose points based off of you scoring less, or your opponent scoring more. All told, the value of a turnover, based on research from Football Outsiders, varies from 3.8 points to 4.25 points, depending on the field position of where the turnover occurs.

A variety of other factors can also greatly affect the value of a turnover, including the time remaining in the game when it occurred, who was leading and by how much, and how far the turnover was returned by the defense, just to name a few.

So, exactly how costly were the eight Wilson interceptions and four fumbles in conference play in 2006? Let's look at each interception and fumble, one-by-one, to get a better look.

For the interceptions...

Wilson was intercepted once in the Vanderbilt game. It occurred in the second quarter, on a first and ten, and we had the ball at our own 34. Vanderbilt, after a zero yard return, took over at their own 47 yard line.
In a 0-0 game in the first quarter against Florida, we were in Florida territory at the 34, facing a 3rd and 8. Wilson's pass was intercepted by Ryan Smith, who returned it 29 yards to the Alabama 47.
Trailing Florida 14-13 with 8:30 to go in the fourth quarter, Wilson was intercepted by Ryan Smith on 2nd and 10. The interception gave Florida the ball at the Alabama 34, and set up a touchdown that put the Gators up 21-13.
Trailing Florida 21-13 with 4:30 to go, we had the ball, 2nd and 10, at the Florida 46, driving in an attempt to score a game-tying touchdown and two-point conversion. Wilson was intercepted after his pass sailed high over the head of Keith Brown into the arms of Reggie Nelson, who raced 70 yards for a Florida touchdown, putting the Gators up 28-13, and effectively ending the game.
Trailing Mississippi State 17-10 with three minutes to go in the second quarter, we had the ball 2nd and 8 at the Alabama 47, and Wilson was intercepted by Quentin Culbertson, who returned the interception for a touchdown, giving MSU a 24-10 lead.
Trailing LSU 28-14 with 3:15 to go in the third quarter, we had the ball 3rd and 12 from LSU 23, desperately needing a conversion to bring the game within one possession. Wilson fired down the field and was intercepted by Chevis Jackson.
Trailing Auburn 22-15 with less than a minute to go, we had the ball 2nd and 7 at our own 44. Wilson looked to his right and threw the ball, where it was intercepted at the Auburn 38 by David Irons, which ended the Iron Bowl and ultimately the Mike Shula era.

Now for the fumbles:

Tied 10-10 with Arkansas in the third quarter, we had the ball 3rd and 13 at the Arkansas 48. Arkansas made the perfect blitz / coverage call, and Wilson was doomed from the start. Instead of taking the sack, Wilson tried to stay in the pocket and make a player, where he was hit. The ensuing fumble was scooped up by Randy Kelly and returned 39 yard for an Arkansas touchdown; Arkansas 17, Alabama 10.
Trailing LSU 21-14 in the closing seconds of the first half, we had the ball 1st and goal at the LSU 8. We were looking for a touchdown to go into halftime tied, or at least a field goal. On first down, however, Wilson was sacked by Daniel Francis and fumbled. LSU recovered, and ran out the clock on the first half.
Leading Auburn 3-0 with the ball 3rd and 6 at our own 25, Wilson was sacked by Quentin Groves. A fumble ensued, which Auburn recovered, and that led directly to an Auburn touchdown, 7-3 Auburn lead.
Trailing Auburn 7-3, two Alabama offensive plays after the previous sack and fumble, Wilson was sacked on a 2nd and 16 from the Alabama 14 by Quentin Groves. Another fumble ensued, Auburn again recovered, and that led directly to another Auburn touchdown, 14-3 Auburn lead.

So what are we to take from Wilson's turnovers in 2006? I'd say three things.

One, Wilson did turn the ball over entirely too much in 2006. All told, he had eleven turnovers in eight conference games, and that is simply entire too many. By comparison, in 2005, Brodie Croyle had only two turnovers in eight conference games, and both of those came in the Mississippi State game. Granted, Croyle's turnovers in 2005 are very much at the lower end of the turnover spectrum, but nevertheless they do highlight the value that can be found in limiting turnovers. The 2005 offense was terrible, no two ways about it, but Croyle did protect the football and thus didn't give away points in that sense. Wilson couldn't replicate Croyle in 2006, and that was a large reason 10-2 crashed into 6-7.

Two, Wilson's turnovers, when they did occur, were extremely costly to the team. Ten of Wilson's eleven turnovers came when we were either tied in a game or trailing in a game, and that is nothing short of brutal. Turnovers are killers regardless of when they occur, but if you turn the ball over when you are tied or behind, it can really just end your chances of winning, which it did with us on many occasions in 2006. Moreover, the majority of Wilson's turnovers either occurred outside of the area between the thirties, and three led directly to touchdowns for the opposing defense. And, Wilson's interceptions were generally returned for a lot of yards, with opponents averaging around 20 yards per return. There are no two ways about it, though turnovers are generally costly, the majority of turnovers committed by Wilson were extraordinarily costly to the Tide.

Three, it is up for Wilson to improve. Many blamed the fumbles on the offensive line -- particularly in the Iron Bowl in the case of Chris Capps -- but at the end of the day, the ultimate responsibility falls upon Wilson to protect the football. It does not matter if all five offensive lineman decide to scratch their privates instead of block the defensive linemen, it is still up to Wilson to protect the football. He should see the situation, and secure the football. If he has to take a sack, then so be it. Not doing so is a failure upon Wilson's part, not the offensive line, and it is a particularly damning failure when the oncoming defender -- as was the case with Quentin Groves in the Iron Bowl -- is well within Wilson's line of sight.

I do not believe that we should be overly critical of Wilson, mind you. He did have a solid season in 2006, and did quite well. And he was a sophomore, a first-year starter, and it is essentially a given with quarterbacks of that nature that they will commit several costly mistakes early on their careers, and Wilson was no different. The point of it all is that -- and the analysis says essentially this -- Wilson hurt his team quite badly in 2006 with turnovers, and that he must improve that in the 2007 season if we are to have the success that we all want, whether it be as an offense or as a team.

Beyond completions, attempts, and touchdowns, perhaps the thing most should keep their eye on this season with regard to John Parker Wilson is turnovers.

High Expectations

2007-07-18T15:19:00.000-05:00

As an Alabama fan, you hear it every day. You know, yet another old refrain, "Alabama has too high of expectations." Some people go extreme with that assumption, some even saying we'll fire Saban if he loses a few games or doesn't bring us a national championship in a couple of years. At bottom, it's a corollary of a Bryant criticism, that we somehow expect our coach, whomever he may be, to do as well as Bryant, and if he doesn't he's going to be promptly fired.

But is there any underlying validity to all of those "high expectations" statements, or is just a tired, baseless, and overused assertion for those who want to criticize Alabama?

Well, there is only one way to find out. Let's look at past Alabama coaches since Bryant retired in 1982.

Ray Perkins, of course, succeeded Bryant in 1983. Despite leading Alabama to its first losing season in almost 30 years, Perkins returned and had good seasons in 1985 and 1986. The Alabama fan base was generally pleased with him, and he was not on the hot seat. Perkins left Alabama of his own volition, when he was wooed back to the NFL by Alabama business school graduate and financier Hugh Culverhouse, who was the owner of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. Had Perkins not left on his own, he would have easily held on to the Alabama job for the foreseeable future.

Bill Curry was chosen to replace Perkins, and despite a less-than-solid track record at Georgia Tech, Curry did well at Alabama. He went 26-10 in three seasons, won the SEC in 1989, and was 6-0 against Tennessee and Penn State. Some people -- either out of ignorance or in a lame attempt to re-write history -- like to claim that we ran Curry off after his third consecutive loss to Auburn in 1989, and that is factually wrong. Granted, no one was happy with Curry's 0-3 record against in-state rival Auburn, nor the fact that they ended our undefeated season in 1989 -- and seriously, what half-way decent fan base would be happy with that? -- but the fact remains that Curry was not ran off by Alabama. He was not fired in the month following the loss to Auburn, and actually led the Tide in a close loss to eventual national champion Miami in the Sugar Bowl. Curry was slated to return to be the Tide coach in 1990, but he left for Kentucky over a contract dispute. At the end of the 1989 season, we offered Curry a new contract that contained clauses that he was not happy with (specifically, no raise and removal of his power to hire and fire assistants), and thus he bolted to Kentucky. Bill Curry himself even admitted as much in the book "The Uncivil War: Alabama v. Auburn 1981-1994." You can read for yourself by purchasing the book and reading chapter eight. At bottom, Curry was not "ran off" or fired from Alabama because he didn't meet our supposedly "high expectations." In reality, Curry left of his own volition, when he could have came back to Alabama in 1990, because of a contract dispute with the university.

Gene Stallings was hired after Curry left for Kentucky, and he was wildly successful. In 1996, though, Stallings chose to retire. Some claim that Stallings was ran off, and his "retirement" was just putting a nice face on the situation. That, too, much like the Curry claims, is incorrect. Stallings left of his own accord due to disputes with university president Andrew Sorensen and athletic director Bob Bockrath. Stallings felt that Sorensen and Bockrath were micro-managing the football program -- and of course the passage of time proved Stallings right in the years that followed -- and Stallings felt with excessive administration meddling in his football program, it would simply make for an untenable situation. Stallings was very much in the Bryant mold -- who contractually demanded that he would report to a laissez faire university president and no one else -- and allowing active and excessive meddling in his program by administrators was simply unconscionable to a man like Stallings. As a result, he left of his own accord. Certainly, there were some disgruntled rumblings about Stallings -- watching his much-superior teams squad about wins by a handful of points due to poor offenses was a very frustrating thing to watch, as you would expect -- but the overwhelming majority of the Alabama fan base knew the magnitude of what all Stallings accomplished in his seven years (a national championship and 70 wins), and the fan base was greatly saddened when he announced after the 1996 Iron Bowl that he would be retiring following the bowl game. "High expectations" didn't get Stallings; far from it, in fact.

Dubose came next, and he got more leniency than you could imagine. After a disastrous 4-7 season in 1997, he had a mediocre year in 1998 (close wins in a couple of games we should have lost, namely LSU) before getting annihilated by Virginia Tech in the Music City Bowl. 1999 saw lightning in a bottle, and 2000 was a disaster. And oh yeah, remember the secretary affair scandal, and the losses to Louisiana Tech, Kentucky, and Central Florida? But Dubose, as terrible as he was, did not get fired. Actually, he submitted his resignation to Mal Moore after the third game of the 2000 season (the 21-0 debacle against Southern Miss), and Mal refused to take it at the time, but that was the end of his tenure. Granted, any decent school would have fired him, but the point remains he was never fired because it never came to that. Dubose saw how the job overwhelmed him, and he resigned.

Fran came next, and of course Fran left of his own volition for Texas A&M.

Then it was Shula, who stayed at Alabama for four seasons. In those four years, Shula had one winning season, a combined 1-12 record against Tennessee, Auburn, LSU, and Georgia, and never finished higher than third in the SEC West. In three of his four seasons, his teams finished forth or worse in the SEC West. Shula was fired by athletic director Mal Moore approximately nine days after the 2006 Iron Bowl loss. In four seasons, his record was just barely .500.

So... that is it? All of these supposed "high expectations" have resulted in one coach fired? Basically, that is what that entire argument -- often repeated as it is -- reduces down to once you actually analyze it.

But what about the firing of Shula? Was that "high expectations," or have other schools done essentially the same thing in similar situations?

Let's look at that, too.

Once you delve into recent SEC football history, you see that many SEC schools have fired coaches within the past decade despite those coaches having won considerably more than what Shula won at Alabama. Let's go through some examples.

Auburn fired Terry Bowden mid-way through the 1998 season, Bowden's sixth on the Plains, after a 1-5 start. In his first five seasons at Auburn, Bowden went 45-12-1, and won 18 consecutive games to start his tenure. In 1997, the year before he was fired, Bowden's Tigers went 10-3 -- including wins over Alabama, Georgia, and LSU -- won the SEC West, came within one point (30-29) of beating Peyton Manning-led Tennessee in the SEC Championship Game, and wrapped up the season with a win in the Peach Bowl over Clemson. Moreover, Bowden led Auburn to -- at the point -- only its second undefeated season, and had a winning record over their two major rivals: Alabama and Georgia.

Georgia fired Jim Donnan at the end of the 2000 season. After inheriting Ray Goff's disaster, Donnan went 5-6 in his first year in Athens. The next four seasons, however, were much more successful, to say the least. From 1997-2000, the year he was fired, Donnan went 35-13, never having fewer than eight wins in a season, and he also racked up four bowl wins in those four years. Donnan was fired in 2000 following back-to-back 8-4 seasons.

LSU fired Gerry Dinardo in 1999 after back-to-back losing seasons. Dinardo took over the Archer / Hallman disaster that saw six consecutive losing seasons at LSU, and did quite well in his first three years. During that span, Dinardo went 26-9-1 and won three consecutive bowl games, quite a feat considering that LSU had only won three bowl games in the twenty-five years prior to Dinardo's arrival. And, his three bowl victories in three seasons is the only time that has ever happened in the history of LSU football. Nevertheless, he was fired.

Florida fired Ron Zook in 2004 after three consecutive winning seasons. All told, in his three seasons, he went 23-15, and made three bowl appearances. Even so, after a 4-3 start to the 2004 season, Zook was fired.

So, as you see, Alabama really didn't do anything out of ordinary when we fired Shula. All told, Shula had a sub-par record in his four years at Alabama, and many other SEC schools the past few years have fired coached who have won considerably more than Shula did. But did we hear about how Auburn, Georgia, LSU, and Florida have supposedly ill-fated "high expectations"? Of course not. So why do you constantly hear that with Alabama? Dear Mr. Casual Reader, meet Mr. Double Standard.

Moreover, I should make another point. When Auburn, Georgia, LSU, and Florida fired their coaches, their successors all did much better, and that group of replacement hires is comprised of Tommy Tuberville, Mark Richt, Nick Saban, and Urban Meyer. No coach not in that group has won the SEC since Steve Spurrier did it in 2000. Obviously, having high expectations is nowhere near the disaster-guaranteed attribute that most "experts" and fans believe it to be.

Putting it all together, it seems that the argument of "high expectations" has no validity whatsoever. Though it may be repeated ad nauseum, it is nevertheless wholly untrue. Just because people swore for centuries that the world was flat did make it flat, and the same reasoning structure applies here. Certainly you must win and win big in order to remain the head coach at Alabama, but with the massive amount of resources poured into college football these days, that is true at any top Division 1-A program. The old Bryant saying, "Be good or be gone" certainly applies big-time modern day college football. However, there is not even one tiny scintilla of evidence that would even remotely suggest that we have unduly high expectations that are far out of line of what is expected with other top programs.

At bottom, as is the same with the "Bear Is Dead" argument, the whole "high expectations" argument is patently absurd, and really only reflects upon the idiocy of whomever is making the argument.

Defense: Starting Eleven

2007-07-17T23:58:00.000-05:00

The Crimson Tide defense, after losing several starters from a year ago, is a bit unsettled going into 2007 as to whom the starters will be. Moreover, that is all compounded by the fact that there is a new regime in town, with a completely different defensive philosophy.

So exactly which players seem to comprise the starting eleven for the upcoming season?

It's hard to tell, to say the least. However, Spring practice and the A-Day game does give us a very good indicator of who is seemingly starting this Fall. Judging by that, the starting eleven seems to be:

DE: Wallace Gilberry
DT: Bryan Motley
DE: Bobby Greenwood

OLB: Zeke Knight
ILB: Darren Mustin
ILB: Prince Hall
Jack: Keith Saunders

CB: Simeon Castille
S: Marcus Carter
S: Rashad Johnson
CB: Kareem Jackson

That was the first-string defense at the A-Day game, and being quite honest, there's no reason to expect that won't be the first-string defense this Fall, barring a couple of possible exceptions.

Going deeper, expounding upon the rough outline of the likely starting eleven:

Wallace Gilberry is a fifth-year senior, and this will be his third year as a starter. He has started twenty-four consecutive games for the Crimson Tide, and he is one of the better players we have on the defensive of the ball. He was a great pass rusher in 2004, but foundered the past couple of years with Kines going to a more conservative pass rushing scheme. Hopefully we'll see the pass rusher we saw as a freshman. He's solid against the run, and he'll be a key cog. As long as Gilberry can stay remotely healthy, he'll be a starter, no question about it.

Bryan Motley is likely to anchor the center of the line. He has some talent but he's also young (redshirt freshman), still needs to put on some weight, and has no Division 1-A experience at nose tackle. It is not that anyone should expect that Motley will set the world on fire, but at the moment no one is going to beat him out. Probably the only incoming freshman who could have done so is Kerry Murphy, and he is not going to qualify academically, it seems. As for the other nose tackles, Motley quickly shot past all of them when he was moved to nose tackle this Spring.

Bobby Greenwood had a good Spring, and started at defensive end opposite Gilberry in the Tide's three scrimmages. All told, he's one of the most talented guys we have on the defensive side of the ball. He was a huge signee coming out of Prattville, as the 6-A lineman of the year with over 100 tackles and 19 sacks in his senior season, and he had a great year as a true freshman in 2005. Just being honest, Greenwood is a rising third-year player with good size, good talent, and lots of potential. Despite a frustrating 2006 season in which he butted heads with his position coach, his tangibles alone means he will start if he stays healthy.

Zeke Knight is, apparently, going to start at outside linebacker. Though he did get some reps at the Jack position this Spring behind Keith Saunders, he played a good bit during the A-Day game as the first-string outside linebacker and had a great showing (three tackles and a quarterback pressure). Much like with Greenwood, Knight is an extremely talented player. He has great size and is incredibly athletic; he was yet another huge recruit coming out of high school, and he is now finally at the position that fits his physical skill set best: linebacker. Much like Greenwood, Knight simply has so much size, speed, athleticism, and overall talent that it will be very hard for anyone to beat him out, assuming he can stay healthy. Moreover, his athleticism will allow Saban to use him as a weapon in a variety of zone blitz packages, which is a major part of Saban's defense.

Darren Mustin, at the moment, is the first-team inside linebacker alongside Prince Hall. Mustin is a 23-year old player, a senior who transferred from Middle Tennessee State. He's pretty big, and that fits pretty well for an inside linebacker in the 3-4. The question with Mustin will be how long he can hold off super recruit Rolando McClain, but until McClain overtakes him, Mustin is the presumed starter.

Prince Hall will be, arguably, the key to the defense, and there's no question of him starting. As long as he's healthy, he will start.

Keith Saunders is without a doubt the front runner for the Jack position, the hybrid end / linebacker in the 3-4. Much like Hall and Gilberry, given his outstanding Spring performance, if he's healthy, he will start.

Simeon Castille will be the team's number one cornerback. He's physically gifted, has a ton of experience, and his natural aggressive style makes him a perfect fit for Saban's aggressive cover schemes. Just like Gilberry, Hall, and Saunders, as long as Castille is healthy, he will be starting.

Kareem Jackson, oddly enough, seems to be the favorite to start opposite of Simeon Castille. Saban and company raved all through Spring practice about Jackson's standout play, and any time someone as critical as Saban is handing out praise, people should take notice. Jackson spent last year in military school, and he seemingly has a very big upside. While more experienced players such as Eric Gray, Marquis Johnson or another player was expected to step up and nab the starting corner job opposite Simeon, Jackson seems to be the front runner. He played with the first-string during the A-Day game, and he is seemingly set to solidify his hold on the starting job. Apparently Saban is very big on him, which only increases his chances of starting.

Rashad Johnson, the former walk-on, surprised everyone last year when he beat out Marcus Carter for most of the year. Honestly, Carter was only able to regain his starting job when Johnson went down with a severe ankle sprain. This Spring, Johnson did well again, seemingly getting a good hold on a starting job this Fall. He's a very athletic guy, and he has a good bit of experience (he played 406 snaps last year, despite missing two games due to the ankle injury, and 196 snaps as a freshman), so he is probably going to hold on to that job.

Marcus Carter, at the moment, is likely to be the starter opposite Johnson. That said, though, he didn't have a very good year in 2006 (go back and watch Keiland Williams' touchdown run in the first quarter of the LSU game for verification), and at the moment it seems that he is only in line for the starting job because of a lack of proven depth behind him. Moreover, Carter tends to play timid and reserved, neither of which are qualities that Saban looks for in a defensive back. And, despite playing with the first-string in the A-Day game, Carter did give up a long touchdown pass to Nikita Stover when he bit entirely too much on the playaction fake. Much like with Darren Mustin, the thing to keep your eye on will be how long Carter can hold off Justin Woodall, and -- if he qualifies -- Michael Ricks. Both of those guys are seemingly more talented, and have more upside, but until they can take over, Carter is the presumed starter.

As for now, that seems to be the likely starters on the defensive side of the ball in 2007.

Tight End Production, Or Lack Thereof

2007-07-17T11:05:00.001-05:00

Many fans are excited about the usage of the tight end in the new Saban / Applewhite / Pendry offensive scheme. Many are even expecting that the tight end will be quite productive in this year's scheme.

A dose of reality could be helpful.

In 2006, we didn't throw the ball very often to the tight end, and rightfully so. In the eight conference games, we threw the ball to the tight end fourteen times, and it only resulted in a completed pass about one-third of the time (five receptions).

Generally speaking, the few catches that the tight ends racked up in 2007 generally came when they were ignored by the defense. For example, Nick Walker's touchdown catch in overtime against Arkansas was a fluke thing that wouldn't normally occur. In that situation, all eleven Arkansas defenders engaged the run, and no one ever thought twice about covering Walker, who waltzed into the back of the end zone wide open. Of course, that was a great play call in that situation, but it's not useful for future performance because if the tight end became more involved in the offense, the opposing defense would have covered him.

At bottom, the tight ends simply were terrible in 2006, and there is no way to sugarcoat the situation otherwise. Despite the fact that we sent tight ends into passing routes with a relatively high degree of regularity (contrary to popular belief, we did try to utilize the tight end in the passing game, and he was not just a blocker; if you don't believe me, ask Chris Capps), it just didn't work. The tight ends didn't get off the line well, ran poor routes, thus struggling to get open, and then struggled to actually catch the ball once it was thrown in their direction.

The performance of the tight ends in the passing game in 2006 can be summed up quite nicely in one play: We are playing Florida, in the Swamp, in a very close game. It is in the fourth quarter, Florida leads 14-10, and we are driving deep into Florida territory. It is 3rd and 5 from the Florida 4-yard line, and we desperately need a touchdown, or at the very least a first down. Nick Walker comes into the game at tight end, and Shula and co., knowing that the Florida safeties will be playing the outside to shut down the dangerous receivers D.J. Hall and Keith Brown, will likely leave the deep middle of the field open, call for Walker to run a post route. Unfortunately, though we have exactly the match-up we are looking for, Walker lazily gets onto the second level, and then runs a very poor route (rounds it off instead of running a good, clean route with a sharp cut towards the middle of the field). The end result is that the pass is almost intercepted by the Florida defender, and the pass falls harmlessly to the ground, incomplete. We settle for a field goal, and never get close to the end zone again.

Ideally, with the match-up that we wanted, Walker would have charged strong out of his stance and quickly moved onto the second level. After running very hard in a straight line, once he reached the depth of about seven or eight yards, he would immediately and unexpectedly make a very sharp and crisp 45 degree cut towards the middle of the field, and in doing so he would separate himself from the defender covering him. As a result, he would be open, and with a good throw from Wilson, we score the touchdown, and take a 17-14 lead over Florida with twelve minutes to go, and it's an entirely different ball game. Of course, though, it did not go as ideally planned, just about like everything else with the 2006 season.

The tight end play will, hopefully, be a good bit improved, but no one should be kidding themselves. The performance of our tight ends last year was terrible, and from a player development perspective, they probably have as far to go as any other unit on the entire team. Rome wasn't built in a day is the common expression these days, and that applies to tight ends as well. No one should be expecting miracles, just hoping for solid, steady improvement.

2006 Pythagorean Wins

2007-07-16T17:21:00.000-05:00

I've posted previously about Pythagorean Wins in this forum, so perhaps it should be a bit familiar. As a refresher, Pythagorean Wins is a statistical measure of how many wins a team "should" have in a given year based on how many points the team scored and how many points they allowed. The concept was first used in professional baseball, but has since been successfully applied to other sports, and I've applied it to college football as well.

At bottom, the underlying point of Pythagorean Wins in regard to predicting future performance is that teams that overachieve -- i.e. win more games than their Pythagorean projections says they should have -- tend to decline the following year, and teams that underachieve -- i.e. win fewer games than their Pythagorean projections said they should have -- tend to improve the following year. After analyzing SEC football from 1999-2006, it becomes very obvious that Pythagorean Wins is a highly useful indicator of future performance.

Among the major declines that Pythagorean wins predicted included 2000 Alabama, 2004 Ole Miss, 2004 Florida, and 2005 Tennessee. Among the major improvements predicted by Pythagorean wins included 2001 Alabama, 2005 Alabama, 2005 Florida, 2006 Arkansas, and 2006 Tennessee.

Generally speaking, the magic number seems to be one. You come up with a Pythagorean projection based on the eight regular season conference games, and the teams that win a game or more above their Pythagorean projection tend to decline the following year, and teams that win a game or fewer above their Pythagorean projection tend to improve the following year.

Here are the Pythagorean projections for the 2006 season:

Obviously, we had three overachievers -- Florida, Kentucky, and Auburn -- and two underachievers -- South Carolina and Vanderbilt -- in 2006.

The Gators, despite having a projection of only 5.5 conference wins, went 7-1 in conference play, won the SEC, and ultimately became national champions. Auburn was the second most overachieving team, and it shouldn't come as much of a surprise. The Tigers beat LSU on a controversial call, stood up South Carolina on the goal line, beat Florida in a narrow game, needed an interception returned for a touchdown to beat Ole Miss, and had another narrow win over Alabama, despite being annihilated by Georgia and Arkansas. Kentucky, too, becomes suspect with a few close wins mixed in with a few lopsided blowouts.

The underachievers, as largely expected, include South Carolina and Vanderbilt. Both teams played solid football all year, but generally ran out of luck in close contests.

You never know for certain, and there will be some exceptions, but if you are looking for teams to mildly improve in 2006, Vanderbilt and South Carolina would be safe beats, and no one should be surprised if Florida, Auburn, and Kentucky suffer a bit of a decline.

A few more general notes on Pythagorean wins:

Generally speaking, the underlying rule regarding Pythagorean wins holds true in SEC football. There does seem to be a couple of exceptions, however. The first exception is second year coaches. Even when a team overachieves with a first year coach, they often times nevertheless improve in their second season. It's not a guaranteed thing, but apparently the gains made by continuity and that particular coach's players in place help offset what the Pythagorean projection says you should do. The second exception is with the sisters of the poor of the SEC, mainly Kentucky, Vanderbilt, and Mississippi State. For whatever reason, those teams tend to be able to underachieve one year, and consistently do as bad or worse the following year. I'm not sure why that happens, but it is something that keeps popping up.

If you factor out the last-second fluke touchdown that Auburn scored on Florida (in which had no influence on the outcome of the game), the Pythagorean projections flip a bit, as suddenly Auburn was the most overachieving team and Florida was the second most overachieving team. Some people take out meaningless, fluke points like that because they skew the data, and that wouldn't be a bad idea in this case. But, technically if I did it for that game, I'd have to do it for every other, too, so I decided against that for the sake of simplicity.

"Bear Bryant Is Dead"

2007-07-16T02:22:00.000-05:00

As an Alabama fan, you usually hear the old refrain, "Bear Bryant is dead." The gist is that well, Bear Bryant is dead, and with him gone Alabama football is nothing special. Moreover, it also implies that we fell apart after Bryant, with us doing very little since he left, and none of the foregoing has any validity.

Let us go deeper and re-visit the past 25 years.

The departure of Bryant could not have had worse timing, and could not have been more surprising. In 1978 and 1979, we were national champions. 1980 brought another incredible year that had us contending for a national championship, and though 1981 was a bit of a down year -- as expected -- we still won 9 games, and Bryant won 315. Then came 1982. Many thought Bryant would win his seventh national championship, and early on that seemed valid. We started out 4-0, and then highly-ranked Penn State and Joe Paterno came to Legion Field. As great as that team was, they were no match for the man under the houndstooth hat. The Tide dominated Penn State day, and won by three touchdowns. After the Nittany Lion massacre, we were 5-0, #1 in both polls, and on track for yet another national championship.

And then it all fell apart. Bryant's health suddenly failed, and he struggled just to get through his day-to-day coaching activities. It showed on the field. The season crashed and burned with losses to Tennessee, LSU, Auburn, and Southern Miss. Penn State, the team that was annihilated by Alabama, went on to beat Hershel Walker and Georgia in the Sugar Bowl, and finished as national champions. Less than a month after the season ended, Bryant was dead.

Again, it couldn't have been worse timing, and it could not have been more surprising. Most were expecting another national championship, and the end result was not even imaginable.

Despite the difficult situation, however, we did quite well in the years following Bryant's death.

Ray Perkins was hired to replace Bryant (though he was not Bryant's choice), and in 1983 we went 8-4 and won the Sun Bowl. 1984 was a major disappointment, largely due to injuries (Kerry Goode), as we went 5-6, our first losing season in almost thirty years. Still, even in that year, we racked up wins over Penn State and Auburn. 1985 was a good year, with the Tide going 9-2-1 and winning arguably the best Iron Bowl ever. The season ended with a blowout win over USC in the Sun Bowl. 1986 was another good year, with the Tide winning 10 games and blowing out Washington in the Sun Bowl.

1987 saw the arrival of the Bill Curry, and it was a bit of a disappointing year. We went only 7-5 -- despite wins over Penn State, Tennessee, and LSU -- and lost a close game to Michigan in the Hall of Fame Bowl. 1988 was an improvement, going 9-3, with wins over Tennessee, Penn State, Texas A&M, and Army in the Sun Bowl. 1989 was the breakout year, as we went 10-0 before losing to Auburn in the Iron Bowl. Still, we finished 10-1, won the SEC, and lost by eight points in a close game to national champion Miami in the Sugar Bowl.

1990 marked the arrival of Gene Stallings, and despite terrible injury luck (Siran Stacey tore his ACL on the first play from scrimmage in the season opener), we still went 7-5 with wins over Tennessee, LSU, and Auburn, and an appearance (albeit a very disappointing one) in the Fiesta Bowl. 1991 saw the Tide go 11-1, win the Blockbuster Bowl, and finish in the final top five. In 1992, of course, we went undefeated and won a national championship. 1993 saw nine more wins, and a bowl win in the Gator Bowl over North Carolina. 1994 ended with a 12-1 record, the sole loss coming by one point to Florida in the SEC Championship Game, and a win over Ohio State in the Citrus Bowl. 1995 saw nine wins, and 1996 ended with another ten-win season, and a bowl win over Michigan in the Outback Bowl.

At bottom, the fourteen year stretch from 1983-1996 was pretty successful for Alabama, even considering our lofty accomplishments. In those 14 years, we had 13 winning seasons with 12 bowl appearances (would have been 13, but in 1995 we were banned from bowl play) and those 12 bowl appearances netted 9 bowl wins. Moreover, we racked up two SEC championships and one national championship, and won over 75% of our games in that 14-year stretch. We had six seasons of 10+ wins, and nine seasons of 9+ wins, and we averaged over nine wins per year. Moreover, in that stretch, we had a 7-7 record against Auburn (in arguably the greatest stretch in the history of Auburn football), a 4-2 record against Georgia, a 9-4-1 record against LSU, and an 8-5-1 record against Tennessee.

Even with Bryant gone, we did very well in the fourteen years following his departure.

It wasn't until 1997, with the hiring of Mike Dubose, that we began to struggle. Unfortunately, the Dubose hiring and the NCAA sanctions doomed us to a poor decade -- well, poor for us, anyway -- from 1997-2006, but all of that had absolutely nothing to do with Bryant. Saying that the Bryant departure was any way related to the struggles from 1997-2006 is about like saying that the Herbert Hoover presidency was related to World War II. There's just no legitimate causal link between the two occurrences.

The truth of the matter is that since the early 1920's, we have been the example of consistent high-quality performance on the football field. Hell, we had three national championships before Bryant even arrived at Alabama as a player, and we continued to do very well in the 20 years after Bryant left. Only the three years of Ears Whitworth saw the Crimson Tide struggle greatly. But after that, Bryant returned, which led 25 years of sheer and utter dominance, and even after he left we had another 14-year stretch of very good football. It's just we've had a rough-for-us ten year stretch from 1997-2006, and nothing more.

At bottom, the whole "Bear Bryant is dead" argument is patently absurd, and really only reflects upon the idiocy of whomever is making the argument.

D.J. Hall: Record Breaker

2007-07-15T15:27:00.000-05:00

Anyone who knows anything about football can tell you that D.J. Hall is a great receiver. In 2006, he broke just about every Alabama single season receiving record, and if he stays even remotely healthy in 2007, he'll own essentially every receiving record in Alabama football history.

All of the mainstream statistics for the receiver position, however, are all cumulative, and thus can be inflated by increased opportunities. In short, a receiver can put up big numbers and still not have a particularly good year, with the reason for the big numbers being so many passes were thrown his way. Considering John Parker Wilson set the Alabama record for single season passing attempts in 2007 with 393 attempts, I wondered if that could have possibly been the real underlying reason to Hall's successes in 2007.

So, I applied the usual analysis, I broke down every pass thrown to Hall this season in the eight conference games.

Long story short, the pass attempts didn't inflate Hall's numbers, he was just that good.

All told, in the eight conference games, 78 passes were thrown to D.J. Hall. Of those 78 passes, Hall caught 47 of them, which gives him a catch rate (percentage of passes thrown to a particular receiver that were actually caught by that receiver) of 60.26%, which is a very high number, especially considering the quality of competition faced in SEC play. Hall went up against opposing team's best cornerback, and often times faced double coverage, but yet he still had a Catch Rate of over 60%, a truly impressive number. To give the number some context, generally speaking, the best NFL receivers have a Catch Rate in the sixty-percent range.

And these weren't short throws, either. It wasn't as if Hall was continuously running five yard curl routes, racking up easy receptions. Hall averaged just under 17 yards per catch on those 47 receptions, so his receptions were generally downfield, more difficult, catches.

Hall's catch rate is even more impressive when you put it context with what surrounded him. The quarterback throwing him the ball, John Parker Wilson, was a first year starter, and Wilson was constantly under pressure due to a poor pass blocking offensive line. Moreover, teams keyed on the pass all year long due the complete ineffectiveness of our rushing attack. Beyond that, Hall largely lacked a legitimate receiving threat to compliment his abilities. Keith Brown was hurt in the Ole Miss game, and never really recovered, and no legitimate receiving threat appeared the rest of the year (aside from Stover in the Iron Bowl).

At bottom, opposing teams knew that Hall was all we had, and they put all of their emphasis on stopping him. We threw to Hall 12 times against Tennessee, 17 times against Mississippi State, and 14 times against LSU. Again, opposing defenses knew he was our only real threat down the stretch, but even so they simply could not stop him.

Beyond that, though, the breakdown showed that we didn't exactly throw to Hall in ideal situations. We threw to him a lot on 1st down (36 times), but when we threw to Hall it was almost always in situations where lots of yardage was needed. Granted, that shouldn't be too surprising -- after all, long yardage situations is why you are throwing in the first place -- but it would have been nice if he could have been utilized better. The underlying idea to play-calling is that you should pass when other teams expect a run, and run when the opposing defense expects a pass, and Shula and co. failed miserably at that in 2006 in relation to Hall. Generally speaking, when you have a play-maker wide receiver, you would like to throw him the ball in situations where the opposing defense expects the run, which should free up man-to-man coverage on the outside for your play-maker receiver. We didn't do that at all in 2006. Of the 78 passes to Hall in 2006, only seven of them came with five yards or less needed for a first down. Unfortunately -- another sign of poor play-calling -- we largely threw the ball to Hall when it was obvious we needed to pass.

Beyond all of the foregoing, we must keep in mind one other thing. Hall played almost all of the 2006 season with a serious left shoulder injury, and injury that was severe enough to require off-season shoulder surgery.

Despite all that he had going against him, Hall caught just about everything that was thrown in his general direction. Actually, the play-by-play data at RollTide.com does not list Hall with dropping a single pass that was thrown his way in conference play in 2006, and, moreover, a large chunk of his incompleted passes were desperation throws late in games that were effectively over.

There are no two ways about it. When you break down Hall's performance using advanced statistics, he really was just that good in 2006, and assuming he can stay healthy in 2007, he's going to likely have an even better year, and break essentially every Alabama receiving record.

Hall's big performance is enough to make the case that he is quite possibly the greatest pure wide receiver we've ever had at Alabama.

A Closer Look: 2006 Red Zone Production

2007-07-14T15:39:00.000-05:00

In the last post, I took a closer look at our red zone production in 2006, and today we're going to take an even closer look than that.

Thankfully, the stat compilation company used by by RollTide.com this season provided in-depth play-by-play data of each and every snap, so we can analyze the Crimson Tide on a play-by-play basis. Furthermore, I've analyzed only eight games -- the eight conference games -- for the exact same reasons as mentioned earlier in the post on Pythagorean Wins.

So, after breaking down every red zone play in the conference games, what exactly did I find?

In the eight conference games, we ran a grand total of 94 plays in the red zone. And, well, those 94 plays were generally pretty damn ugly. All told, in 94 red zone plays, we accumulated only 166 yards of offense, about 1.7 yards per play. Moreover, we scored only seven touchdowns in these 94 plays, meaning we scored, on average, one touchdown per every 13.4 red zone plays.

John Parker Wilson, despite an otherwise solid year, struggled a good bit in the red zone. Yes, he did throw five red zone touchdown passes, but all told he was only 14-29 in the red zone, completing less than 50% of his passes. Moreover, Wilson also had 10 rushes (either scrambles or sacks) on aborted passing plays. All told, Shula and co. called 39 passing plays in the red zone in 2006, and it resulted in only 14 completions. Putting a percentage to it, only a mere 35.8% of called passing plays actually resulted in a completed pass, and the average completion -- in the relative rarity that it did occur -- went for only about four yards. Unfortunately, the much more often result was a sack, a Wilson scramble, a turnover, or an attempted pass that fell harmlessly to the ground.

Beyond that, I went a bit deeper in breaking down our red zone production into more specific categories. I broke down the 94 plays into four regions: from the 20-16, from the 15-11, from the 10-6, and from the 5 to the goal line. Looking at the numbers in that sense brought about some interesting insights.

From the 5-yard line to the goal line, we were atrocious, as expected, gaining only 15 yards off of 18 plays. All told, when inside the five, we netted on average about two feet per play. And the production from the 20-16 was even worse, as we gained only 32 yards off of 31 plays. Even though it's a higher yard-per-play average than from within the five, it's nevertheless worse because positive gains are capped inside the five yard line by a complete lack of room to move the ball much farther, something that is much less of a problem from the 20-16.

Of course, struggles in both areas had a very negative impact on overall point production. The struggles inside the five yard line turned should-be touchdowns into field goals, and the struggles to move ball from the 20-16 inside the 15 not only hurt point production by stopping drives that could have potentially produced touchdowns, but also by making the field goals that had to be kicked more difficult because of increased distance, which is course drives down the likelihood that those kicks will be successful. And the latter impact is far from insignificant. Given the relative inconsistency of college kickers, a field goal five to ten yards further away probably has anywhere from a 10%-25% smaller chance of being good than from one five or ten yards closer to the goal line.

Oddly enough, though, between the 15-6, we did relatively well, and much better than we did from the 20-16 or the 5 to the goal line. In that area, for whatever reason, we averaged around three yards per play, which, while not great, is triple what we averaged from the 20-16 and the 5 to the goal line. I honestly have no clue as to why that was. Perhaps it was just a statistical oddity that would have worked itself out had we seen a larger sample size, but perhaps there was a legitimate reason for the differences in levels of production. If it is the latter, though, I can't think of why that would be the case.

But what about offensive balance?

All we heard all year long, and even up until today, was that one of our main problems in the red zone was that we were not balanced, that we ran the ball entirely too much and got conservative when it counted; opposing defensive coordinators knew what we were doing, and this allowed opponents to effectively stop it. So how does that argument play out?

Once you run the numbers, that argument doesn't seem to have that much validity, despite spirited assertions to the contrary. All told, from the 20-6, we had 71 plays. Of those 71 plays, 39 were runs (54.9%), and 32 were passes (45.1%). And, of course, that 55-45 split is generally the definition of offensive balance in college football. Even when you break it down by individual games, we were still pretty balanced. We weren't too balanced in the Vanderbilt game (ran mostly), the Arkansas game (ran mostly, especially late in the fourth quarter), and the Florida game (passed mostly), but for the other five SEC games, we were really well balanced in terms of play-calling from the 20 to the 6.

At bottom, despite what some people will strongly assert to the contrary, conservatism wasn't the reason we struggled in the red zone. We were atrocious, for the most part, regardless what we did, whether it be run or pass.

From the five yard line to the goal line, it was a bit of a different story. We had 18 plays from inside our opponent's five yard line, 13 runs and 5 passes. Obviously, the play-calling was heavily swayed in favor of running the football, but before you criticize Shula, you have to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of plays inside the five yard line should be running plays. Throwing the football that deep in your opponent's territory is very difficult, and the interceptions that can occur generally yield much higher return yardage for the opposing team than a normal interception. All told, running the football generally yields small, consistent gains, and that is what you need with such a short distance to go.

The problem wasn't, seemingly, the fact that we ran the ball so much from inside the five yard line, it was who we ran it with that was the problem. In conference play, Tim Castille -- out of the dread jumbo package -- got eight carries inside the five yard line (Castille carried the ball on almost 45% of plays inside the five), and those eight carries netted a grand total of five yards. All told, Castille averaged about 20 inches per carry inside the five yard line. In general, with Castille -- a fullback -- plays were very slow to develop, and it gave opposing defenses a lot of time to shoot the gaps and stop the play for little or no gain. At the end of the day, hindsight 20/20, a quicker back like Johns or Darby would have likely been the better solution.

The bottom line, the jumbo package should have be re-titled the junk package.

So what all should we take from the analysis? I'd say two things.

One, the play-calling -- or, more precisely, I should say the supposed overly conservative play-calling -- was not, apparently, the problem with our lack of red zone production in 2006. One way or the other, regardless of what we tried in the red zone, it just really didn't work. Running plays were generally stuffed at the line for little or no gain, and passing plays more often than not resulted in incompletions, interceptions, fumbles, or sacks. Our lack of red zone productivity would most certainly not have been improved simply by throwing more passes and opening the offense up more.

Two, however bad you thought our red zone production was in 2006, the statistics show that it was probably much worse than you imagined.

At bottom, after really going in-depth on overall red zone production in 2006, you just appreciate how horrendous it really was. Odds are, we could perform poorly in the red zone again in 2007, and still have red zone production significantly better than in 2006.

Heaven Help Us: Red Zone Breakdown

2007-06-30T19:21:00.000-05:00

The Crimson Tide was atrocious in the red zone in 2006, and no one needs any in-depth analysis to figure that one out. But exactly how bad were we, and how much did it hurt us?

Answering the first question, it was as bad as you think, and then probably worse.

After running the numbers, we made 53 visits to the red zone in 2006. Of those 53 visits, we scored on just over 75% of them (40), which is a good -- but certainly not great -- number. The major problem, of course, was being able to put the ball into the end zone. All told, we only scored 20 touchdowns in 53 trips to the red zone, thus putting it in the end zone on only 37.74% of red zone trips.

It gets worse.

When we look at the eight conference games the Tide played (which, of course, we went 2-6), we made 28 trips to the red zone. Of the 28 times that we got into the red zone in SEC play in 2006, we managed a mere 6 touchdowns. 6 touchdowns in 8 conference games. Long story short, we scored a touchdown on only about 20% of our red zone trips in conference play.

Now let's compare that to LSU, who led the conference in both total offense and scoring offense. Believe it or not, LSU had essentially the same number of red zone trips in conference play that we did (LSU had 30 red zone trips, we had 28). But, of course, they did much more with theirs. All told, LSU scored 22 touchdowns in their 30 trips, and, well, that was a big part of the reason why they led the conference in point production.

So exactly how much did the lack of productivity in the red zone hurt us in terms of wins and losses? Quite a bit, it would seem. With even half-way decent red zone production (say, just to quantify that, 14 touchdowns on 28 trips), our final win-loss record would have been drastically different, and the margin of victory in the games we did win would have gone up as well.

Against Hawai'i, despite us leading all night, it turned out to be a close game, with victory ensured only when a time-expiring Colt Brennan heave to the end zone was intercepted by Lionel Mitchell. We went to the red zone five times that night, and emerged with only one touchdown. With decent red zone production, that game never comes down to a last-second heave.

Against Vanderbilt, the following week, we narrowly edged out a 13-10 victory, at home, over the eventual 4-8 Commodores after Leigh Tiffin booted a 47-yard field goal late in the fourth quarter. During that game, we went to the red zone four times, scored no touchdowns, and came away with only six points. Again, with decent red zone production, that game is never that close; we would have by somewhere in the neighborhood of 14-20 points.

Against Arkansas, two weeks later, five trips to the red zone netted only one touchdown and ten points. Even with slightly better than atrocious red zone production, much less decent production, Alabama wins that game in Fayetteville. Instead, horrendous red zone production turns a sure-win into a one-point loss.

The following week against Florida, two red zone trips netted six points and no touchdowns. Decent red zone production might not have turned this game into a win, but it would have made it very close. Most people forget that this was a 14-13 game with under seven minutes to go in the fourth -- and Alabama having the ball. With decent red zone production, we likely have a 17-14 lead at that juncture, and instead of throwing the football -- which led to a Reggie Nelson interception returned for a touchdown that ultimately doomed us -- we are running out the clock. Again, Florida may still have won, but it would have been a much closer game.

Against Ole Miss -- big shock forthcoming -- we actually had solid red zone production. I've written before that it was probably our best offensive performance, and rightfully so. Four trips to the red zone resulted in 20 points (two touchdowns and two successful field goals). And -- big shock again -- we won this one, though one of the poorest defensive efforts of the year turned it into a very close game.

The following week in Knoxville, poor red zone production was largely responsible for a loss to the hated Volunteers. We had three trips to the red zone, and could muster only one touchdown. With just one more touchdown on the other two red zone trips (again, my definition of half-way decent red zone production), we win that game. Instead of leading 13-9 late, we would have been leading 17-9, and Tennessee would have not only needed to score a touchdown, but successfully complete the two-point conversion just to force overtime.

Against Mississippi State, it was more of the same. Four trips to the red zone netted zero touchdowns and only nine points. In a game ultimately decided by eight points, decent red zone production could have gotten us a win.

One week later against LSU, we played the Bayou Bengals surprisingly tough, but again... red zone woes. We made three trips to the red zone, which netted only ten points. Although this is most likely still a win for LSU with decent red zone production, it would have went right down to the wire in a close contest, particularly if Jamie Christensen could have connected on a first quarter field goal.

Against Auburn, in the Iron Bowl, red zone woes played another big role in our loss. Three red zone trips resulted in only one touchdown, and nine total points. Again, with decent red zone production, we may win that one.

At bottom, red zone woes really killed our 2006 team. It wasn't just that our problems in the red zone hurt us some, they have a drastic effect on our overall win-loss record. We finished the regular season at 6-6, but being quite objective about it, and decent red zone production would have probably given us an 8-4 or 9-3 regular season record, with those losses being very close losses at that. That would have put us, likely, in the Peach Bowl, and Mike Shula would still be the head coach of the Crimson Tide.

The good news though, I suppose, is that with nine starters returning on the offense for 2007, this group should be able to finally break through and translate all of that potential into points.

Scary Similarity: Shula and Stovall

2007-06-22T11:11:00.000-05:00

When Mike Shula was fired days after the 2006 Iron Bowl, the national response was effectively, "Alabama has too high of expectations, and they shouldn't have fired Shula." Many of those making this argument, though certainly not all or even a majority, were the LSU fans. In reality, though, Mike Shula's tenure at Alabama was almost exactly like Jerry Stovall's tenure at LSU. In fact, they are almost so similar that it's a bit scary.

Jerry Stovall was hired in January of 1980 after the tragic death of Bo Rein. After having success at North Carolina State, LSU selected Rein to be the successor to long-time LSU coach Charlie McClendon. However, as the fates would have it, Rein died on January 10th of 1980 when his plane, returning to Baton Rouge from a recruiting trip to Shreveport, apparently lost internal pressure, causing both Rein and the pilot to go unconscious, and the plain ultimately crashed off the Eastern seaboard in the Atlantic Ocean. Needing an emergency hire in a desperate situation, LSU tapped one of its own former players. It wasn't that LSU really wanted Stovall, otherwise they would have hired him in the first place, but he was the best they could do given a difficult situation.

Mike Shula was hired in May of 2003 after Mike Price was fired as a result of his lack of discretion on a night that included a pit stop at the Arety Angel's strip club. At that point, in the midst of probation, Alabama had to make an emergency hire in a desperate situation, and had to tap into its own alumni base. As a result, Mike Shula was selected to be the man at the Capstone. It wasn't that Alabama really wanted Shula, otherwise they would have hired him instead of Price, but he was the best they could do given a difficult situation.

Jerry Stovall was a legendary player at LSU. He was the successor to Billy Cannon, and in 1962 he made the All-America team, and finished second in the Heisman Trophy voting. Only the dazzlings of Oregon State's Terry Baker kept Stovall from hoisting the Heisman at the Downtown Athletic Club.

Mike Shula was a legendary player at Alabama. Although he was never in the league of predecessors such as Starr, Namath, and Stabler, Shula was known for his gutsy play and his legendary comebacks. His last-minute miracle comeback to set up Van Tiffin's 52-yard game winning field goal in the 1985 Iron Bowl will forever be etched in the annals of Alabama football history.

Jerry Stovall, upon taking the LSU job, had no head coaching experience. After Stovall's NFL playing career ended, he became an assistant, and was ultimately an offensive assistant on Charlie McClendon's staff.

Mike Shula, upon taking the Alabama job, had no head coaching experience. After Shula gave up playing football, he moved to coaching and spent the entire time before coming to Alabama as an offensive assistant.

Jerry Stovall had very mixed results in his first two seasons in Baton Rouge. In 1980, he did relatively well, given the circumstances, and went 7-4. In the second season, however, things fell apart, and Stovall went 3-7-1. All told, in his first two years, he only had a winning percentage of roughly 47%

Mike Shula had very mixed results in his first two seasons in Tuscaloosa. In 2003, things went poorly with several close losses, and he went 4-9. The following year, he did relatively well, given the circumstances (tons of injuries), and went 6-6. All told, in his first two years, he had a winning percentage of only roughly 40%.

Jerry Stovall finally found big success in his third season in Baton Rouge. Carrying an undefeated 7-0-1 record late into the season, LSU and Stovall was finally knocked off in a three point loss at the hands of Mississippi State. Shortly thereafter, LSU suffered a disappointing loss to in-state rival Tulane in the last game of the regular season. Nonetheless, though, LSU played in the Orange Bowl, and though they lost a close game to Nebraska, Stovall was nationally lauded for having a great season and putting LSU football back on the map after several years of relative mediocrity.

Mike Shula finally found big success in his third season in Tuscaloosa. Carrying an undefeated 9-0 record late into the season, Shula and Alabama was finally knocked off in a three point loss at the hands of LSU. Shortly thereafter, Alabama suffered a disappointing loss to in-state rival Auburn in the last game of the regular season. Nonetheless, though, Alabama earned a berth in the Cotton Bowl, and beat Texas Tech in a close game. Shula was nationally lauded for having a great season and putting Alabama football back on the map after several years of relative struggles.

Following a successful 1982 campaign, the expectations were quite high for Stovall and his Fighting Tigers in 1983. After a decent start, things soon imploded, and a losing season was guaranteed after a close loss to the Billy Brewer-led Ole Miss Rebels, and another close loss to Alabama in Tiger Stadium. At the end of the year, Stovall was fired. All told, Stovall had a 22-21-2 record at LSU, with a 51.1% winning percentage.

Following a successful 2005 campaign, the expectations were quite high for Shula and his Crimson Tide in 2006. After a decent start, things soon imploded, as the Tide was beaten by quality opponents, and narrowly squeaked by horrible opponents. At the end of the year, Shula was fired. All told, Shula had a 26-23 record at Alabama, with a 53.0% winning percentage.

Long story short, it's really just scary how similar Stovall's tenure at LSU was to Shula's tenure at Alabama. Considering LSU fired Stovall in almost exactly the same situation, they should be the last ones to accuse Alabama of high expectations for firing Shula.

2006 SEC Football: Offensive Sack Rates

2007-06-21T23:11:00.000-05:00

We often hear in traditional media outlets about how certain offensive lines are good because they allowed such a few number of sacks, and others are poor because they allowed so many sacks, but in reality that approach is inherently flawed. Since sacks allowed is a cumulative statistic, people tend to just look at the final number and fail to put that number in any real context. What is almost overlooked is the effect the number of passes thrown have on how many sacks an offensive line will allow.

For an absurd example, say one team gives up 10 sacks in 150 passing attempts while another team gives up 20 sacks in 400 passing attempts. An initial analysis would say the former offensive line is much better, but once you consider passing attempts, the latter was a better pass blocking line.

So how did SEC teams stack up in 2006 in terms of offensive sack rates? Here are the numbers broken-down:

Another important factor to consider is not only the number of sacks allowed, by also how many yards were lost on average per sack. So how did SEC teams stack up in 2006 in terms of average yards lost per sack? Here are the numbers broken-down for that:

We see some pretty interesting things when we go beyond surface-deep. Just a few random notes:

The Alabama line was generally thought of as absolutely terrible in 2006. And, while it wasn't very good, it was probably a bit better than most expected. If you had told an Alabama fan immediately after the season was over that we had the eighth best line in the conference in terms of pass protection, nearly everyone would have probably said they were being very overrated. In reality, that's exactly what they were.

The real trouble with the Alabama line was the average yards lost per sack, 7.29, which was 11th in the conference. The good news, however, is that number is probably more indicative of the play-calling on Shula's behalf. All year long, I bemoaned about the lack of three and five step drops; almost everything was a seven-stop drops, which made our already relatively poor offensive line have to pass block even longer. As a result of the long drops, when sacks did occur, they were generally for more yardage. More three and five step drops in 2007 will hopefully ameliorate that problem.

Auburn was dead last in the conference in sack rate, and actually by a very wide margin. I believe most of that could be chalked up to Brandon Cox's lack of mobility following ankle injuries early in the season. However, Auburn was second in the conference in average yards lost per sack, and this is largely the result of so many quick and short passes called by the Auburn offense. Without doubt, a large amount of credit must go to the Auburn coaching staff here. Faced with an immobile quarterback, they shifted their offensive gameplans to include more short drops and quicker throws. Good job by Borges and company.

The Arkansas offensive line was generally regarded as a great run blocking line, but a poor pass blocking line. In reality, though, they pass blocked very well in 2006. They had the second lowest sack rate in the conference, and they allowed the second fewest average yards lost per sack. Certainly, a great deal of credit goes to the strong running game, which yielded a lot of playaction passing, but the fact remains that they consistently got the job done, even though they were protecting for a true freshman quarterback almost all season.

Tennessee was simply great up front, leading the conference in offensive sack rate, even though they had to face a non-divisional opponent in LSU that was first in the conference in defensive sack rate, all with a backup quarterback. David Cutcliffe got almost all of the credit for re-invigorating the hapless Erik Ainge, but the offensive line should get a good deal of credit. Teams knew Tennessee was going to throw it a lot (second most pass attempts of any team in the conference), yet they stood up and passed the test anyway.

Georgia, much like Arkansas, did a very good job of protecting a true freshman quarterback. They finished third in offensive sack rate, despite not having the greatest of rushing attacks. Much of the success in pass protection came from the tackles, Daniel Inman and Ken Shackleford, both of which will not return in 2007. Inman was one of the best linemen in the conference, and he started 48 games in his career for Georgia. If the Georgia line falls off in pass protection in 2007, the loss of Inman and Shackleford will be the likely reason why.

LSU presents an interesting case study. They finished fourth in the conference in offensive sack rate, and that may seem a bit low considering JaMarcus Russell was the quarterback. Russell is often considered almost un-sackable, and that was one reason he went so high in the NFL Draft. So you would expect that to be a bit better. However, on the other hand, while they were fourth, they were very close to first overall, so it's probably best if we don't pay much attention to that. Then, beyond that, they were dead last in the conference in average loss per sack allowed. But maybe that makes sense, too. The 2006 LSU offense was based almost solely on a deep passing threat, and all of the deep passes (which require deep drops and long times to develop) should result in some big sacks for losses. Still, though, for LSU, they remain an interesting case study, particularly in 2007. Most of the offensive line returns, but they will be switching from an offense predicated upon the deep pass to an offense that has a much higher emphasis on short, quick throws, and the mobility of the quarterback should go up a bit. LSU probably has the greatest transition to make in terms of differences in what their line must accomplish in 2007.

Pythagorean Projection: Alabama Football

2007-06-21T12:34:00.000-05:00

The Pythagorean Projection is an approximation of how many games a particular team should have won in a particular season that is determined solely by focusing on points scored and points allowed. First created by revolutionary baseball thinker Bill James, the Pythagorean Projection has been equated to many other sports, such as football and basketball.

The basic formula for the Pythagorean Projection is as follows:

For football, the basic formula remains relatively the same. However, Daryl Morey of STATS, Inc. found that for football, the best exponent is not 2, but 2.37, so the formula is slightly tweaked for football.

But what all does it mean? If a team wins fewer games than its projection said it should have, that team underachieved, and if a team wins more games than they should have, that team underachieved. But exactly what does that mean? Well, the Projection can mean different things to different people, but it is generally accepted that, more than anything else, Pythagorean Projections are mainly an indicator of lucks. Teams that overachieve are said to be "lucky" and teams that underachieve are said to be "unlucky." And truthfully, that's probably the foremost thing we should take from this. However, baseball researchers have found two other variables that have an impact besides luck: coaching decisions and bullpen depth. Obviously, there's no bullpen in football, but that could be construed as a measure of overall team depth, and obviously coaching decisions come into play.

So how has the Crimson Tide stacked up in terms of the Pythagorean Projection the past few years? Let's have a look-see.

To begin with, I should note that I only analyzed eight games in most seasons, and only seven in 1990 and 1991. Why only analyze seven or eight games when you play eleven or twelve regular season games? The reason I did so was because I found that when you look at all games played, the Pythagorean Projection seems to be a bit inflated, as teams never seem to win as many games as they should have. Something didn't seem right to me when I ran the numbers that way, and then it suddenly dawned on me that the reason it was happening because all of the weak opponents an SEC program will play in a season. For example, you play Division 1-AA Western Carolina, and you win 52-0, and suddenly your Pythagorean Projection shoots up dramatically. But why should you get credit for beating an East Popcorn State? In MLB, where the Pythagorean Projection has its roots, you don't have East Popcorn States because all MLB teams only play other MLB teams, where the talent levels are much closer, and as a result the Projections are much more accurate. Obviously, if you started counting results from when the Chicago White Sox play the Birmingham Barons, the projections would lose a good bit of their accuracy, and that is essentially what happens when a team like Alabama plays Western Carolina.

So, to get around all of that, I used solely regular season conference games. As a result, the Projections became much more accurate. And hence why there are only seven and eight conference games. Since 1992, the SEC has played eight regular season conference games, and seven were the norm before the expansion of the SEC in 1990 and 1991.

So what do we see about the Crimson Tide?

I noticed that some of the teams that I felt really underachieved were actually some of the ones that underachieved in the Pythagorean Projection. Just to name a few...

1990: You never hear it mentioned, but in actuality the 1990 defense allowed exactly as many points as the 1992 defense. The offense, though, really struggled with a tough schedule and injuries. Siran Stacey, the star of the offense, went out for the year with a torn ACL on the first play from scrimmage in the season opener against Southern Miss, and that really turned the Tide offense stagnant. As a result, the Tide lost narrow games against Georgia and Florida (Spurrier's first year) when the offense couldn't get it going.

2000: The 2000 team underachieved quite a bit, obviously. Some people think of that season as a pure disaster, and it was, but people often forget just how close we were to winning several games. We lost in Fayetteville to Arkansas when two very controversial penalties kept their game-winning drive alive, lost to Central Florida by two points, and lost to LSU in Baton Rouge by two points.

2004: The 2004 season was, in a lot of ways, a clone of the 1990 season. The torn ACL by Brodie Croyle basically ended the season, and we lost a ton of close games due to an impotent offense. In both years, atrocious offensive output spoiled great defensive efforts.

The same goes for a few of the overachievers:

1991: Stallings' second squad went 11-1, but even I questioned how good we were during that time. In the second game of the season, we were annihilated 35-0 in Gainesville by Florida, in what is still the most dominating performance I've ever seen against an Alabama squad. From there, we had a ton of squeaker wins, such as a five point win over 9-3 Tennessee, a six point win over 7-5 Mississippi State (Danny Woodson's last game, I believe), a three point win over 5-6 Memphis, a seven point win over 5-6 Auburn, and a six point win over 8-3-1 Colorado. We were a good team that year, but you don't win that many close games without a good bit of luck on your side.

1994: Going into the 1994 SEC Championship Game, we were 11-0 and 3rd in the country. But we probably weren't that good, to be brutally honest. We looked sloppy in a 17-7 win over Vanderbilt, and Arkansas gave us trouble in Fayetteville, as we won only 13-6 over a 4-7 Danny Ford team. It took a career night from Jay Barker, at home, and luck from the Field Goals Gods on a Michael Proctor kick late in the first half for us to pull out a narrow 29-28 victory over a 6-4-1 Georgia team. We won two road games by a combined four points against solid Mississippi State and Tennessee teams. Finally, we held on to beat Auburn in the closing seconds after their furious comeback ended when Frank Sanders was stopped inches short on a 4th and 6. Again, you just don't do something like that without a good bit of luck on your side.

1999: The 2000 collapse shocked everyone, but should have really shocked no one. We had a projection of a mere five wins in 1999, yet went 7-1 in conference play and won the SEC. The 1999 season, all together, was full of close wins. After squeaking by Arkansas, the Gators had us beat in Florida until we got very lucky with a muffed Florida punt return with under two minutes to go and the Extra Point Gods decided to shine on us twice in overtime. A week later, it was another narrow win over a solid Ole Miss team, led by Deuce McAllister and Romero Miller. After a loss to Tennessee, we faced LSU, a team in the midst of a seven-game losing streak that had blown blown out by the likes of Kentucky, yet we needed a time-expiring Goal Line stand to beat the hapless Dinardo-led Bayou Bengals, in Bryant-Denny. Two weeks later, we trailed Auburn for three quarters, and pulled out a victory only after a ~~dumb play call by Tommy Tuberville~~ great play by Kindal Moorehead to sack Ben Leard for a safety after Auburn held on fourth and goal, and Shaun Alexander re-emerged for the first time in weeks to run wild on the Auburn defense in the last stanza. Long story short, it shouldn't have surprised many that we fell apart in 2000, it was a wonder all along that we won that many games in 1999.

A few other notes...

As noted earlier, bullpen depth seemingly changes the difference between actual and expected wins, so you would think overall team depth in football would do the same. So what about when we were on probation? In 1997-1999, the years most thought would be the worst from the probation era, we overachieved twice in three years. On the other hand, from 2004-2006, the years most thought would be the worst from the second probation era, we underachieved three straight years.

Also as mentioned earlier, the quality of coaching decisions can change the difference between actual and expected wins. Unfortunately for former coach Mike Shula, in his four seasons, we underachieved all four years. Maybe the baseball people have it right when it comes to coaching. After all, luck is probably a big part of the Pythagorean Projection, but I'm sure it's not the only variable.

The 2002 squad really was a great one. Although we lost to Georgia in a narrow game at Bryant-Denny (without our starting quarterback), we actually had more Pythagorean Wins than the Dawgs did in the 2002 season. It just reinforces the fact that we all missed out on a great SEC Championship game. And although it shows the 2002 team as underachieving (we had a projection of roughly seven wins, but won only six), I wouldn't look at them as underachievers. We had a projection of seven wins, and going into the Auburn game we had six wins, coming off of a 31-0 blowout of LSU in Tiger Stadium. Long story short, we were on pace to nail the projection... and then Dennis Franchione decided he was going to be an Aggie, and missed team meetings all week. The lack of preparation resulted in an Iron Bowl loss, and that caused us to underachieve. But did we really? Not in my book.

2006 Season: How Johns Was Under-Utilized

2007-06-20T10:40:00.001-05:00

As mentioned in the previous post, it was much the debate last Fall over whether or not Jimmy Johns was being utilized correctly. After charting every carry Johns had last season over the course of our ten big games, we can take a much closer look at that.

Against Hawai'i, Johns had seven carries in the first half. All seven carries were successes when judged by the Running Back Success Rate, and the seven carries resulted in a grand total of 56 yards, thus averaging eight yards per carry. Moreover, five of the runs either went for a first down, or put the Tide within one yard of a first-down. Yet, for some reason, after picking up nine yards on a second and ten in the second quarter, Johns didn't see another carry until the fourth quarter, and ultimately that carry would be his last of the evening.

The following week against Vanderbilt, it was more of the same. Johns had five carries in the first quarter, three of which were successes, and they ground out 25 yards of rushing. After the initial success in the first quarter, though, Johns didn't see another carry until mid-way through the third quarter, which resulted in a fumble (backup-itis?). All told, after his hot first quarter start, Johns saw two carries the rest of the day.

Against Arkansas, it was another solid start, with four carries for 18 yards in the first half. Then, inexplicably, he dropped off the map. After that, Johns only saw one carry (a draw play on a 3rd and 26) before finally being inserted at the end of the fourth for some token carries to run out the clock, and presumably set up a successful Leigh Tiffin field goal.

Against Ole Miss, more of the same. Johns started out with 29 yards off of just four carries, three of which were successes, in the first quarter. From that hot start, he only saw one carry the rest of the day.

Against Tennessee, Johns was hot early yet again. He had three carries in the first half for 38 yards, including a 26 yard scamper. All three carries were successes, and either picked up first downs for the Tide or put them within two yards of a first down. Yet, after the hot first half start, Johns didn't see another carry for the rest of the day.

Same thing again when we played LSU. Johns started out with four carries for 25 yards in the first half, two of which were successes. Yet, after another good start in the first half, Johns never saw a carry in the second half.

Finally, it all culminated in the Independence Bowl, where Johns again looked good early. In the first half, Johns had 38 yards off of just five carries, four of which were successes. Yet, after the initial first half success, Johns only saw one carry in the entire second half, and if my memory is correct, that was an attempt at a bit of a gimmick play.

The story just keeps repeating itself. Johns would have a lot of success on carries in the first half, and then Shula would rarely, if ever, call his number in the second half.

In the seven games I just mentioned, Johns had 33 first half carries for 229 yards. On average alone, that's 6.93 yards per carry, but moreover, an amazing 24 of his 33 carries were successes, giving him a success rate of 72.72%. Long story short, Johns' productivity on the limited first half carries he had was simply incredible.

And then Shula, for whatever reason, decided Johns shouldn't get the time of day in the second half. All told, despite the great production in the first half from Johns, Shula rewarded him by giving him less than 10 second half carries over a seven game stretch. Even with a stagnant offense and an even more stagnant running game, Shula chose to keep what was statistically by-far his best back on the sideline.

Small wonder Shula is no longer at the Capstone, and an even smaller wonder that he is not calling plays with his new position with the Jacksonville Jaguars.

Analyzing Jimmy Johns

2007-06-19T22:27:00.000-05:00

Jimmy Johns and his performance in 2006 was very much the hot topic of discussion last Fall. For months, almost from the first snap of the Hawai'i game to the end of the Independence Bowl, Darby v. Johns debates filled Alabama message boards and other mediums of football discussion. Of course, the performance of Johns is not purely one of past relevance for the Crimson Tide. With Darby gone, Johns has the most experience of any returning back, and his performance will likely be a key determinant of the success in our rushing attack in 2007.

Thus, I decided to break down John's performance in the 2006 season.

Just scratching the surface, using the standard statistics, Johns logged 66 carries for 293 yards, and thus averaged 4.4 yards per carry. He had one touchdown, and his longest run from scrimmage was 26 yards. Of course, the purpose of this blog is to go much deeper than anything you will find in a traditional stat-line, so let's start delving further right now.

For starters, I charted every carry that Johns had in ten games this season. The eight games included the standard eight conference games, the season opener against 11-2 Hawai'i, and the Independence Bowl vs. Oklahoma State. I chose to ignore the results from the Duke game and the Florida International game, mainly because both were such terrible teams (0-12 each), and many of the carries by Johns in both games came from the quarterback position where he was running Shula's variant of Meyer's Tim Tebow package, which does us little or no good in evaluating Johns' effectiveness as a tailback.

All told, in those ten games, Johns accumulated 51 carries for 274 yards. However, I decided to omit three of those carries for a variety of reasons (one was a halfback pass gone bad, another was a draw play on third and 25+, and the other was an intentional carry solely to move the ball to the middle of the field at the end of a half). Once adjusted for those carries, Johns carried the ball 48 times for 267 yards, thus averaging 5.56 yards per carry.

Impressive as that yard-per carry number may be, Johns' performance looks better the deeper we go.

Football Outsiders came up with Running Back Success Rate in order to take down and distance into account in whether or not a particular run is successful. Long story short, a run is considered successful if it generated 40% of yards needed for a first down on first down, 60% of yards needed on second down, and 100% of yards needed on third and fourth downs. Obviously, the higher the success rate for a tailback, the more he consistently picks up the needed yardage, and the lower the success rate for a tailback, he's less consistent in picking up the needed yardage. In the NFL, a success rate of 50% or higher is considered very good, while a success rate of 40% or lower is considered very poor. So how did Johns stack up? Of his 48 runs, 28 were successes, which means he had a whopping 58.33% success rate. Though I would imagine success rates for good backs in college football tend to be a bit higher than in professional football (due to greater disparities in talent between good and bad players), a success rate of almost 60% would be considered very high. Any time a player, at any level, can create a successful play almost 60% of the time he touches the ball, it's speaks highly of that particular player, especially when he does so with an offensive line as poor as the line we had in 2006.

Beyond that, Johns did an exceptional job of limiting negative plays. Football Outsiders, again, came up with a statistic to measure negative plays by tailbacks, called the Stuffed Rate. Technically, a back is "stuffed" if he gains zero or negative yards on first down, or if he gains less than one-fourth of the yards needed for another first down on second and third down. Using that metric, Johns was again impressive. Of his 48 carries, he was stuffed a mere 6 times, for a Stuffed Rate of only 12.5 percent. Again, a very impressive statistic that speaks volumes of Johns performance. On the whole, studies have indicated that backs that consistently gain positive yardage have a higher value than backs who are more boom and bust -- those who have big gains sprinkled in with several no gains and negative plays, and that seems to fit Johns to a T. All told, he consistently gained positive yardage at a very high rate all season.

Another thing to consider, largely on those lines, is how a few long gains can impact a back's average. In reality, a couple of very long gains in a season when a back has a relatively few amount of carries can change a tailback's yard-per-carry average by two yards or more (Tide fans may well remember when Santonio Beard averaged over 7 yards per carry in 2001 when that very thing happened). As a result, a few big gains skew the data to make it seem like a particular back consistently gained more yardage, when in reality he wasn't as good, but had a couple of big runs along the way (Again, Beard, 2001). You can get around that, statistically speaking, by capping the runs of more than 10 yards and just counting them as a 10-yard run. For example, a 75-yard run goes down statistically as a 10-yard run. So what effect does that have on Johns' performance? Again, Johns performs well here. Johns had 6 carries of 11 yards or more in 2006, and once you cap those runs at 10 yards, Johns ran for 224 yards on 48 carries, which still yields a yard-per-carry average of 4.66. Again, even when you cap the big runs to keep them from skewing the average, Johns still shows through as a consistent yard-gainer almost every time he touched the football.

Let's go one step further by categorizing Johns' carries by yards gain on each individual carry:

Negative to 2 yards: 14 times (29.17%)
3-5 yards: 15 times (31.25%)
6-10 yards: 13 times (27.08%)
11+ yards: 6 times (12.50%)

Again, Johns looks very impressive. Over 70% of his carries went for three yards or more, and right at 40% of his carries yielded six yards or more. Again, the basis is the same: Johns consistently gained good chunks of positive yards each time he touched the football with relatively few negative plays mixed in.

I, for one, have been a bit harsh on Johns and his performance in 2006. However, perhaps next time I should keep my mouth shut before I do a more thorough analysis. After analyzing his season much closer, Johns looked very good in 2006. Certainly, he needs to improve greatly on the fundamentals of being a tailback, but even with poor fundamentals, he still had a very solid and productive season in 2006. Much of that, of course, can be chalked up to Johns' amazing physical abilities, something everyone has gushed about since he stepped onto campus over two years ago. Without doubt, Johns has a lot of work to do off the football field, but on the football field he looked very good in 2006.

Judging by his performance in 2006, mixed with his amazing natural abilities, if Johns can get it together off-the-field and with his fundamentals, he seems to have the potential to be a truly great back.

Offensive Unbalance

2007-06-19T00:11:00.000-05:00

One of the most insightful indicators of offensive balance is the play-calling on first down. With first down and ten, head coaches and offensive coordinators can literally do whatever they want without being overly influenced by more extreme down and distance situations. Quite obviously, given freedom to generally do as they please, it becomes of the utmost importance for coaches to find offensive balance on first and ten. By looking at run / pass ratios on first downs, we can see which teams were the most balanced, and moreover, by looking at which plays teams called in the first half on first downs (where they are less influenced by trying to play catch-up late in games with lots of passes, or trying to run out the clock with several runs), we can get an even purer look at offensive balance.

So how did the Crimson Tide stack up in 2006 in terms of offensive balance in first downs?

Unfortunately, not too well. For the entire season, we were very balanced offensively, with 112 running plays and 111 passing plays on 223 first down plays. Statistically speaking, that's 50.2% run, and 49.8% pass. Balanced, anyone?

However, looking more closely at the individual games, the Tide was, generally speaking, unbalanced offensively, and very unbalanced on first downs in the first half. At times, we ran the ball entirely too much, and at others we threw the ball entirely too much; rare was the occasion in which we achieved any real balance.

Against Vanderbilt, we ran 59.26 percent of the time on first down, and 75% of the time on first down in the first half. Two weeks later against Arkansas in Fayetteville, we ran the ball on 70.37% of first downs, and 64.29% of first downs in the first half. Although the total number of runs were inflated by an attempt to grind out the clock late in the game with hand-offs to Ken Darby, the first half numbers show that we were running the ball at almost a 2-1 ratio even then. It was the same story when we played Tennessee in Knoxville, when we ran the ball 72.73% of the time on first down in the first half.

On the other hand, on a couple of occasions we threw the ball entirely too much. Against Florida, on 29 first down plays, we threw the ball 21 times, i.e. 72.41% of the time. More amazingly, in the first half we had 13 first down plays, and threw the ball on 12 of them. Small wonder we managed a net of only six offensive points in that game. Later in the year, against LSU in Baton Rouge, we threw the ball 73.68% of the time on first down. Of the 19 first down plays that occurred in the first half, we ran the ball only 5 times.

Honestly, the only SEC game that we found a good balance on first down was the Ole Miss game. There, in the first half, we had twelve first down plays, and ran the ball six times and threw the ball six times. As an entire game, we ran the ball a good bit more on first down than we threw it, but that was because Ken Darby took over in the second half and found great success. Certainly no blame can be found there for continuing to give the ball to Darby.

At bottom, the point production was atrocious in 2006, and that was due to a large variety of reasons. However, breaking down the run/pass ratios, we can see one of the major problems of the 2006 offense was a complete lack of offensive balance in conference games. Long story short, the offense was just so predictable in terms of play-calling, and that, too, likely had a very negative impact on overall production. It wasn't the only problem, of course, but it was one problem.

Hopefully the new Saban / Applewhite offense will be able to find the play-calling balance that the Shula offense couldn't find in 2006.

Welcome

2007-06-18T23:35:00.000-05:00

Welcome to Outside The Sidelines.

This blog is a bit of a pet project that seeks to provide in-depth statistical analysis attempting to find the real reasons why teams win and lose, and also to determine what really happened during the course of a game. To be very straightforward, if you are looking for cliches and the like, you are probably not in the right place.

Long story short, this blog will very much be in the mold of the Moneyball analyses, such as Football Outsiders, and others.

The blog will focus mainly on my beloved Alabama Crimson Tide, but it will also focus somewhat on other SEC teams, and might occasionally even focus on other college football teams outside of the SEC.

Posts should be coming shortly. I hope everyone enjoys.